1、 全球金融危機期間日本中小企業融資： 來自公司調查的證據 在遠和上杉威一郎 摘 要 從一個獨特的公司的調查數據使用，本文考察了日本小型和中型企業（SME）在日本的全球金融危機期間的融資。本文的主要調查結果是雙重的。首先，在信貸供應方面，由主要銀行提供的擴張貸款是大多數日本中小企業應對危機的“第一道防線”。相反，由公司的主要供應商所提供貿易信貸的作用相對有限。該政府在應對這場危機緊急出臺信貸擔保（ECG）計劃也有助于增加信貸投放。其次，在企業的事后條款性能，由公司的主銀行提供的貸款延長和政府政策措施支持的貸款支持延長沒有任何可衡量的影響。而獲得這些貸款的企業平均盈利能力的惡化超過了這些公司200

2、9年沒有獲得貸款時的水平，這兩個群體之間的差異在2010年后消失。 中圖分類號：G21，G28，G30，G38 關鍵詞：中小企業融資，主要的銀行，貿易信貸，信用擔保 1 簡介 當全球金融危機在雷曼兄弟這個很大的投資銀行于2008年9月破產后爆發 ， 導致日本經濟陷入嚴重的衰退。在與美國和歐洲銀行的對比，日本的銀行由于持有大量債務抵押債券或信用資產負債表衍生產品掛鉤于美國次級抵押貸款并沒有嚴重損害受苦。盡管如此，日本經濟保持著連續四個季度負的GDP增長率記錄，從2008年第二季度到2009年第一季度，日本的出口由于經濟大衰退急劇下降。雖然許多中小型企業（SMEs）的并沒有直接出口，他們不過被通過

3、沖擊其交易伙伴受到嚴重影響，即客戶，供應商和貸款人。 本文的目的是在提供日本中小企業在全球金融危機融資的概述。為此，我們使用一個公司的調查數據集的描述性統計數據來研究中小企業在危機期間融資和通過使用這一數據集提供深入討論的經驗研究。特別是，我們重點關注以下三個問題。首先，我們要論證影響中小企業沖擊（需求，供給和金融沖擊）的本質，并研究如何應對公司受到的這些沖擊。其次，我們研究關系貸款（主要銀行），商業上的債權人（主要供應商），和政府在危機時期中小企業融資的的作用。對于政府的作用，我們主要關注在2008年秋季退出的應對這次危機的緊急信貸擔保計劃（）。第三，我們比較信貸可用性和依靠關系貸款 的性能

4、，貿易債權人和政府計劃的中小企業在2008年至2012年的事后表現。我們采用的數據集，是基于經濟研究協會和貿易和工業（經濟產業研究所）兩項調查，它對研究上述問題時特別有用。該問卷調查是通過學者和研究人員，包括我們與經濟產業研究所合作精心構建以匹配實證策略從而來回答有關的研究和政策問題。我們這篇文章中調查的實證研究是為這個深思熟慮的研究設計的產品。在此外，結合經濟產業研究所的調查數據集和從應訴企業在危機發生后的財務數據聲明，目前的研究提供了關于關系貸款人，貿易債權人和政府如何貸和款信貸延長了對于提高信貸的可用性和期間和危機之后提高企業績效是很有用的一個事后評價 。 本文的主要結果，包括用經濟產業

5、研究所的調查所得到的實證研究的結果，現報告如下。首先，我們發現，在在全球金融危機對中小企業融資的影響方面最重要內容是通過對客戶的需求沖擊而不是任何供給面的融資沖擊。為了應付需求面沖擊，許多中小企業依靠銀行貸款，尤其是通過他們的主要銀行提供的貸款。由主要供應商所提供的貿易信貸的作用是相對有限的。第二，雖然我們發現，從主銀行貸款對于大多數中小企業來說是應對危機的“第一道防線”，我們也發現，一些企業遇到從他們的主要銀行獲得貸款的困難。后者的一個可能的原因是，這些企業危機前從非主銀行取得事務性貸款，這削弱了它們與主銀行的關系 。我們還發現，銀行突然收緊在危機期間放貸的態度是針對事務性貸款者。第三，雖然

