國際商法第五版第七章PPTrayaugust著演示文稿當前1頁，總共71頁。CHAPTER7

TRADEINGOODSTopicsforthischapter:HistoryofContemporaryInternationalTradeLawTheWorldTradeOrganizationThe1994GeneralAgreementonTariffsandTradeMultilateralTradeAgreements7-2當前2頁，總共71頁。HistoryofContemporaryInternationalTradeLaw

Duringthepastsixdecades,therehasbeenamovementawayfromtariffsandquotasandtowardfreetradeamongnations.Therehasbeenashiftawayfromprotectingone’sownbusinessestowardmultilateraleffortstoreducetariffsandothertradebarriers.7-3當前3頁，總共71頁。ProtectionismTheUSraisedtariffsonmorethan900itemsin1930andmajortradingnationsreciprocatedwithsimilarincreases.RooseveltadvocatedloweringtariffsaspartofhisrecoveryplanfromtheGreatDepression.Startingin1934,theUSenteredintobilateraltradenegotiationstomutuallylowertariffs.TheendofWWIIledtoanintegratedinternationalsystemtoencouragetradeliberalizationandmultilateraleconomiccooperation.

7-4當前4頁，總共71頁。TheBrettonWoodsSystem7-5當前5頁，總共71頁。TheBrettonWoodsSystemWassupposedtocreateasystemthatwouldpromotetradeliberalizationandmultilateraleconomiccooperation.Intendedtocreateamultilateralinstitutionalframeworkofrulesandobligationsthroughthreeorganizations:InternationalMonetaryFund(IMF)InternationalBankofReconstructionandDev.(IBRD)InternationalTradeOrganization(ITO)ITOcharterneversubmittedbyPres.TrumantoSenateforconfirmationduetofearthatitwouldbedefeated,harmingU.S.foreignrelations.7-6當前6頁，總共71頁。The1947GeneralAgreement

onTariffsandTradeInsteadoftheITO,thedevelopedmarket-economycountriesenteredintotheGeneralAgreementonTariffsandTrade(GATT)1947,amultilateralagreementthatsetouttherulesunderwhichthecontractingstateswerecommittedtonegotiatereductionsincustomstariffsandotherimpedimentstointernationaltradeingoods.GATT1947cametogovernalmostalloftheworld’strade.

