CORPORATION

KEYFINDINGS

■Majorpowersoftenbegintoengageinproxywarsoutofasenseofacutevulnerabilitytotheactionsofotherstates.Astheydeveloptheircapabilities,theyfrequentlybegintoengageinproxywarsonawiderbasis.Thiscompetitionthroughproxiesrisksaself-reinforcingdynamic.

■Ideologicalfactorsalsoplayarole,providingamotiveforsuchformsofcompetitionandsometimesprovidingready-madelocalallieswithsimilarideologies.

■Economicfactorsusuallyplayamorerestrainingrole,especiallyforthosepowerswhosetradeandinvestmentrelationshipsmightbeharmedbysuchconflicts.RussianinterventioninUkraineisanexceptioninthisregard.

■Thereareworryingindicationsthatgeopoliticalfactorsmaybedrivingcountries,includingRussiaandIran,tomorefrequentuseofproxywarfare,andChinamightreturntosuchformsofcompe-titionundercertaincircumstances.

■IftheU.S.DepartmentofDefensehasfocusedexclusivelyonhigh-intensity,conventionalwarfightingcontingencies,itislikely

tobepoorlypreparedforthechallengesposedbynonstateactorswhoarefunctioningasproxiesforothermajorpowers.

ResearchReport

STEPHENWATTS,BRYANFREDERICK,NATHANCHANDLER,MARKTOUKAN,CHRISTIANCURRIDEN,ERIKE.MUELLER,EDWARDGEIST,ARIANEM.TABATABAI,SARAPLANA,BRANDONCORBIN,JEFFREYMARTINI

ProxyWarfareinStrategic

Competition

OverarchingFindingsand

Recommendations

T

hisreportsynthesizesandsummarizesfindingsfromtwocompanionreports,ProxyWar-fareinStrategicCompetition:StateMotivationsandFutureTrendsandProxyWarfareinStrategicCompetition:MilitaryImplications.1Thesereportsrespectivelyexaminethecausesandmilitaryimplicationsofproxywars,whichwedefineascivilwarsinwhichanexternalstatesponsorprovidesatleastonelocalwarringpartywithsupportthatcouldbeusefulforwaging

armedconflict,suchasfunding,arms,equipment,advising,train-ing,intelligence,and/ortroops,forthepurposesofaccomplishingsomestrategicobjective.Morespecifically,thereportsaddressfourquestions:

?Whydoexternalstatesprovidemilitarysupporttopartiestoacivilwar?

?Dothesemotivationsprovideanyindicationofwhetherproxywars,andespeciallyproxywarsinvolv-ingmajororregionalpowers,mightincreasesubstantiallywithinthetimehorizoncurrentlydrivinglong-termU.S.defenseplanning(i.e.,through2035)?

?Ifastatenotcurrentlyengagedinproxywarfareweretodecidetodramaticallyexpandthegeo-graphicalreachormilitary

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sophisticationofitsproxyactivities,howlongwouldittakethatcountrytodevelopthenec-essarycapabilitiestodoso?

?Whatmilitarychallengesareposedbyviolentnonstateactors(VNSAs)whoreceivemilitarysupportfromstatesponsors,andwhataretheimplicationsforU.S.defensecapabilitiesgen-erallyandU.S.Armycapabilitiesspecifically?

Theresearchtoanswerthesequestionswasconductedinfoursteps.First,weconductedanextensivereviewoftheexistingliteratureonproxywarfare.Second,weusedquantitativeanalysistoassesstrendsinanddriversofproxywars.Third,weconductedcasestudiesofthethreemajorU.S.adver-sariespowersthathavebeentheprimaryusersofproxywarfareoverthepastseveraldecades—Russia(andtheSovietUnionbeforeit),China,andIran—todeterminewhytheyhadengagedinproxywarfareand,fortheperiodsinwhichtheyhadturnedawayfromthisinstrumentofcompetition,whytheystoppedsuchpractices.2Fourth,weconductedcasestudiesoffourproxywars—theFirstandSecondIndochinaWars,theHouthiRebellion,andtheDonbasWarpriortoRussia’sinvasionin2022—toassessthemilitaryimplicationsofcasesinwhichVNSAsgainmoresophisticatedmilitarycapabilitiesinpartthroughstatesupport.3

ItisimportanttonotethatthesereportswerewrittenbeforetheFebruary2022outbreakofwarbetweenRussiaandUkraine.Theanalysishereinthereforedoesnotincludeanyassessmentofthecur-rentsituationinUkraine,noroftheimplicationsofthesefindingsfortheproxywartakingplacethere.However,theUkrainewarhasaddedurgencytotheissueofproxywarfare,andthesefindingsandtherelatedrecommendationsremainimportantinthecontextofthesemore-recentevents.