6、我們發現因為非主銀行減少貸款而引起的主銀行貸款增加緊急信貸擔保計劃在增加中小企業在危機中取得貸款可得性很有用，正是主銀行在提供緊急信貸擔保計劃。這一發現表明，公司和銀行保持緊密的關系可能對公共信用擔保的有效性產生負面影響。最后，雖然由主要銀行提供的貸款延長和貸款要不是由任何政府下屬的金融機構提供的或通過政府信貸擔保方案包括緊急信貸擔保計劃提供，一般來說都有助于增加中小企業取得的信貸投放，他們并沒有幫助改善所獲得貸款的這些中小企業的事后表現。接受這些貸款公司的平均盈利能力比公司在2009年沒有接受貸款時更加惡化，而這兩個群體之間的差別 在2010后消失。此外，接受這些貸款公司的員工人數，特別是從

7、主銀行取得的貸款的員工人數比沒有取得貸款的公司減少了更多，特別是再年之后。綜合考慮這些，這些結果表明，主要銀行，政府金融機構，和信用擔保公司借款敦促這些公司通過削減成本的重組增加他們的盈利能力，從而導致在員工數量的減少。然而，該這些企業的盈利能力仍然沒有顯示出任何改善顯著，大概是因為他們的總銷售額也有所下降比例。通過提供貿易信貸主要的供應商也沒有對企業事后的表現產生較大的影響。 在本文的其余部分的結構如下。第2節提供了日本中小企業在全球金融危機期間融資一個概述。第3節說明了經濟產業研究所調查和我們使用的TSR數據庫。部分4檢查來自危機的沖擊的本質與中小企業如何應對它們。第5，6，和7然后分別考

8、察了由主銀行提供，由主要供應商提供貿易信貸貸款，和并由ECG項目擔保的貸款信貸的作用。接下來，第8節調查這些貸款是否有助于增加貸款的可得性，以及提高中小企業的事后表現。第9節總結。 2 日本中小企業在全球金融危機期間融資概述 全球金融危機使日本經濟陷入嚴重的經濟衰退和對很多中小企業造成了負面影響。圖1顯示了從1991年到2012年日本各種不同大小規模的企業的ROA（資產利潤率=營業利潤/總資產），這里公司的大小規模是用總資產來衡量。該圖顯示，自從90年代初“泡沫”經濟的爆發， 繳足資本小于千萬日元這些最小的公司表現出最壞的ROA。此外，由于在它們的銷售額的急劇下降，它們的ROA 在2008年后

9、急劇下降。在此背景下，許多中小企業面臨融資困難，正如由日本央行提供的 公司的財務狀況擴散指數的惡化所表示的那樣。 圖1在這附近 圖2在這附近 雖然全球金融危機對日本經濟的影響經濟是相當大的，增加企業破產的數量是適度的當與21世紀初相比，當時日本經濟由于不良貸款而癱瘓（圖3）。還應當指出，中小企業貸款2008年后沒有出現急速下滑（圖4）。這表明，經過惡化中小企業的財務狀況2008如圖2所示主要是由于企業利潤的下降（即在內部下降基金），而不是由于緊固貸款供應（即，在外部資金的下降），說明銀行通過提供救援資金，可能會在防止全球金融危機傳播到中小企業的沖擊中發揮了作用 - 這個問題，我們會在下文詳細研

10、究。 圖3在這附近 圖4在這附近危機期間銀行對中小企業貸款也沒有下降的原因之一是相比于美國和歐洲的銀行，這次危機對日本銀行的財務健康的損害是相對有限。例如，與證券化產品相關聯的損失額在2008年9月底日本銀行合共為3.3萬億日元，遠低于其總的一級資本（50.0萬億日元）和他們的每年的利潤（61000億日元）.1相比之下，西方銀行掛鉤于證券化產品的損失為均高于日本銀行十倍，從而對它們的資產負債表造成嚴重的損害（圖1-10，日本銀行，2010年a）。另外一個幫助緩解了金融危機的影響的因素是日本央行和政府在應對金融危機時的大規模的干預（見amori等人（2013年）了解詳細信息）。特別是在應對資本市