7-7當前7頁，總共71頁。MainPrinciplesofGATT1947Tradediscriminationforbidden.Eachstatehadtoaffordmost-favored-nationstatustoallothercontractingstatesequally;foreigngoodstreatedthesameasdomesticgoodsaccordingtothenationaltreatmentprinciple.Most-favored-nationstatus:WhenaGATTmembernationsetsafavorabletariffrateonaparticulartypeofgoodsimportedfromoneGATTmember,thesametariffratemustbesetonthosegoodsforotherGATTnations.7-8當前8頁，總共71頁。MainPrinciplesofGATT1947Nationaltreatmentprinciple:Oncegoodsarelegallyimported,theymustbetreatedthesamewayasdomesticgoods.Onlybarriersthatonecontractingstatecouldusetolimittheimportationofgoodsfromanothercontractingstatewerecustomstariffs.Thetraderegulationsofcontractingstateshadtobetransparent.Transparent:traderegulationsGATTmembersmustbepublishedandavailabletomembers.7-9當前9頁，總共71頁。MainPrinciplesofGATT1947Customsunionsandfreetradeagreementsbetweencontractingstateswereacceptableforliberalizingtradesolongastheydidnotdiscriminateagainstthird-partyGATTstates.GATTstateswereonlyallowedcertainchargesonimportedgoods:ImporttaxequaltointernaltaxesAntidumpingdutiesCountervailingdutiestocounteractforeignexportdutiesFeesandproperchargesforservicesrendered7-10當前10頁，總共71頁。MultilateralTradeNegotiationsToupdateGATT1947,contractingpartiesparticipatedinmultilateraltradenegotiations(MTNs),whichareknownasrounds.Thefirstfiveroundsweremostlydevotedtoreducingtariffs.Thelastthreecompletedroundsexpandedtohandlenon-tariffmatters.Theeightroundswere:Geneva1947Annecy,France(1949)Torquay,England(1950-1951)7-11當前11頁，總共71頁。MultilateralTradeNegotiationsGeneva(1955-1956)DillonRound–Geneva(1961-1962)KennedyRound–Geneva(1964-1967)EstablishedthepracticeofsettinganagendaanddefiningthetechniquesforGATTnegotiations.Declaredacrosstheboardtariffreductions.Alloweddevelopingstatestonotexercisereciprocitywithdevelopedstates.Producedagreementonantidumping.7-12當前12頁，總共71頁。MultilateralTradeNegotiationsTokyoRound–Geneva(1973-1979)Producedseveralspecialagreements(codes)CustomsvaluationSubsidiesandcountervailingmeasuresAntidumpingStandardsImportlicensingGovernmentprocurement7-13當前13頁，總共71頁。MultilateralTradeNegotiationsTokyoRound(continued)Alsoreachedagreementsinthreespecialsectors:CivilaircraftDairyproductsBovinemeatUruguayRound–infourcities(1986-1994)EstablishedtheWorldTradeOrganizationMeatproductionandexportationhasbeenanissueatmanysessionsofthreedifferentrounds.Photo:?KarissaHamblet7-14當前14頁，總共71頁。Ex.7-2ResultsoftheUruguayRoundMultilateralTradeAgreementsbindingonallmembers.PlurilateralTradeAgreementsonlybindingonstateswhoaccept.7-15當前15頁，總共71頁。TheWorldTradeOrganizationTheWTOisanintergovernmentalorganizationresponsiblefor:Implementing,administering,andcarryingouttheWTOAgreementanditsannexes.ActingasaforumforongoingMTNs.Servingasatribunalforresolvingdisputes.ReviewingthetradepoliciesandpracticesofWTOmembers.7-16當前16頁，總共71頁。TheWTOAgreementTransformedGATT1947,whichwasatradeaccordservicedbyaprofessionalsecretariat,intoamembershiporganization.Theoriginalmembershipof125in1994hasgrowntomorethan150.WTOwascreatedasaunifiedadministrativeorgantooverseetheUruguayRoundAgreements.Doesnotcreateanewsupranationalorganization.Isguidedbytheprocedures,customarypractices,anddecisionsoftheoldGATT.TheWTOhasnomorepowerthanGATTdidunderpreviousagreements.7-17當前17頁，總共71頁。WTOMembershipTheUkraineenteredtheWTOinFebruary2008,bringingthemembershipto151nations.GATT1947membersandEUmemberswereeligibletobecomeoriginalmembers.AnynewmembermustnegotiateentryintotheWTOandbeapprovedby2/3ofthemembers.MembersmaywithdrawfromtheWTOwithsixmonthsnoticetothedirector-general.

7-18當前18頁，總共71頁。StructureoftheWTOTheWTOhasfivemainorgans:aMinisterialConference,aGeneralCouncil(actsasDisputeSettlementBodyandTradePolicyReviewBody),aCouncilforTradeinGoods,aCouncilforTradeinServices,andaCouncilforTrade-RelatedAspectsofIntellectualPropertyRights.AllmembersbelongtotheMinisterialConferenceandtheGeneralCouncil.TheGeneralCouncilnamesthemembersoftheotherorgans.7-19當前19頁，總共71頁。MinisterialConferenceMeetsatleasteveryotheryeartooverseetheoperationoftheWTO.Hasfivestandingcommitteesthatdealwith:tradeanddevelopment;balance-of-paymentrestrictions;budget,finance,andadministration;tradeandenvironment;andregionalagreements.7-20當前20頁，總共71頁。GeneralCouncilCarriesonfunctionofMinisterialConferencebetweenmeetings.Convenestooperateas:WTODisputeSettlementBodyWTOTradePolicyReviewBodyOverseessubordinatecommitteesandtheimplementationandadministrationofthethreemainWTOagreements:GATT94,GATS,andTRIPS.ArrangeseffectivecooperationwithIGOsandNGOsinmattersofinteresttotheWTO.7-21當前21頁，總共71頁。DecisionMakingWithintheWTOTheWTOcontinuesthepracticeofdecisionmakingbyconsensusfollowedunderGATT1947.Consensusisthemakingofadecisionbygeneralagreementintheabsenceofanyvoicedobjection.Adecisioncanbemadebysimplemajorityvoteifaconsensusisnotreached.7=22當前22頁，總共71頁。WaiversAwaiveristherelinquishmentofanobligationowedbyanother.UnderGATT1947,acountrycouldavoidtraderegulationsbygettingawaiver.TheWTOterminatedexistingwaiversin1996.Togetanewwaiver,thememberstatemustdescribethemeasurethatitproposestotake,specifythepolicyobjectivesitseekstoobtain,explainwhyitcannotachievetheseobjectiveswithoutviolatingGATT1994.TheMinisterial

