ElectricityMarketVisions

TOSUPPORTARELIABLEANDAFFORDABLEELECTRICGRIDUNDERELECTRICITYDECARBONIZATION

March2025 ES

ENERGYSYSTEMS

INTEGRATIONGROUP

ENERGYSYSTEMSINTEGRATIONGROUP

PAGE\*roman

viii

ELECTRICITYMARKETVISIONS

ES

ENERGYSYSTEMSINTEGRATIONGROUP

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evolution-report/

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?2025EnergySystemsIntegrationGroup

ElectricityMarketVisionstoSupportaReliableandAffordableElectricGridUnderElectricityDecarbonization

AReportbytheEnergySystemsIntegrationGroup’sElectricityMarketsUnder100%CleanElectricityTaskForce

WritingTeam

ErikEla,EnergySystemsIntegrationGroup,EPRI

RobinHytowitz,TaskForceChair

RyanSchoppe,EPRI

RobGramlich,GridStrategies

KelliJoseph,UniversityofPennsylvania

JacobMays,CornellUniversity

DebraLew,EnergySystemsIntegrationGroup

TaskForceMembers

ManojKumarAgrawal,

GridControllerofIndiaLimited

MohitAgrawal,NextEraEnergy

FarhadBillimoria,AuroraEnergyResearch

FrankBerring,SMAAmerica

AaronBurdick,EnergyandEnvironmentalEconomics(E3)

ScottBurger,FormEnergy

ConleighByers,HarvardUniversity

JuanPabloCarvallo,LawrenceBerkeleyNationalLaboratory

YonghongChen,NationalRenewableEnergyLaboratory

PatrickDanner,NewYorkPowerAuthority

WilliamD’haeseleer,KULeuvenResearchandDevelopment

JoshuaDillon,PineGateRenewablesMarkDrummond,IndependentElectricitySystemOperator

PengweiDu,ElectricReliabilityCouncilofTexas

WillFrazier,encoord

BethanyFrew,NationalRenewableEnergyLaboratory

MichaelGoggin,GridStrategies

JimGonzalez,SouthwestPowerPoolJessicaGreenberg,EnelGreenPowerKarlHausker,WorldResourcesInstitute

SamanthaHoffman,TransAlta

HanneleHolttinen,RecognisOy

JonJensen,WesternElectricityCoordinatingCouncil

VijithaKandamkumarath,GridControllerofIndiaLimited

LynnKiesling,NorthwesternUniversity

BheshajKrishnappa,SolarEnergyIndustriesAssociation

DanieleLerede,OpenEnergyTransition

ToddLevin,ArgonneNationalLaboratory

EliMassey,MidcontinentIndependentSystemOperator

JacobMays,CornellUniversity

MarianoMezzatesta,BonnevillePowerAdministration

MichaelMilligan,MilliganGridSolutions,Inc.

DavidMindham,EDPRenewables

ZacharyMing,EnergyandEnvironmentalEconomics(E3)

FranciscoMu?oz,GeneradorasdeChile

PramilaNirbhavane,NewYorkIndependentSystemOperator

KazuhikoOgimoto,UniversityofTokyo

ArneOlson,EnergyandEnvironmentalEconomics(E3)

GlendaOskar,U.S.DepartmentofEnergyKarenPalmer,ResourcesfortheFutureMichelePastor,Enernex

CodyPhillips,ConnectGenKevinPorter,ExeterAssociatesPramodKumarPrajapati,

GridControllerofIndiaLimited

MollyRobertson,ResourcesfortheFuture

HammadSaleem,IndependentElectricitySystemOperator

MichaelSchowalter,FreshEnergy

BrianSergi,NationalRenewableEnergyLaboratory

PaulSotkiewicz,E-CubedPolicyAssociates

SylvieSpewak,CaliforniaIndependentSystemOperator

ElinaSpyrou,ImperialCollegeLondon

GordStephen,NationalRenewableEnergyLaboratory

MuthuSubramanian,IndependentSystemOperatorforNewEngland

MichaelTita,FederalEnergyRegulatoryCommission

KarinWadsack,NationalRenewableEnergyLaboratory

ThisreportwasdevelopedbaseduponfundingfromtheAllianceforSustainableEnergy,LLC,ManagingandOperatingContractorfortheNationalRenewableEnergyLaboratoryforthe

U.S.DepartmentofEnergy.