Abbreviations

DoD

ISR

RLSF

VNSA

U.S.DepartmentofDefense

intelligence,surveillance,andreconnaissance

Russian-ledseparatistforcesviolentnonstateactor

ResearchFindings

WhyDoStatesUseProxyWarfareasaToolofStrategicCompetition?

Statesengageinproxywarfareforacomplexmixtureofgeopolitical,ideological,domesticpolitical,andeconomicmotivations.Geopoliticaland,toalesserextent,ideologicalconcernsappeartobetheprimarymotivesforsuchconflicts,whilepoliticalandeco-nomicconsiderationsplaymostlyalimitingrole.Wesummarizeourassessmentofthesefactorsinfivemainpoints.4

First,geopoliticalconsiderationsappeartobeparamountinthedecisiontoprovidesupporttoVNSAs,acrossmostactorsandatmosttimes.

Whilethereareexceptions,thedesiretounderminerivalsandshiftregionalbalancesofpoweristhemostclearlyandconsistentlysupportedfactorinthereport.Thisdesiretouseproxywarfareinaproac-tivemanner,includinginregionsfarfromastate’sborders,oftenhasitsrootsinareactiveconcern,drivenbyacuteperceptionsofthevulnerabilityofthestate’sownsecuritytoadversaryproxywarfare.However,oncestateshavedevelopedtheseproxywarfarecapabilities,theyoftenusethemmuchmorewidelythansimplytoaddresstheinitialvulnerabil-ity.Thispatternwasobservedacrossmultiplestates,includingthePeople’sRepublicofChinaunderMaoandpost-1979Iran.Russia’sexpandinginvolvementincivilconflicts—includingincountriesfarfromitsborders,suchasSyria,Libya,andMali—suggestthatitmightbefollowingasimilarpattern.

Second,whiledifficulttoseparatefullyfromgeopoliticalconsiderations,ideologicalfactorsalsoseemtohaveplayedanimportantroleformanystatesindecisionstoengageinproxywars.PostrevolutionaryregimesappeartobemorelikelytosupportVNSAsthanotherstates.5StateideologyisalsoacrucialfactorinshapingwhichVNSAsmoststateswillconsidersupporting,fromtheIranianfocusonShiagroupstotheSovietandChinesefocusonleftistorcommunistgroups.Finally,ideol-ogyplaysaroleindrivingtheoverallperceptionofthreatfromarivalthatmotivatesmuchproxywaractivityinthefirstplace.6

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Third,wefoundlesssupportfordomesticpoli-ticsasfactorsmotivatingstatestopursueproxywarfare.Wefoundlittleevidence,particularlyinthecasestudies,thatpublicattitudes,suchasconcernsfordiasporagroupsorparticularrebelgroups,wereanimportantfactorinstatedecisionstosupportVNSAs.However,wedidseerepeatedevidencethatsupporttoVNSAsisoftenattractivetopolicymak-ers(bothindemocraciesandautocracies)preciselybecauseitavoids,oratleastlimits,thedomesticpoliticalcostsandscrutinythatwouldaccompanytheuseofthecountry’sownmilitaryforces,espe-ciallyinlargenumbers.Thefactthatstatesthatdevelopacapabilityforfightingproxywarsseemtoexpandtheiruseofthistoolovertimemayalsosuggestthatabureaucraticmechanismisatplay.Thatis,politicallypowerfulactorswithinastate’sbureaucracy,suchasIran’sQudsForceorthesilovikiinRussia,maybeempoweredbyinitialsuccessesandpresstoexpandtheiractivities.

Fourth,similartotheprevioustheme,wefoundconsiderableevidencethatstatesturntoproxywarfaretolowertheeconomiccostsoftheireffortstounderminetheirrivals.However,therewaslittleevidencethatthepotentialforeconomicgains(e.g.,throughseizingnaturalresourcesand/ortheprofitsthatderivefromthem)playsalargeroleinmostmajorpowers’supportforVNSAs.7

Finally,despitethelowerdirectcostsofproxywarfare(comparedwithconventionalwarfare)forthesponsoringstate,itwasrepeatedlyclearinourcasestudiesthattherecanbeconsiderableindirectcosts.Surrogatessometimesturnonthesponsoringstate,embarrassitwiththeirbehavior,orcontributetoundesiredlevelsofescalationbetweenthesponsor-ingstateanditsrivals.8Ifthesponsoringstategetsdrawnmoredeeplyintoadirectroleinwhatstartedasaproxywar,theassociatedcostscanskyrocket.Inmanycases,sponsoringstatesterminatedparticu-larproxyrelationshipsorturnedawayfromproxywarfarealtogether(atleastforaperiodoftime)dueinparttoeithertheseindirect,oftenstrategiccostsorthecostsassociatedwithgettingdrawnintomoredirectroles.