11、場故障方面，日本央行暫時推出涉及到回購交易和商業票據直接購買措施和企業債的特殊貨幣政策。2此外，在2008年10月底，日本政府擴大了政府下屬金融機構可以擴展的直接貸款的總金額，同時增加了它們被授權直接購買量。此外，關于中小企業融資，政府出臺了緊急信貸擔保計劃。此計劃是有史以來實施的在任何地方都實施的最大的信用擔保問題之一，當該計劃在2011年4月結束時總擔保的金額達到27.1萬億日元（約300十億美元）。除了金融爆發之后采取這些政策措施 ，日本政府2009年12月實施了利融資的中小企業（簡稱“中小企業融資法”以下）上臨時法案措施，然而大多數的危機之后出臺的政策措施，旨在方便為中小企業提供新貸款

12、，中小企業融資法案旨在減輕現有中小企業貸款的債務負擔。具體而言，中小企業融資法案要求金融機構使客戶通過借款人的中小企業積極響應的請求修訂其最大努力貸款合同條款，通常表現為推遲償還貸款的形式。為了鼓勵金融機構接受借款人這樣的請求，只要借款人作出修訂貸款可信的業務重組計劃（或致力于使業務重組計劃一年之內），就在法律允許不將上述貸款歸類為不良貸款。的中小企業融資法案是作為一項臨時措施，是最初計劃在2011年3月結束。然而它被延長了兩次，最終在2013年3月結束。 企業所能請求申請到的修改貸款貸款條約的累計數 超過了430萬美元，其中其中3和93的請求分別被接受。這種申請被接受的貸款累積量120000

13、0億日元。在這種情況下，需要注意的是，雖然中小企業融資法案可能有助于保持企業破產的數量比否則沒有中小企業融資法案的情況下減少，它也有可能使“僵尸”企業生存（Yamori等人，2013年）。此外，該法案可能會削弱日本銀行的報表的融資公告的透明度和可信度，因為它可能已經向主管報告的真實的貢獻不良貸款的數量。 3 數據集在我們將在下面調查的現在所使用的和先前的研究使用的數據都來自于以下調查： Kinyukikan to no Torihiki Jittai Choss(公司間和公司銀行的交易調查）于2008年2月進行，Kinyukikika ni okeru Kinyukikan to no Tor

14、ihiki Jittai Chosa ( 金融危機期間在公司間和公司銀行間交易的調查）這兩次調查都是在在2009年2月 進行的。調查均是在的經濟研究協會，貿易和工業（經濟產業研究所），一個政府下屬的研究機構下執行的，以下將它稱為“經濟產業研究所調查”。2008年的經濟產業研究所的調查被送往從對由中小企業機構編寫的以前政府調查做出回應的公司中挑選的17018 企業。調查公司隨機從東京商工研究數據庫抽取（以下簡稱TSR數據庫），它是一個商業數據的公司。該TSR數據庫涵蓋了超過1.2萬家日本公司，它保持這對公司的財務報表信息，以及他們的主要特征，包括企業年齡，企業的股權結構，以及銀行與他們的交易身份

15、。受訪企業對2008年的調查數量是6079。 2009年的經濟產業研究所的調查問卷發送到對2008年調查做出回應的公司2008年這里調查不包括拖欠違約。對于5979家公司，該問卷被送到了的 2009年的調查，其中4103家公司做出回應。關于這些樣本公司特性的詳細摘要（日語）和這些調查的結果可以在上杉（2009年）等人研究中發現。 可以明確在這里說，絕大多數受訪企業在2008年調查中的93.5企業和在2009年的調查94.7的企業 - 是不超過300個員工的中小企業 。因此，經濟產業研究所的調查是對于用于檢查中小企業如何度過金融危機是非常有用的。但請注意，這與這些應訴企業的規模分布與含有1701