SuggestedCitation

EnergySystemsIntegrationGroup.2025.ElectricityMarketVisionstoSupportaReliableandAffordableElectricGridUnderElectricityDecarbonization.Reston,VA.

https://www.esig.energy/

market-evolution-r

eport/

.

Disclaimer

Thisreportwasproducedbyataskforcemadeupofdiversememberswithdiverseviewpointsandlevelsofparticipation.Specificstatementsmaynotnecessarilyrepresentaconsensusamongallparticipantsortheviewsofparticipants’employers.

Contents

viiExecutiveSummary

1

Introduction

2

ElectricityMarketsUnderDeepDecarbonization:

LiteratureReviewandTaskForceWorkshops

FourKeyPrinciplesforElectricityMarkets’Objectives,Today

andintheFuture

ASharedViewofaBeneficialDesignofFutureElectricityMarkets

5

AssumptionsAboutandCharacteristicsof100%CleanElectricitySystems

andTheirImplications

5

TheResourceMix:PathwaystoMeet100%CleanElectricity

10

TransmissionandOtherInfrastructure

ReliabilityonaSystemwithHighLevelsofWeather-Dependent,

Variable,Uncertain,andInverter-BasedResources

WholesaleEnergyPricesandPriceFormationwith

Zero-Fuel-CostResources

IncorporatingCleanEnergyPoliciesasanExternalityWithin

theWholesaleMarkets

AVisionforMarketDesignandMarketStructureinFutureSystems

with100%CleanElectricity

15

TheVision

17

TheContinuationofPresentMarketStructures

20

TheContinuationofShort-TermEnergyandGridServices

SpotMarkets

29

HybridMarketApproachestoEnsuringResourceAdequacy,

RiskMitigation,andInvestmentCertainty

MarketsShouldNotSubsidizeCleanElectricityResources

butCanFacilitateOutsidePolicyInstrumentsThatProvide

IncentivesandSubsidiestoCleanElectricityResources

SummaryofPossibleFutureMarketDesignsIncluding

AlternativeProposals

PossibleNextStepsforRealizationoftheMarketDesignVision

PotentialActions

IdentifyingMetricstoEvaluateFutureMarketDesigns

38

LookingForward

38

SummaryoftheMarketDesignVision

40

Evolution,NotRevolution

40

ANeedforGlobalCollaboration

41

References

PHOTOS

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A

stheelectricitygridcontinuestoevolveand

themixofelectricitysuppliersmovestowardonewherethereareclean,emissions-freesuppliers,

opportunitiesandchallengesarise.Withthesechanges,organizedelectricitymarketscanplayakeyroleinthefutureinachievingasystemthatmaintainsthegoalsofaffordabilityandreliabilityandfostersfurtherinnova-tion.TheEnergySystemsIntegrationGroupconvenedtheElectricityMarketsUnder100%CleanElectricityTaskForcetoevaluatethepotentialdesignofelectricity

Theelectricitymarketcanachievemanygoals,but

itcannotdoeverything.Insomecasestheincentivesthatarebuiltintothemarketdesigncanbechangedbydesignersorregulatorsbasedonwhatthechallengesareandwheresolutionsareneeded.Wefocusonfourkeyprinciplesforwhatamarketneedstodotodayandinthefuture(FigureES-2,p.ix):(1)toenableinnovationsuchthatmarketdesignsarenotfixedtothecurrent

setoftechnologiesbutrathershowtherightsignalstoimproveupontheexistingtechnologywhencost-

effective,(2)toincentivizeinvestmentdecisions(entry

ExecutiveSummary

Organizedelectricitymarketscanplayakeyroleinthefutureinachievingasystemthatmaintainsthegoalsofaffordabilityandreliabilityandfostersfurtherinnovation.

marketsunderasysteminwhichallelectricityissuppliedfromclean,zero-emittingsupplyresources.Taskforceparticipantsincludedexpertsfrominde-pendentsystemoperatorsandregionaltransmissionorganizations,expertpractitioners,developers,andotherkeystakeholdergroups.Theprimarygoalwastodeterminewhatkindofdesignwillbebeneficialtosocietywhilealsoconsideringfuturestructures,institutions,andpolicies.Itwasacollaborativeeffort

todescribeacoherentvisionofhowafutureelectricitymarketcanprovideefficientsignalssuchthatmeetingelectricitydemandwithallzero-emittingcleanenergyresourcesleadstoareliableandaffordablesystemthatisfairandequitable.Thisreportpresentsacollectivevisionregardingparticulargoalsandcorefundamentalsaswellashighlightsareasstillunderactivedebate.