Conferencemustapprove.7-23當前23頁，總共71頁。The1994GATTGATT1994istheAnnextotheAgreementEstablishingtheWTOthatsetsouttherulesunderwhichmembersofthatorganizationarecommittedtonegotiatereductionsincustomstariffsandotherimpedimentstointernationaltradeingoods.GATT1947continuestoexistandcountriesmaybemembersofboth.WTOisguidedbythedecisions,procedures,andcustomarypracticesfollowedbythepartiesoftheGATT1947.7-24當前24頁，總共71頁。DirectEffectDirecteffect:theprinciplewherebyatreatymaybeinvokedbyaprivatepersontochallengetheactionsofastatethatispartytothetreaty.SomeGATT1994provisionsaredirectlyeffective.ProvisionsthatprohibitastatefromtakingactioncontrarytotheGeneralAgreementaredirectlyeffective.WTOheadquartersinGeneva,Switzerland(DrawingcourtesyofM.Nicole,LosAngeles.)7-25當前25頁，總共71頁。Case7-1

FinanceMinistryv.ManifatturaLaneMarzotto,SPAPlaintiffsuedFinanceMinistryforimposinganadministrativeservicesdutyonAustralianwoolitimported.ManifatturaclaimedthatthisdutyviolatedGATT1947ArticleIII(1)(b)asitexceededthedutiessetoutintheAgreement’sannexesandschedules.FinanceMinistryclaimedArticleIII(1)(b)wasnotdirectlyeffective.7-26當前26頁，總共71頁。Case7-1

FinanceMinistryv.ManifatturaLaneMarzotto,SPAHeld:GATTprovisionthatprohibitsGATTmemberfromincreasingdutiesabovetheestablishedlevelswhenmemberaccededtoagreementisdirectlyeffective.ItwaspartofItalianlawandprivatecompanycouldsuetoenforceit.

7-27當前27頁，總共71頁。NondiscriminationThemostfundamentalprincipleofGATT.Internationaltradeshouldbeconductedwithoutdiscrimination.Nondiscriminationenforcedthroughmost-favored-nationandnationaltreatmentrules.7-28當前28頁，總共71頁。TheMFNRuleGATTrequireseachmembertoapplyitstariffrulesequallytoallothermembers.Theruledoesnotapplyto:Theuseofmeasurestocounterdumpingandsubsidization.Thecreationofcustomsunionsandfreetradezones.Restrictionsthatprotectpublichealth,safety,welfare,andnationalsecurity.Developedstatesmayalsoadoptmeasuresthatgivepreferencetodevelopingstates.

7-29當前29頁，總共71頁。PreferentialTreatmentSchemesGeneralizedSystemofPreferences(GSP):Allowsdevelopingcountriestoobtaintariffconcessionsfromadevelopedstateonanonreciprocalbasis.South-SouthPreferences:Allowsdevelopingstatestogranttariffpreferencestoeachotherwithouthavingtograntthemfordevelopedstates.ThesepreferenceschemesoperateasexceptionstotheMFNrule.7-30當前30頁，總共71頁。TheNationalTreatmentRuleOnceimportedgoodsarewithintheterritoryofastate,thatstatemusttreatthosegoodsnolessfavorablythanittreatsitsowndomesticgoods.ArticleIIIrequiresthesamenondiscriminatoryrequirementwithrespecttointernaltaxes.7-31當前31頁，總共71頁。Case7-2