16、8公司原始樣品公司相比較的略微更圍繞中心。也就是說，無論是落入哪個尾部，非常大的企業，還是很小企業的反應速度，都比它們之間落在中間的企業要低。關于本研究的目的，經濟產業研究所調查的一個顯著特征是，它們會詢問調查的企業一些關于交易伙伴，也就是客戶，供應商和銀行的問題，此外，2009年的調查明確詢問企業自己與交易伙伴的關系如何受到繼雷曼兄弟在2008年秋季破產后的這次金融危機的影響，并在下面我們大多使用的數據集從2009年的調查構造審查交易伙伴在中小企業中的作用融資。此外，經濟產業研究所的調查要求企業確定與他們有貸款余額的最大和第二大的量的兩家銀行。在本文中，我們將吧與公司有突出的貸款金額最大的銀

17、行稱為其“主銀行”，并與一個公司有第二大數額貸款的銀行為稱為其“第二主銀行”。我們也假設一個銀行主要是公司“主銀行”，因而是有關系的貸款人。因為自從2008年秋季雷曼兄弟的破產，已經5年多過去了，我們也可以根據公司的財務報表追蹤應訴企業的信用情況和在危機后的表現變化。這些數據可以從上述的TSR數據庫得到。通過上訴的TSR(交易伙伴)數據庫可以得到。 4 通過交易伙伴和中小企業的回應看危機的影響4.1 危機通過交易伙伴的影響 在全球金融危機通過與交易伙伴各個環節，具體表現形式為客戶的需求沖擊，供應著的供給沖擊，以及銀行的融資沖擊對中小企業造成負面影響。為了理解的在此期間，中小企業面臨的困難的實質

18、，因此量化這些不同的沖擊的相對重要性是重要的。為此，2009年的經濟產業研究所的調查會詢問自從2008年9月全球金融危機之后，公司與自己的關系客戶和供應商，并與他們有最大的放貸貸款余額的有放貸態度的銀行（即他們的主要銀行），第二大貸款余額（第二原發銀行）量等銀行等的關系是否“改良”，“沒有改變”，或“惡化” 。 表1示出了結果，其中該擴散指數（DI）表示的回答與客戶關系變差的企業 是最低的（-24.7個百分點）。 那些回答與交易客戶關系“惡化”的公司的比例更少，D.I.僅登記了-6.8個百分點。最后，在該擴散系數（DL）銀行“貸款的態度 范圍在-3.0個百分點（主要銀行）-8.9個百分點（其他

19、銀行 ）之間變動。總的來說，結果表明，最普遍的沖擊是從客戶需求的的沖擊，而估計的從供應商和銀行發出的沖擊要比以前更少。 SME Financing in Japan during the Global Financial Crisis: Evidence from Firm Surveys Arito Ono and Iichiro Uesugi Employing data from a unique firm survey, this article examines small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) financing in Japan du

20、ring the global financial crisis. The major findings of the article are two-fold. First, in terms of credit availability, loans extended by main banks were the “first line of defense” for most Japanese SMEs to deal with the crisis. In contrast, the role of trade credit provided by firms main supplie

21、rs was relatively limited. The Emergency Credit Guarantees (ECG) program introduced by the government in response to the crisis also helped to increase credit availability. Second, in terms of firms ex-post performance, loans extended by firms main bank and loans backed by government policy measures

22、 did not have any measurable impact. While the average profitability of firms that received these loans deteriorated more than that of firms that did not in 2009, the difference between these two groups vanished after 2010. JEL classifications: G21, G28, G30, G38 Keywords: SME financing, main bank,

23、trade credit, credit guarantees 1. Introduction The global financial crisis that erupted after the failure of Lehman Brothers, a large U.S. investment bank, in September 2008 led the Japanese economy into severe recession. In contrast with U.S. and European banks, Japanese banks did not suffer from