FigureES-1(p.viii)showssixkeycategoriesthatneedconsiderationforfuturemarkets.

andexit)whentheyareneededtomeetreliabilityneedsandmaximizeefficiency,(3)toallowforhedgingfromsuppliersandconsumersalikewhenuncertaintyorvari-abilitycanincreaserisk,and(4)toprovideanincentivefortheexistingparticipantsinthemarkettooperateinawaytomaximizeefficiencyandtocontributetoreliability.

FIGUREES-1

CategoriesofChangeforFutureMarketDesignVision

Transmissionandotherinfrastructure

Incentivesandpoliciestoachievethenecessarycost-effectiveinfrastructure

Demandparticipation

Promotingdemand-sidesupport

throughpricesandgridsignals

Priceformation

Intheshortterm,howpricesareformed

andalignwithoperationaldecisions

ElectricityMarketComponents

Operationalreliabilityservices

Incentivesforresourcestoprovidetheshort-termoperationalgrid

services

Cleanenergyincentives

Howtoincentivizetheefficienttransition

tocleanenergyresources

Resourceadequacyandinvestment

Efficiententryandexitthatleadstoanadequatesupplysystem

Severalcategorieswerediscussedaspartoftheworkshopsandtaskforcediscussionthatneedconsiderationwhensharingthefuturemarketdesignvision.Theseincludedpriceformation,cleanenergyincentives,resourceadequacyandinvestment,operationalreliabilityservices,demandparticipation,andtransmissionandotherinfrastructure.

Source:EnergySystemsIntegrationGroup.

Allfourprincipleswerekeptinmindfor

anyfuturemarketdesignproposalandwereleveragedthroughoutthereport.

Keepingallfourprinciplesinmindforanyfuturemarketdesignproposaliskeyandleveragedthroughoutthereport.

Todevelopthefuturemarketdesignvision,severalassumptionsweremadeaboutthepowersystemanditsassociatedcharacteristics.Notimeframeorspecificmixwaslaidout,asregionswillvaryinthisregard.Butit

wasassumedthatthisfuturesystemwouldcontainsubstantialamountsofvariablerenewableenergysuchaswindandsolar,withasubstantialamountofenergy

storageresources.Itmaybelikelythatthesetechnologiesarebuiltprimarilyatthetransmissionscale,wherelarge-scaletransmissionexpansionandinnovativetransmissiontechnologiesallowfordeliveryoftheirenergytoloadcenters.Butthetechnologiescouldalsohaveagreaterpresenceonthedistributionnetworkasdistributedenergyresources,therebypotentiallylesseningthetransmissionneed.Itwasalsoassumedthatareasonableamountofcapacitythatiszero-emittingbutalsowithfirmandlong-durationavailabilitywouldbepresent

tomaintainreliabilityduringcriticaltimeperiods.The

FIGUREES-2

FourKeyPrinciplesThatMarketsAimtoAccomplish

Innovate

Invest

Hedge

Operate

Isthereameans

fornewtechnologiestoenterandcompete?

Ifanewresourceorcapitalprojectisefficientandcompetitive,is

thereanincentiveforaninvestortoinstall?

Ifefficiencycausesuncertainty,canparticipantshedgeagainstit?

Isthereincentivetooperatethefacilityinthemostefficientandreliablemanner

possible?

Successfulmarketsmustincentivizeinnovation,investmentincapital,hedgingagainstrisk,andbehaviortooperateinwaysthatleadtoreliableandeconomicallyefficientoutcomes.

Source:EnergySystemsIntegrationGroup.

amountofthistypeofresourcewilldependinpartonhowmuchofthedemandisresponsivetopricesandgridneeds.

Certainchallengesexistintoday’ssystemsbutareamplifiedonasystemwiththismake-upofresources.Thissystemleadstochallengestoreliabilityandresourceadequacy,andaffectsthedistributionoftheresultingwholesaleprices.Dependingonthesystem’smake-up,therecouldbeadditionalchallengesofbuildingsufficientinfrastructureormeetingthecontrolandvisibilitynecessaryforreliability.Itisalsoconfrontedwiththelackofdirectcompetitivecleanenergyincentiveswithinthemarkettonaturallybringcleanenergyresources

tothemix.