Japan-TaxesonAlcoholicBeveragesCanada,theEU,andtheUScomplainedthatJapanimposedlowertaxesonlocallyproducedalcoholthanitdidonimportedalcoholicbeverages.GATTArticleIII:1states“Thecontractingpartiesrecognizethatinternaltaxes…shouldnotbeimposedtoimported…productssoastoaffordprotectiontodomesticproduction.”Productsimportedfromcontractingpartyshallnotbesubjecttointernaltaxesinexcessofthoseappliedtolikedomesticproducts.7-32當前32頁，總共71頁。Case7-2

Japan-TaxesonAlcoholicBeveragesThePanelfoundthatshochuandvodkawerelikeproducts,andvodkawasbeingtaxedinexcessofshochu.JapanwasrequestedtobringtheLiquorTaxLawintoconformitywithGATT1994.ThePanelalsoapplieditsfindingtoitswhiskey,brandy,rum,gin,genever,andliqueurs.7-33當前33頁，總共71頁。ProtectionOnlyThroughTariffs

Eachmemberstatemayprotectitsdomesticindustriesonlythroughtheuseoftariffsthatmustbecollectedonlyatthetimeofimportation.Quotasarenotallowed.Exceptionstotheprincipleofprotectionthroughtariffsinclude:ImpositionoftemporaryexportprohibitionstopreventcriticalshortagesUseofrestrictionsrelatedtoapplicationofstandardsforclassifying,grading,ormarkingcommodities7-34當前34頁，總共71頁。ProtectionOnlyThroughTariffsUseofquantitativerestrictionsonimportofagriculturalandfisheriesproductstostabilizenationalagriculturalmarketsUseofquantitativerestrictionstosafeguardastate’sbalanceofpaymentsUseofquantitativerestrictionsbyadevelopingstatetofurtheritseconomicdevelopment.TariffreductionsarerecordedatSchedulesofConcessionsannexedtoGATT.AboundtariffraterepresentsthehighesttariffrateaWTOmembermaysetonimportsfromanotherstate.7-35當前35頁，總共71頁。TransparencyTransparencyistheprinciplethatgovernmentsmustmaketheirrules,regulations,andpracticesopenandaccessibletothepublicandothergovernments.Membersmuststrivetosimplifytheirimportandexportformalities.Theseprinciplesareimportanttothewaycountriesclassifyimportsforimposingduties.TheConventiononNomenclaturefortheClassificationofGoodsinCustomsTariffscreatedtheHarmonizedSystemforclassifyinggoodsforcustomspurposes.

7-36當前36頁，總共71頁。RegionalIntegrationGATTencouragesWTOmemberstoparticipatein:Freetradeareas–agroupofstatesthathavereducedoreliminatedtariffsamongthemselvesthatmaintaintheirownindividualtariffsindealingwithotherstates.Customsunions–agroupofstatesthathavereducedoreliminatedtariffsamongthemselvesandhavealsoestablishedacommonexternaltariff.GATTrulesapplytothefreetradeareaorcustomsunionasawholeandnottoitsconstituentstates.7-37當前37頁，總共71頁。CommodityArrangementsCommodityarrangementsareintergovernmentalagreementsregulatingtheproductionandsupplyofprimarycommodities.Primarycommoditiesareproductsobtainedbyextraction(e.g.ironore)orharvest(e.g.coffee)thatrequireminimalprocessingbeforebeingused.Oncefounded,theorganizationscreatedbycommodityagreementsoperateindependently.Theynormallyhaveacouncilmadeupofrepresentativesandapermanentsecretariat.Stabilizationprogramssetquotas,buy/sellatagreeduponprices,andfinancebufferstocks.7-38當前38頁，總共71頁。CommoditiesArrangementsMembersmayparticipateincommoditiesagreementsaslongastheyinvolveboththeimportingandexportingstatesandaresubmittedtotheWTOforapproval.AnIntegratedProgramforCommoditieswasproposedbyUNCTADtoprovideacommonfundtounderwritethecostsofmaintainingabufferstockofprimarycommoditiesasawaytostabilizesupplies.Commoditiesprogramsweresetupforcocoa,coffee,rubber,sugar,andtin,buttheCommonFundhasyettobefunded.7-39當前39頁，總共71頁。EscapeClauseArticleXIXofGATT1994isanescapeclausethatallowsaWTOmemberstatetoescapetemporarilyfromitsGATTobligationswhenthereisasurgeinthenumberofimportscomingfromothermemberstates.Theinjuredstatecanimposeemergencyrestrictivetrademeasures,calledsafeguards.AstateusingtheescapeclausemustnotifyWTO,andnegotiatewithexportingstate,orelsetheexportingstatecanretaliate.7-40當前40頁，總共71頁。ExceptionsGATTunderstoodthatsometimesstatesneedtotakecertainmeasuresasamatterofpublicpolicythatconflictwithGATT’sgoalofliberalizingtrade.ThesearesetforthinGATTasGeneralExceptionsandSecurityExceptions.Examplesofgeneralexceptionsincludemeasuresthat:arenecessarytoprotecthuman,animal,tectnationaltreasuresofhistoric,artistic,orarcheologicalvalue.7-41當前41頁，總共71頁。Case7-3