MighttheUseofProxyWarfareIncreaseSubstantiallyintheComing

Years?

AscanbeseeninFigure1,theuseofproxywarfareinthemodernerapeakedinthelateColdWaranddeclinedsubstantiallyoverthesubsequent20years.Inthepost–ColdWarera,proxywarschangednotonlyinthenumberofinstancesbutalsointhenatureofthecountriesinvolved.DuringtheColdWar,proxywarfarewasoftenatoolofmajorpowers,suchastheUnitedStates,SovietUnion,andChina.Inthepost–ColdWarera,proxywarswereoftenusedbyweaker,lesscapablestates.

Unfortunately,atthetimeourresearchwasconducted(2020),systematicdataontheincidenceofproxywarsafter2010werenotpubliclyavailable.But,atleastanecdotally,proxywarfareseemstohavechangedagaininrecentyears.AstheexamplesofongoingwarsinSyria,Yemen,andUkrainesuggest,majorpowers,includingRussia,theUnitedStates,Iran,andothers,haveagainbeenplayersintheseandothercivilwars.Asmightbeexpectedfromtheirinvolvement,theresourcesavailabletobothinsur-gentsandgovernments,includingadvancedweap-onryandmilitarytraining,appeartohavesimilarlyincreased,atleastbasedonpublicreporting.9

Fromapolicymaker’sperspective,thekeyques-tioniswhethertherecentapparentincreaseinproxywars,andespeciallyproxywarsconductedbymore-capablestates,islikelytocontinueinthefuture.Ouranalysissuggestsacomplicatedanswer,butthereareanumberofreasonsforconcern.

WiththeanticipatedcontinuingrelativedeclineofU.S.powerandinfluenceinseveralregionsthroughouttheworld,andtherenewedfocusinmanystatesonstrategiccompetition,thereseemtobegrowingrisksthatstateswillfeelincreasinglythreatenedbytheirrivalsandtakegreaterstepstocounteractthesethreatsintheyearstocome.Ourcasestudieshighlighthowsuchanenvironmentcanoften,thoughnotalways,leadtoanincreasedinterestinsupportingproxywars.Ofevengreaterconcern,geopoliticaldriversofproxywarfarecanoftenbeself-reinforcing.Inthepast,regimesthathavemadewidespreaduseofproxywarshavetypi-callybegunsuchcampaignsoutofanacutesenseof

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Numberofarmedconflicts(line)whereexternal

supportwaspresent(shaded)

FIGURE1

NumberofProxyWarsoverTime

50

45

40

35

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

1950196019701980199020002010

Year

SOURCES:RANDArroyoCentersynthesisofUppsalaConflictDataProgram—PeaceResearchInstituteOslo,nonstateactor,andnonstatearmedgroupdatasets;forfulldetails,seethecompanionreport,ProxyWarfareinStrategicCompetition:StateMotivationsandFutureTrends(Wattsetal.,2023b).

vulnerabilityandalackofothertoolsthatareappro-priate(areaffordable,haveasufficientlylowriskofescalation,andsoon).Oftentheuseofproxywarfareexpandsovertime,however,frominstancesinwhichitappearsclearlydefensive(respondingtospecificthreatsthataregeographicallyproximate)tomuchmoreaggressive,wide-rangingusesofproxywarfare.Furthermore,theuseofproxywarfarehashistori-callypromptedsimilarbehaviorinadversariesandrivals,creatingaspiralinwhichonestate’suseofthetoolincreasesitsusebyothers.Therearealsonumer-ousinstancesofspillovereffects,inwhichsupportforonelocalproxyleadstosupportforothersinnearbycountries(e.g.,U.S.supportforSouthVietnamlead-ingtoinvolvementinwarsinLaosandCambodiaorIraniansupporttoLebaneseHezbollahhelpingtodrawIrandeeperintotheSyriancivilwar).Thesefactorshighlightthepotentialrisksthatmayaccom-panytheapparentrecentincreaseinproxywars.