Giventheseassumptionsandchallenges,thetaskforcelookedatmarketdesignsthatcouldenableanaffordableandreliablesystemassocietytransitionstothatfuture.Thereportsharesdetailsoffutureelectricitymarketsdis-cussedbythetaskforce.Itconsidersthemanyproposalsandreviewsintheliteratureandprovidesashared—butnotconsensus—visionoffuturemarketswithafocusonthesixcomponentsinFigureES-1.Thefundamentalsofthefuturemarketvisiondescribedinthereportgenerallywereagreedonbymanytaskforceparticipants,althoughalternativepathswerealsoproposedandsupportedbythegroup.Forexample,someparticipantsrecommended

substantialcoordinationbetweenpolicymakersandgridplannersasawaytoachieveresourceadequacywith

afeasibleresourcemixandinfrastructureinvestmentsinplace.

ElementsoftheMarketDesignVision

Whilemarketstructure—themake-upofthemarketandtheresponsibilitiesofdifferententities—isimportant,thetaskforceprimarilyfocusedonthemarketdesignforitsvision.Thefollowingeleven

designelementsencapsulatethefuturemarketdesignvision.Somearemoreconcreteandwithbroaderagree-mentamongtaskforceparticipants,whileforothersonlythegeneralobjectivewasagreeduponandimple-mentationproposalsvaried.Someareona“business

asusual”path,whileothers,thoughnotnecessarilysuggestingmajorredesigns,doshowsubstantialchangesfromthestatusquo.

PriceFormation—IncentivizetoOperate

Amajorityofthetaskforceagreedthattheexistinglargeregionalenergymarketswithbid-basedeconomicdispatchandnodalmarginalcostpricingwithsufficientlocationalandtemporalgranularitywouldremainlargelyinplaceasawaytoincentivizeoperationalbehaviorand

providesignalsthatcanhelpinvestmentdecisionmaking.

PriceFormation—IncentivizetoOperateandtoInvest

Taskforceparticipantsagreedthatshortageorscarcitypricingwouldbeusedthatdrivespriceshighwhencon-ditionswarrant.Extendedreservedemandcurvescouldbeusedthatwouldallowforlessvolatileshortagepricesbeforetheactualscarcityconditionbecomesapparent,whileprovidingbeneficialoperationalincentives.

PriceFormation—IncentivizetoOperate

Whileparticipantsbelievedthatexistingenergymarketdesignshouldlargelycontinue,theyalsothoughtthatsomeincrementalchangescouldcontinuetobeconsid-eredsuchasimprovedsectorcoordination,regionalseamsmanagementandefficiencyimprovements,marketpowermitigationprocedures,andexplorationofwhethertheunitcommitmenttoolformarketclearingisstillnecessaryandwhatmightreplaceit.Stakeholdersandresearchersshouldcontinuetoexplorethefeasibility

offurthergranularityofpricing,suchasdistributionnetworkpricing,todeterminewhetheritispracticalandwhetheritprovidesbenefitsthatoutweighthecomplexityandadministrativecosts.

PriceFormation—IncentivizetoInnovateandtoOperate

Toincentivizeinnovationinenergyandgridservicesupplytechnologies,thetaskforcefavoredparticipation

modelsthatarepreemptiveandprioritizedforreliability,butthatdonotpreventorstallnewtechnologiesthatarecompetitivefromparticipatingintheelectricitymarket.Participantsbelievedthatmarketdesignshouldstrivefortechnologyneutralitybutnotattributeneutrality.

DemandParticipation—IncentivizetoOperateandtoInnovate

Thetaskforcebelievedthatmechanismsshouldbeexploredtoenablemoredemandresourcestosupportgridreliabilitythantheydotoday,includinggivingaccesstosystemcostsandpricesonasgranularabasisaspossibleforthesubsetofthosedemandresourcesthatchoosetoparticipate,whileprotectingcertaincustomerclassesfromfinancialharmandkeepingequityobjectivesinmind.

OperationalReliability—IncentivizetoOperateandtoInnovate

Taskforceparticipantsagreedthatcontinualevaluationisneededofwhethernewoperationalreliabilityproductsarenecessaryandwhethercompetitivemarketsforthoseproductswouldprovideadditionalbenefitsthatoutweightheircostsandadministrativeburden.Anyresource,regardlessofitstechnology,thatdemonstratesadequateattributesandperformanceshouldbequalifiedtoparticipateinthatservice.

OperationalReliability—IncentivizetoOperateandtoInvest

Therewasashortdiscussionaroundwhethertheopportunitycostdesignforancillaryservicemarketsissufficientbyitselfwithextendedoperatingreservedemandcurves,andwhetherforwardcontractsforgridservicesmaybenecessaryforcertainservices.