US—ImportProhibitionofCertainShrimpandShrimpProductsUSrequiredU.S.shrimptrawlvesselstouseTEDsinspecifiedareaswheretherewassignificantmortalityofseaturtlesinshrimpharvesting.Alsobannedimportedshrimpharvestedwithcommercialfishingtechnologywhichmayadverselyaffectseaturtles.AppellatepanelfoundthatanimalspeciesareanexhaustiblenaturalresourceunderGATTSectionXX(g),however:7-42當前42頁，總共71頁。Case7-3

US—ImportProhibitionofCertainShrimpandShrimpProductsEveniftheturtlesareanexhaustiblenaturalresource,theU.S.measuresmustnotbeappliedinamannerwhichwouldconstituteameansofarbitraryorunjustifiablediscriminationbetweencountrieswherethesameconditionsprevail,orasadisguisedrestriction.WTOpanelheldthattheU.Sruleswerediscriminatoryinthattheywereappliedinarigidmannerwithoutregardtomeasurestakentoprotectturtlesbyothernations.Alsoarbitrarydiscriminationduetonohearing.7-43當前43頁，總共71頁。ExportControls—

ProtectionofCulturalPropertySeveralinternationalorganizationshavesponsoredconventionstocontrolinternationaltransferofculturalartifacts.Culturalpropertyismovableorimmovablepropertyofgreatimportancetotheculturalheritageofeverypeople.Theconventionsprohibittheftduringarmedconflict,prohibitimport,export,andtransferofownership,andrequirememberstatestotakestepstoreturnproperty.7-44當前44頁，總共71頁。MaintenanceofNationalSecurityStatesimposerestrictionsonstrategicallyimportantexportsasamatterofnationalsecurity.ThiswasamainfeatureoftheColdWar.In1996,aftertheendoftheColdWar,33countriesapprovedtheWassenaarArrangement.Itcoordinatesnationalpoliciessothattransfersofconventionalarmsanddual-usegoodsandtechnologiestonotcontributetodevelopmentofmilitarycapabilitiesthatundermineinternationalandregionalsecurity.7-45當前45頁，總共71頁。OtherMultilateral