24、severe damage to their balance sheets due to massive holdings of collateralized debt obligations or credit derivatives linked to U.S. subprime mortgages. Nevertheless, the Japanese economy recorded negative GDP growth rates for four consecutive quarters, from the second quarter of 2008 to the first

25、quarter of 2009, as Japans exports fell drastically due to the Great Recession. Although many small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) were not exporting directly, they were nevertheless badly affected via shocks to their transaction partners, that is, customers, suppliers, and lenders. The aim of

26、this article is to provide an overview of SME financing in Japan during the global financial crisis. To this end, we use descriptive statistics from a firm survey dataset to examine SME financing during the crisis and provide in-depth discussions of empirical studies that employed this dataset. In p

27、articular, we focus on the following three issues. First, we identify the nature of shocks (demand, supply, and financial shocks) that affected SMEs and examine how firms responded to each of these shocks. Second, we investigate the role of relationship lenders (main banks), trade creditors (main su

28、ppliers), and the government in SME financing during the crisis period. Regarding the role of the government, we primarily focus on the Emergency Credit Guarantee (ECG) program that was introduced in the fall of 2008 in response to the crisis. Third, we compare credit availability for and the ex-pos

29、t performance of SMEs that relied on relationship lenders, trade creditors, and government schemes from 2008 to 2012. The dataset we employ, which is based on two surveys by the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI), is particularly useful for examining the above issues. The ques

30、tionnaire for the surveys was prepared by academics and researchers including ourselves in cooperation with RIETI and therefore was carefully constructed so as to match empirical strategies to answer relevant research and policy questions. The empirical studies we survey in this article were the pro

31、ducts of this well thought out research design. In addition, by combining the RIETI survey dataset with data from respondent firms financial statements after the crisis, the present study provides an ex-post evaluation of how loans and credit extended by relationship lenders, trade creditors, and th

32、e government were useful in increasing credit availability and improving firm performance during and after the crisis. The major findings of this article, including the results of empirical studies that used the RIETI survey, are as follows. First, we find that in terms of the impact on SMEs the mos

33、t important element of the global financial crisis was the demand shock through their customers rather than any supply or financial shocks. In order to cope with the demand shock, many SMEs relied on bank loans, especially loans provided by their main bank. The role of trade credit provided by main

34、suppliers was relatively limited. Second, while we find that a loan from the main bank was the “first line of defense” for most SMEs to deal with the crisis, we also find that some firms experienced difficulties in obtaining a loan from their main bank. A likely reason for the latter is that these f

35、irms had obtained “transactional” loans from non-main banks before the crisis, which undermined the close relationship with their main bank. We also find that banks that abruptly tightened their lending attitude during the crisis were transactional lenders. Third, while we find that the ECG program

36、was useful in increasing loan availability for SMEs in the midst of the crisis, we also find evidence that increased credit availability as a result of the ECG program was partially offset by a decrease in non-ECG loans when it was a main bank that extended an ECG loan. The finding suggests that clo

37、se firm-bank relationships may have perverse effects on the efficacy of public credit guarantees. Finally, while loans extended by main banks and loans either provided by government affiliated financial institutions or guaranteed through government credit programs, including the ECG program, helped

38、to increase credit availability for SMEs in general, they did not help to improve the ex-post performance of SMEs that obtained these loans. The average profitability of firms that received these loans deteriorated more than that of firms that did not in 2009, while the difference between these two

39、groups vanished after 2010. In addition, the number of employees of firms that received these loans, especially loans from their main bank, decreased more than that of firms that did not, even after 2010. Taken together, these results suggest that main banks, government financial institutions, and t

40、he credit guarantee corporations urged borrowing firms to increase their profitability through cost-cutting restructuring, resulting in a reduction in the number of employees. However, the profitability of these firms nevertheless did not show any significant improvement, presumably because their gr

41、oss sales also declined proportionately. Trade credit provided by main suppliers also did not have a measurable impact on firms ex-post performance. The structure of the rest of the article is as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of SME financing in Japan during the global financial crisis. Se