ResourceAdequacy—IncentivizetoInvestandtoHedge

Thetaskforcelargelyagreedthatenergymarketsandrelatedmarketmechanismsbythemselvesmaynotaccomplishallthefunctionstoensureinvestmentofanadequateandefficientsupplyportfoliothatmeetsthecleanenergycriteria.Interventionsmaybeneededforresourceadequacyandforcertainreliabilityattributesaswellasforinfrastructure.Thetaskforcedifferedontheemphasisandtheextentoftheintervention,anditconsideredseveraldifferentdesignapproachestothissuchasexistingcapacitymarkets,strongcoordinatedgenerationandinfrastructureplanning,mandatorycontractsforhedging,andothers.

TransmissionandOtherInfrastructure—IncentivizetoInvestandtoInnovate

Mostofthetaskforcethoughtthatsubstantialtrans-missionexpansionandotheradditionalinfrastructure,currentlydecideduponlargelyoutsideofthewholesalemarkets,mayneedfurtherconsiderationtoenablethecleanenergytransition.Workablepolicythatcouldincentivizeinnovationandefficientinvestmentininfrastructureshouldbeexploredfurther.

CleanEnergyIncentives—IncentivizetoInvestandtoInnovate

Manyinthetaskforcebelievedthatcleanenergyincen-tiveshavesoundeconomicprinciplesanddesignsthatfocusonreducingemissions.Theythoughtthatmarketdesignerscanplayaroletofacilitateregional/statepoliciesandaccommodateefficienttradingofenergywithpoliciesbuiltinasconstraintsinthemarketdesign.

CleanEnergyIncentives—IncentivizetoOperateandtoHedge

Ashortdiscussionexploredwhetherloadscouldorshouldinputtheirwillingnesstopurchasecleanenergy

withintheelectricitymarketsandwhetherthemarketsshouldprovidetransparencytothepremiumthatmaybepaidforthatcleanenergy.

—————————

AsseeninFigureES-3(C)(p.xii),ingeneral,priceformationandthemodificationstodesignoftheenergymarketwererelativelyminoraspartofthisvisionandremainontheircurrenttrajectory.Largerchangeswereenvisionedbythetaskforceacrossthecategoriesofdemand-sideparticipationandresourceadequacy,investment,andhedging.Theserelatetotheexpansionofdemand-sideresourcesbeingabletosupportthegridthroughmoregranularpricingorotherwise,andtheneedformandatorycontractsand/orlarge-scalecoor-dinationtomeettheinvestmentneedsandresourceadequacyofafuture100%cleanelectricitysystem.

Whilesolutionsaroundinfrastructurewerenotdiscussedextensively,thetaskforcediddiscusstheneedtoexpandtransmissionandotherinfrastructuresuchasdistributionandfueldeliveryinfrastructure,whichmaybedonethroughpolicymechanisms.Thesamediscussionoccurredregard-ingcleanenergyincentives.Substantialchangeswere

notdiscussedatlengthregardingoperationalreliabilityneeds,butthevisionnoteshowneworincreasedneedsforgridservicesshouldbecontinuallystudiedanddiscusseswhethertheycontinuetoincentivizeoperation,investment,hedging,andinnovation.

Recommendations

Thetaskforceprovidedafewrecommendations.Forthepartsofthevisionwherebroadagreementwasreached,stakeholderscanworktogethertodeterminewhetheranyadditionalresearchorimplementationdetailsareneededforfurtherimplementation.Italsomightbeworthconsideringwhetherpolicyandrulechangesareneces-sarygiventheamountoftimethatsomeofthesemaytaketomovefromideatoapprovaltoimplementation.

Forthosepartsofthevisionwhereseveraldifferingim-plementationsstillexistedamongtaskforceparticipants,suchashowefficientinvestmentandhedgingcouldbeattainedunderthecleansupplyscenario,furtherworkmayberequiredtoevaluatethepotentialoutcomestoseewhichoptionsmayworkbestinwhichsituations.