Export-ControlProgramsAustraliaGroup:Concernedwithcurbingtheproliferationofchemicalandbiologicalweapons.ZanggerCommittee:ExportingstateswhowerepartiestotheTreatyonNon-ProliferationofNuclearWeaponsthatseektoharmonizetheirinterpretationsofthetreaty’sexportprovisions.NuclearSuppliersGroup(NSG):Groupofnuclearsupplierstatesconcernedwithlimitingtheproliferationofnuclearweaponsbymaintainingcontrollistsofnuclearexports.MissileTechnologyControlRegime:Tolimittheproliferationofmissilescapableofdeliveringnuclearwarheads.7-46當前46頁，總共71頁。MultilateralTradeAgreementsThereare13otherAgreementsonTradeinGoodsannexedtotheWTOAgreement.Theagreementsdealwith:(1)customsvaluation,(2)preshipmentinspection,(3)technicalbarrierstotrade,(4)sanitaryandphytosanitarymeasures,(5)trade-relatedinvestmentmeasures,(6)import-licensingprocedures,(7)subsidiesandcountervailingmeasures,(8)antidumping,and(9)safeguards.Thesectoralagreementscover(1)agricultureand(2)textilesandclothing.Eachagreementisnowaddressedindividually:7-47當前47頁，總共71頁。MultilateralTradeAgreements—CustomsValuationTheCustomsValuationCodeharmonizesthemethodsusedbyWTOmemberstodeterminethevalueofgoodsthatarechargedatariff.Theprimarymethodofcustomsvaluationistofigurethetransactionvalue.Thisisthecustomsvalueofimportedgoodsthatisbasedonthepriceactuallypaidorpayableforgoodsatthetimetheyweresoldforexport.Ifthiscannotbedetermined,thenfallbackmethodsareused,suchastransactionvalueofsimilaritems,deductivevalue,computedvalue,orderivedvalue.7-48當前48頁，總共71頁。MultilateralTradeAgreements—PreshipmentInspectionTheAgreementonPreshipmentInspectionallowsWTOdevelopingmemberstatestousepreshipmentinspectionstopreventover-andunder-invoicingandfraud.WTOmembersthatusePSImustensurethatcertainconditionsaremet.Examplesinclude:PSIactivitiescarriedoutinnondiscriminatorymannerActivitiesareconductedintransparentmannerInformationreceivedaspartofPSIisconfidential.UnreasonabledelaysareavoidedincarryingoutPSIPriceverificationiscentraltothePSIprocess.7-49當前49頁，總共71頁。MultilateralTradeAgreements—TechnicalBarrierstoTradeTheTBT

AgreementestablishesrulesgoverningthewayWTOmembersdraft,adopt,andapplytechnicalregulationsandstandards.Technicalregulationsaremandatorylawsthatspecifythecharacteristicsofproducts;theprocessesandproductionmethodsforcreatingproducts;andtheterminology,markings,symbols,packaging,orlabelingrequiredforproducts,processes,orproductionmethods.7-50當前50頁，總共71頁。TechnicalBarriers

toTradeStandardsarevoluntaryguidelinesthatspecifythesamethingastheregulations.Conformityassessmentproceduresincludesampling,testing,andinspectingproducts.

Hazardouschemicallabelsareacceptedasapropertechnicalregulation.

7-51當前51頁，總共71頁。MultilateralTradeAgreements—

SanitaryandPhytosanitaryMeasuresTheSPSAgreementdefinesthemeasuresthatWTOmemberstatesmaytaketoprotectlifeandhealthofhumans,animals,andplants.Foralmost10years,theUSandseveralothercountriesbattledanEUbanonbiotechfoodsandothergeneticallymodifiedfoodproducts.TheWTOpanelruledthatthebanonsuchfoodslackedthenecessaryscientificprooftobejustifiedundertheSPSAgreement.7-52當前52頁，總共71頁。Case7-4

Australia—MeasuresAffectingImportationofSalmonAustraliaputquarantineonfresh,chilled,orfrozensalmonfromCanadatopreventtheintroductionofanyinfectiousdisease.Australiaallowedherringandliveornamentalfishtobeimported.WTOAppellateBodyruledthatAustraliaviolatedGATTbyadoptingarbitraryorunjustifiabledistinctionsinthelevelsofsanitaryprotectionsitconsideredtobeappropriateindifferentsituations.Australianactionwasnotbasedonscientificorriskassessmentandwasadisguisedrestrictiononinternationaltrade.7-53當前53頁，總共71頁。MultilateralTradeAgreements—TradeRelatedInvestmentMeasuresTheTRIMsAgreementforbidsprovisionscommonlyfoundinforeigninvestmentlawsthatdiscriminateunfavorablyagainstforeignersandimposequantitativerestrictionsontheuseofforeignproductsbyforeign-ownedlocalenterprises.Examples:Includelocalcontentrequirements,requirementsthatrestrictthevalueofanenterprise’simportsbylinkingthemtothevalueofitsexports(trade-balancingrequirements)orbycorrelatinganenterprise’saccesstoforeignexchangetoitsforeignexchangeearnings.7-54當前54頁，總共71頁。MultilateralTradeAgreements—ImportLicensingProceduresTheAgreementonImportLicensingProceduresrequiresthattheimport-licensingproceduresofWTOmemberstatesbeneutralintheirapplicationandthattheybeadministeredinafairandequitablemanner.Formsandproceduresaretobeassimpleaspossible.Applicantsshouldonlyhavetodealwithasingleadministrativeagency.Licensesarenottobedeniedduetominorerrorsinfillingouttheapplication.7-55當前55頁，總共71頁。MultilateralTradeAgreements—AntidumpingTheAntidumpingCodeallowsWTOmemberstatestocounterdumpingbytheapplicationofantidumpingduties.Dumpingisdefinedas:Aproductisconsideredtodumpediftheexportpriceoftheproductexportedfromonecountrytoanotherislessthanthecomparableprice,intheordinarycourseoftrade,forthelikeproductswhendestinedforconsumptionintheexportingcountry.7-56當前56頁，總共71頁。Case7-5