Ideologicalfactorsemergedinourcasestudiesasimportantpartsoftheexplanationforwhystateshavehistoricallypursuedrobustproxywarfarepro-grams.Onthisfront,thecurrentenvironmentandanticipatedtrendsarenotasgrim.NeithercurrentmajorU.S.competitor,ChinaandRussia,hasapar-ticularlyideologicalregime,certainlynotincompar-isonwiththeregimesofChinaandtheSovietUnionduringtheearlierColdWarperiod.Neitherrepre-sentsaglobalizedideologywithaready-madesetofpotentialpartnersthroughoutotherpartsoftheworld(and,conversely,potentiallocalpartnerslackaready-madeideologytoappealtoChinaorRussiaforassistance).Indeed,themainprofessedideologicaldifferencethatChinaandRussiarepresentrelativetotheUnitedStatesanditsalliesisafocusonstatesov-ereigntyandthecontinuityofexistinggovernments,regardlessofthosegovernments’behaviorortreat-mentoftheirpeople.(Russia’sactivitiesinUkraine

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since2014andotheractivitiesofbothRussiaandChinajustifysomeskepticismofhowsincerelytheseideologiesareheld.)Thisstatedideologymayormaynotincreasetheirwillingnesstoprovidesupporttogovernmentsinthemidstofcivilconflicts,butitdoesnotseemlikelytoincreasetheirinterestinpro-vidingsupporttoVNSAs.

Ourresearchsuggeststhateconomicmotiva-tionshaveoftenservedtorestrainproxywarfarebygreatpowersinthepast,asmajorpowersconcernedaboutinternationalreactionorinstabilityheldbackintheirsupporttopotentialproxiestomaintaineconomicgrowthoraccesstointernationalmar-kets.WhileeconomicconcernsdidnotrestrainRussiafromaggressioninUkraine,thereisreasontobelievethatsuchmotivationsarelikelytocontinuetoplayarestrainingroleonthedecisionsofChinainparticulargoingforward,asthecountrycontinuestobecomeincreasinglyintegratedintotheglobaleconomyandeconomicallyinvestedinAfrica,theMiddleEast,CentralAsia,andEuropethroughitsBeltandRoadInitiative.Thelikelihoodthatinvest-mentsinthoseregionswouldpayoffcouldbesub-stantiallyunderminedbyawidespreadresurgenceinproxywarfare.Thisisnottosuggestthatgeopoliticalconcernscannotoverrideeconomicconcernsinpar-ticularcountriesorcontexts,however.AndChina’sconcernsaboutnegativeeconomicconsequencesofconflictmaybelesspronouncedwithrespecttosomecountriescomparedtoothers.If,forexample,U.S.effortstopreventorlimitChineseeconomicpenetra-tionofacountrysucceeded,perhapsmostlikelyinU.S.alliesorpartners,thenChina’seconomicinterestinpreservingthestabilityofthatcountrycouldthendecline.Absenteconomicmotivationforstability,geopoliticalfactorsmightmotivatecloserconsider-ationofChinesesupporttoVNSAsinthatcountry.

ChinamaybeanoutlieramongU.S.competi-torsintheextenttowhicheconomicconsiderationsmayberestrainingitsconsiderationofproxysup-port.Russia’seconomylargelyremainsfocusedonnaturalresourceextractionand,indeed,isalreadyunderahostofinternationalsanctionsbecauseofitsaggressioninUkraine(includingsupportforprox-ies)anddoesnotappeartohavebeeninhibitedinitswillingnesstosupportproxiesintheMiddleEastandelsewhere.Similarly,Iranhasbeenunderextensive

economicsanctionsfordecades,withnoapparentreductioninitsinterestorwillingnesstosupportproxiesinitsregion.

HowLongDoesItTakeStatestoDevelopCapabilitiesforProxy

Warfare?

TwocurrentU.S.competitors,RussiaandIran,alreadyhavesophisticatedproxywarfarecapabilities.ButifChinaweretoreengageinthisformofstra-tegiccompetition,howlongmightittakeBeijingtodevelopsuchcapabilitiesagain?Toanswerthisques-tion,wedistinguishbetweenhowquicklyastatemaybeabletoinitiallycreateaproxywarfarecapabilityandhowlongittendstotakestatestorefinethatcapabilityandmakeitmoreeffectiveorrobust.