Metricsareneededthatcanevaluatemarketdesignpro-posals,andconsensusonwhichmetricstofocusonand

FIGUREES-3

ViewingtheScaleofChangeofMarketDesignFuturesbyCategory

Transmissionandotherinfrastructure

Demandparticipation

A)

iceation

BAU

Operreliaser

Cleanenergyincentives

Resourceadequacyandinvestment

(

Prform

ationalbilityvices

(

Transmissionandotherinfrastructure

Demandparticipation

B)

iceation

MajorRedesign

Operreliaser

Cleanenergyincentives

Resourceadequacyandinvestment

Prform

ationalbilityvices

Transmissionandotherinfrastructure

Demandparticipation

(C) MarketDesignVision

Priceformation

Operationalreliabilityservices

Cleanenergyincentives

Resourceadequacyandinvestment

Themarketdesignvisioncanbeexpressedusingarosechartacrossthesixcategoriesshownhere.Theupperleft-handside(A)illustratesbusinessasusualwhiletheupperright-handside(B)illustrateswhatacompletemajorredesignwouldlooklike.Thebottomimage(C)expressesthemarketdesignvisioninthispaperintheseterms.

Source:EnergySystemsIntegrationGroup.

Metricsareneededthatcanevaluatemarketdesignproposals,andconsensusonwhichmetricstofocusonandhowtheycanbecombinediscritical.

howtheycanbecombinediscritical.Insomecases,marketdesignpilotscanbeintroducedtobegingather-inginformationonpromisingdesignproposalsthatarepromisingbutuntested.Further,determiningwhether

theremaybeconsensusfromtechnicalexpertsbeyondthistaskforceisimportant.Thatconsensuscanbeveryhelpfulfordecisionmakersandpolicymakers.

Lastly,thetaskforcerecognizesthatglobalcollaborationiskey.Differentregionsmayseeacleanelectricityfutureatdifferenttimesandthusmayintroducemarketdesignandpolicyatdifferentpoints.Globalcollaborationwillbecriticalforunderstandingimpacts,includingsharingbothfailuresandsuccesses,andexploringfutureconceptsandideasthatcansupporttheevolutiontoward100%cleanelectricity.

ENERGYSYSTEMSINTEGRATIONGROUP

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10

ELECTRICITYMARKETVISIONS

Introduction

E

lectricpowersystemsareundergoingmajortransformation.Theresourcemixischanging,bothwithincreasedvariablerenewableenergysources

(VRES)andenergy-limitedresources,includingelectricstorageresources.ClimatepoliciescontinuetoariseinmanystateswithintheUnitedStatesandworldwide.

Demand-sideresources,includingthoseconnectingatdistributionsystemsandthosebehindthecustomermeter,arealsoincreasinglyresponsive,andtheloaditselfisexpectedtogrow,includingfromdatacenters,manufacturing,andtheelectrificationofheatingandtransportation.Cleanelectricityhasalsobecomeapriorityforindividualcompaniesthatchoosetoinvest

inzero-emittingenergyorpaypremiumsforthatcleanenergy.Withthesechanges,organizedelectricitymarketscanlikelyplayakeyroleinthefutureinachievingasystemthatcanmeetclimategoalswhilestillmaintain-ingouroverarchinggoalsofaffordabilityandreliabilityandfosteringfurtherinnovation.

TheEnergySystemsIntegrationGroup(ESIG)convenedtheElectricityMarketsUnder100%CleanElectricityTaskForcetoevaluatethepotentialdesignofelectricitymarketsunderasysteminwhichallelectricityissuppliedfromclean,zero-emittingsupplyresources.

Taskforceparticipantsincludedexpertsfromindepen-dentsystemoperators(ISOs)andregionaltransmissionorganizations(RTOs),expertpractitioners,developers,andotherkeystakeholdergroups.Theprimarygoalofthetaskforcewastodeterminewhatkindofchangeswillbeneededtothedesignofwholesalemarkets,whilealsoconsideringfuturestructures,institutions,andpro-cesses.Itwasacollaborativeefforttodescribeacoherentvisionofhowafutureelectricitymarketcanprovideefficientsignalsforinvestmentandoperationalbehaviorsuchthatmeetingallelectricitydemandwithallzero-emittingcleanenergyresourcescanleadtoareliable

Thiswasacollaborativeefforttodescribeacoherentvisionofhowafutureelectricitymarketcanprovideefficientsignalsforinvestmentandoperationalbehaviorsuchthatmeetingallelectricitydemandwithallzero-emittingcleanenergyresourcescanleadtoareliableandaffordablesystemthatisfairandequitable.

andaffordablesystemthatisfairandequitable.Althoughthisreportpresentsacollectivevisionregardingparticu-largoalsandcorefundamentals,sharedbymanythoughnotnecessarilyalltaskforceparticipants,italsohigh-lightsareasstillunderactivedebatewithinthetaskforcewheresomeparticipantsemphasizedcertainmarket