NipponSteelCorp.v.USLengthyandcomplicatedantidumpingcasethatinvolvedfourTradeCommissiondeterminations,fouropinionsfromtheCourtofInternationalTrade,andtwoopinionsfromtheU.S.CourtofAppeals,spanningaperiodofoversixyears.Nippondumpedtin-andchromium-coatedsteelsheetsintheUS.Mainissueswerewhetherthedumpingmateriallyinjuredadomesticindustryandaffectedprices.7-57當前57頁，總共71頁。Case7-5

NipponSteelCorp.v.USRulingoftheCourtofInternationalTradewasreversedandtheCommission’sfactualfindingsofmaterialinjuryandpriceeffectwerereinstated.

7-58當前58頁，總共71頁。MultilateralTradeAgreements—

Subsidiesand

CountervailingMeasuresAsubsidyisafinancialcontributionmadebyagovernmentthatconfersabenefitonanenterprise,agroupofenterprises,oranindustry.Examplesofsubsidiesinclude:GrantsandloansLoanguaranteesTaxcreditsProvidinggoodsorservicesConferringanyformofincomeorpricesupport.Whenusedbyagovernmenttopromoteitsexporttrade,thesubsidiesviolateGATT.7-59當前59頁，總共71頁。MultilateralTradeAgreements—

Subsidiesand

CountervailingMeasuresTheSCMAgreementclassifiessubsidiesas:Prohibited–subsidiesthateitherdependuponexportperformance,orarecontingentupontheuseofdomesticinsteadofimportedgoods.Actionable–subsidythatmaybechallengedastradedistortingifit:nullifiesorimpairsthebenefitsdueanothermember,injuresadomesticindustryofanothermember,orcausesorthreatenstocauseseriousprejudicetotheinterestsofanothermember.

7-60當前60頁，總共71頁。MultilateralTradeAgreements—

Subsidiesand

CountervailingMeasuresNonactionablesubsidies–subsidythatispermissibleandnonchallengeable,suchasgovernmentfundingto:underwriteresearchactivities,aiddisadvantagedregions,orhelpexistingfacilitiesadapttonewenvironmentalrequirements.7-61當前61頁，總共71頁。MultilateralTradeAgreements—CountervailingMeasuresRemediesandcountervailingmeasuresavailabletoastatethatbelievesitsdomesticindustrieshavebeeninjuredbyprohibitedoractionablesubsidiesincludetheoptionof:doingnothing,requestingconsultationswiththeexportingmemberstate,seekingaremedyfromtheWTO,includingimpositionofcountervailingduties,orindependentlyimposingcountervailingduties.7-62當前62頁，總共71頁。Case7-6

MukandLtd.v.CounciloftheEUStainlesssteelbrightbars(SSBBs)importedfromIndiaintotheEUweresubsidizedbytheIndiangovernment.MukandarguedthattheEUmadeanerrorinassessingtheamountofinjuryandthequestionofcausationintryingtodetermineifitwasthesubsidythatcausedsomeinjury.EUproducersappliedasurchargetotheirSSBBs,makingitdifficulttodetermineifthesubsidycausedamaterialinjuryandtheamountofanyinjury.Thesurchargemayhavecausedpricestodouble