42、ction 3 explains the RIETI surveys and the TSR database that we use. Section 4 examines the nature of shocks from the crisis and SMEs responses to them. Sections 5, 6, and 7 then respectively examine the role of loans extended by main banks, of trade credit supplied by main suppliers, and of loans g

43、uaranteed by the ECG program. Next, Section 8 investigates whether these loans helped to increase loan availability for and improve the ex-post performance of SMEs. Section 9 concludes. 2. Overview of SME financing in Japan during the global financial crisis The global financial crisis threw the Jap

44、anese economy into severe recession and negatively affected many SMEs. Figure 1 shows the ROA (return on assets = operating profit/total assets) of Japanese firms of various sizes, where firm size is measured in terms of firms capital, from 1991 to 2012. The figure shows that since the burst of the

45、“bubble” economy in the early 1990s, the smallest firms with paid-in capital of less than 10 million yen exhibit the worst ROA. In addition, their ROA further declined sharply after 2008 due to a rapid drop in their sales. Against this background, many SMEs faced difficulties in their finances, as i

46、ndicated by the deterioration in the diffusion index for firms financial position provided by the Bank of Japan. Figure 1 near here Figure 2 near here Although the economic impact of the global financial crisis on the Japanese economy was substantial, the increase in the number of corporate bankrupt

47、cies was modest when compared with the early 2000s, when Japans economy was paralyzed by the bad loan problem (Figure 3). It should also be noted that there was no abrupt decline in loans to SMEs after 2008 (Figure 4). This suggests that the deterioration in SMEs financial position after 2008 seen i

48、n Figure 2 was mostly due to a decline in firms profit (i.e., a decline in internal funds) and not due to a tightening of loan supply (i.e., a decline in external funds), indicating that banks, by providing rescue finance, may have played a role in preventing shocks from the global financial crisis

49、from propagating to SMEs an issue that we examine in detail below. Figure 3 near here Figure 4 near here One reason why bank loans to SMEs did not decline during the crisis period is that the damage to the financial health of Japanese bank through the crisis was relatively limited compared to U.S. a

50、nd European banks. For example, the amount of losses associated with securitized products at the end of September 2008 for Japanese banks in aggregate was 3.3 trillion yen, which was far below their aggregate tier 1 capital (50.0 trillion yen) and their annual profits (6.1 trillion yen).1 In contras

51、t, losses linked to securitized products for Western banks were about ten times larger than those of Japanese banks, resulting in severe damage to their balance sheets (Chart 1-10, Bank of Japan, 2010a). Another factor that helped to alleviate the effects of the financial crisis was the massive inte

52、rventions by the Bank of Japan and the government in response to the financial crisis (see Yamori et al. (2013) for details). Specifically, in response to the malfunctioning of capital markets, the Bank of Japan temporarily introduced extraordinary monetary policy measures that involved repo transac

53、tions and outright purchases of commercial paper and corporate bonds.2 In addition, at the end of October 2008, the Japanese government expanded the total amount of direct loans that government affiliated financial institutions could extend and increased the amount of CP they were authorized to purc

54、hase outright. Further, regarding financing for SMEs, the government introduced the ECG program. This program was one of the largest credit guarantee problems ever implemented anywhere, with total guarantees amounting to 27.1 trillion yen (about 300 billion U.S. dollars) by the time the program ende

55、d in April 2011. In addition to these policy measures taken right after the outbreak of the financial crisis, the Japanese government in December 2009 implemented the Act on Temporary Measures to Facilitate Financing for SME (referred to as the “SME Financing Act” hereafter). While most of the polic

56、y measures introduced after the crisis erupted aimed to facilitate the provision of newloans to SMEs, the SME Financing Act aimed to lighten the debt burden of existingloans to SMEs. Specifically, the SME Financing Act required financial institutions to make their best effort to respond positively to requests by client SME borrowers to amend loan contract terms, typically in the form of deferring loan repayments. In order to provide an incentive for financial institutions to accept such requests from borrowers, the law a