Thestatesconsideredinourcasestudieswereusuallyabletodevelopatleastarudimentarycapa-bilityforproxywarfareveryquickly,withinacoupleofyears,oftenbuildingonthecapabilitiesofprioreffortsorregimes.Beyondthisbaselinecapability,however,arelativelylengthyperiodoflearningandgrowthtobetterdevelopproxywarfarecapabili-tiesappearstobecommon.Iran,whichinheritedasubstantialproxysupportinfrastructurefromthepriorregime,stilltookyearstobuildrelationshipsandcapabilitieswithgroupssuchasHezbollah.TheSovietUniontookdecadestoprogressfromitsearlyfocusoncoordinationwithpotentialpartnersthroughCominterntoitslater,morerobustColdWarcapabilities,thoughthistimelinewassubstan-tiallyaffectedbylimitedinitialSovietmotivationtodoso.Theearlypost-1949Chineseexperienceofhavingbecomehighlyeffectiveatproxysupportrela-tivelyquicklythereforeappearstobemoreunusualandlikelyisaproductoftheChineseCommunistParty’slengthyexperienceasarebelmovementitself.Formoststates,whileaninitialcapabilitymightbestooduprelativelyquickly,alongerlearningcurveshouldbeexpectedforgreaterproficiency.

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WhatAretheMilitaryImplicationsofProxyWarfare?

TheadditionalcapabilitiesthatstatesponsorscanprovidetoVNSAshaveimportantconsequencesfortheforcesthatopposethem.Ourresearchinthisareawasbasedonfourcasestudies,sotherewillbelimitstoitsgeneralizability.Still,severalkeyinsightsemerged.Atthetacticalandoperationallevelsofwar,statesupporttoVNSAsfrequentlycombinesmuchofthelethalityofconventionalwarfarewiththechal-lengesofoperatingagainstahighlydispersedenemythathastakenadvantageofcomplexterrainandinte-grationamongcivilianpopulations.10Atthestrategiclevel,theincreasedlethalityofVNSAscomplicatestraditionalmodelsforrespondingtoinsurgenciesandotherformsofirregularwarfare,whiletheriskofescalationforeclosespotentialoptionsforrespondingtothesechallenges.11

Thereisampleevidenceinourcasestudiesoftheincreasedlethalityofnonstateactorswhentheyaresupportedbystates.IntheFirstIndochinaWar,theChinese-supportedVietminhdefeatedmorethan10,000FrenchsoldiersatDienBienPhuusingdozensofhowitzers,Katyusharocketlaunchers,andantiaircraftartillery.PriortotheRussianinva-sionofUkrainein2022,theRussian-ledseparatistforces(RLSF)inUkraineusedheavyweaponryto

TABLE1

ExamplesofState-SupportedVNSAMilitaryCapabilities

VNSACapability

Examples

Short-rangeairdefense

?Houthis

?Contras

?Afghanmujahideen

?RLSF

?Vietminh

Antitankguidedmissile/antiarmorweapons

?RLSF

?LebaneseHezbollah

?Hamas

?IraqiShiitemilitias

Artillery

?RLSF

?Vietminh

Mining

?Vietcong

?IraqiShiitemilitias

?ZimbabweAfricanNationalLiberationArmy

destroyalargefractionofthearmoredvehiclesoftheArmedForcesofUkraine,andsophisticatedRLSFairdefensecapabilitieshadessentiallyneutral-izedUkrainianairpower.TheelectronicandcyberwarfarepracticedbyRLSFprovidesomeindicationofthelevelofsophisticationthatVNSAstodaycanachievewhensupportedbyamajorpower.AsTable1illustrates,thecapabilitiesusedsoeffectivelybytheseVNSAsarenotunique;theyhavebeenemployedbyagreatmanyothergroupsovertheyears.

WhatAretheMilitaryImplicationsofPotentialContingenciesInvolvingHighlyCapableSurrogateForcesintheComingYears?

First,theincreasedlethalitypossessedbymanystate-supportedVNSAslookslikelytocontinueintothefuture.TheUnitedStatesdevelopedhighlevelsoftacticalproficiencyinirregularwarfareinAfghanistanandIraq.ButjustasU.S.capabili-tieshaveimproved,sohavethoseofpotentialU.S.adversaries.WhilemostofthedamagethatIraninflictedonU.S.forcesinIraqcameintheformofmines,thewarintheDonbasshowshowmuchmoremilitarilysophisticatedVNSAscouldpoten-tiallybecomewithaccesstoadvancedelectronicwarfare;cyber;intelligence,surveillance,andrecon-naissance(ISR);andothercapabilities.Whileitispossiblethatcontinuedimprovementsincommer-cialoff-the-shelftechnologycouldgreatlyenhanceVNSAcapabilitieswithoutstatesupport,thusfar,trulyhigh-endmilitarycapabilities,meaningnotjustadvancedtechnologybutalsothetrainingandsustainmentnecessarytomakeeffectiveandcon-sistentuseofthesetechnologies,havebeenthepre-serveofVNSAswithstatebacking.12

Second,becauseoftheirpotentialforincreasedlethality,state-supportedVNSAscanposeamajorchallengeforthoseU.S.alliesandpartnersinwhichtheyoperate.AftertheexperiencesinIraqandAfghanistan(andVietnambeforethem),theUnitedStatesislikelytoremainhesitanttobecomeinvolvedagaininlarge-scale,irregularwars.Butsupportlimitedtocivilassistance,intelligence,militaryadvising,andstandofffiresmaynotbe

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enoughtoprotectU.S.alliesandpartnersagainstwell-developedinsurgencieswithhighlevelsofstatebacking.TheVNSAsinourcasestudieswereabletoeithermilitarilydefeatoratleastimposelargecostsonevenquitecapablestatemilitaries.Weakandfragilestatesorthosewithlow-qualitymilitariesareunlikelytofarewellagainstsuchadversaries.

Third,ifU.S.forcesbecomedirectlyinvolvedinsuchwars,theywillrequiremasteryofbothcon-ventionalandirregularskillsets.Withitssophisti-catedISRcapabilitiesandairdominance,theUnitedStatescanmakeitextremelydifficultforVNSAstomass,which,inturn,makesitextremelydifficultforthemtolaunchconventionaloffensivestoseizeandholdterritory.Butthroughirregularoperationsandtactics,VNSAscanmakelargeportionsofU.S.alliesandpartnersessentiallyungovernable.Pushingbackagainstsuchtacticswillrequiresomelevelofcontin-uedproficiencyinirregularwarfare.

Finally,iftheUnitedStatesweretobecomedirectlyengagedwithRussianorChinesesurro-gatesonalargescale,orpossiblywithsurrogatesofanuclear-armedIranatsomepointinthefuture,itwouldlikelyfindtheconflictextremelychalleng-ing.WithlimitsontheextenttowhichtheUnitedStatescouldescalatetheconflict(atleastatcostsitwouldbewillingtobear),itwouldlikelyfaceacon-flictthatwouldbebothprotractedanddeadly.TotheextentthattheUnitedStatescouldbolsteritsallies’andpartners’abilitytofightwithrelativelylittledirectcommitmentofU.S.forces,itmaybeabletokeepcostsmanageable.However,keepingU.S.com-mitmentslimitedinordertorestrainthecostsofsuchconflictshasoftenbeendifficultinthepast.

PolicyRecommendations

WedivideourpolicyrecommendationsbetweenthosemostrelevantfortheentireU.S.governmentandnational-levelpolicymakersandthosemostrel-evantfortheU.S.DepartmentofDefense(DoD)andtheArmyinparticular.

RecommendationsfortheU.S.

Government

Theanalysisinthisreporthighlightsseveralstrategic-levellessonsforU.S.nationalpolicymak-ersfocusedonstrategiccompetitionwithChinaandRussia,aslaidoutintherecentNationalSecurityandNationalDefenseStrategies.13

StrategicCompetition:LimitingProxyWarfareWherePossible

Thefirstlessontoemergefromouranalysisisthatproxywarstypicallyimposeconsiderablecosts,bothontheUnitedStates(whenitisaparticipant)andontheothercountriesinvolved.Beforebecominginvolvedinaproxyconflict,theUnitedStatesshouldcarefullyassesstheinterestsatstakeandtherisks.

TheremaywellbecircumstancesinwhichadversaryproxysupportthreatensimportantU.S.interests,and,thus,amilitaryresponse,throughanescalatedlevelofU.S.proxysupporttotheaffectedstatesorthroughdirectU.S.militaryintervention,iswarranted.TotheextentthattheUnitedStatescanavoidorminimizesuchsituationswithoutsacrific-ingvitalnationalinterests,however,itshoulddoso.Seekingtoestablishlimitsor“rulesoftheroad”instrategiccompetitionsuchthatleadersofothercountriesdonotfeelanacutesenseofthreatfromtheUnitedStatestothesecurityoftheirstatesorregimescouldmitigatewhathashistoricallybeenthekeymotivationforstatestoexpandproxywar-fareandcould,inturn,reducethelikeliho