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GLOBALPRIVATEEQUITYREPORT2024
AboutBain&Company’sPrivateEquitybusiness
Bain&Companyistheleadingconsultingpartnertotheprivateequity(PE)industryanditsstakeholders.PEconsultingatBainhasgrowneightfoldoverthepast15yearsandnowrepresentsaboutone-thirdofthefirm’sglobalbusiness.Wemaintainaglobalnetworkofmorethan2,000experiencedprofessionalsservingPEclients.Ourpracticeismorethantriplethesizeofthenext-largestconsultingcompanyservingPEfirms.
Bain’sworkwithPEfirmsspansfundtypes,includingbuyout,infrastructure,realestate,anddebt.Wealsoworkwithhedgefunds,aswellasmanyofthemostprominentinstitutionalinvestors,includingsovereignwealthfunds,pensionfunds,endowments,andfamilyinvestmentoffices.Wesupportourclientsacrossabroadrangeofobjectives:
Dealgeneration.Weworkalongsideinvestorstodeveloptherightinvestmentthesisandenhancedealflowbyprofilingindustries,screeningtargets,anddevisingaplantoapproachtargets.
Duediligence.Wehelpsupportbetterdealdecisionsbyperformingintegratedduediligence,assessingrevenuegrowthandcost-reductionopportunitiestodetermineatarget’sfullpotential,andprovidingapost-acquisitionagenda.
Immediatepost-acquisition.Afteranacquisition,wesupportthepursuitofrapidreturnsbydevelopingstrategicblueprintsforacquiredcompanies,leadingworkshopsthatalignmanagementwithstrategicpriorities,anddirectingfocusedinitiatives.
Ongoingvalueaddition.Duringtheownershipphase,wehelpincreasethevalueofportfoliocompaniesbysupportingrevenueenhancementandcost-reductioninitiativesandrefreshingtheirvalue-creationplans.
Exit.Wehelpensurethatinvestorsmaximizereturnsbypreparingforexit,identifyingtheoptimalexitstrategy,preparingthesellingdocuments,andprequalifyingbuyers.
Firmstrategyandoperations.WehelpPEfirmsdevelopdistinctivewaystoachievecontinuedexcellencebydevisingdifferentiatedstrategies,maximizinginvestmentcapabilities,developingsectorspecializationandintelligence,enhancingfund-raising,improvingorganizationaldesignanddecisionmaking,andenlistingtoptalent.
Institutionalinvestorstrategy.Wehelpinstitutionalinvestorsdevelopbest-in-classinvestmentprogramsacrossassetclasses,includingprivateequity,infrastructure,andrealestate.Topicsweaddresscoverassetclassallocation,portfolioconstructionandmanagerselection,governanceandriskmanagement,andorganizationaldesignanddecisionmaking.Wealsohelpinstitutionalinvestorsexpandtheirparticipationinprivateequity,includingthroughcoinvestmentanddirectinvestingopportunities.
Bain&Company,Inc.
131DartmouthStreet
Boston,Massachusetts02116USA
Tel:+16175722000
NetPromoter?,NPS?,NPSPrism?,andtheNPS-relatedemoticonsareregisteredtrademarksofBain&Company,Inc.,NICESystems,Inc.,andFredReichheld.NetPromoterScoreSMandNetPromoterSystemSMareservicemarksofBain&Company,Inc.,NICESystems,Inc.,andFredReichheld.
Copyright?2024Bain&Company,Inc.Allrightsreserved.
GlobalPrivateEquityReport2024
Contents
TheDarkbeforetheDawn................................................2
PrivateEquityOutlook2024:TheLiquidityImperative..........
.........
....
..3
Investments.............................................
.........
....
..9
Exits......................................................................................................
..................
........
..15
Fund-raising...............................
.......
...
.19.........
Returns.................................
......
...
.24.........
Move-InReady:RenovatingYourGrowthStrategy.............
.........
....
.28
HaveSecondariesReachedaTippingPoint?...........
......
...
.35........
BuildingaStrongerBuy-and-Build.......................
........
....
39.....
HarnessingGenerativeAIinPrivateEquity.................................45
TheYearCashBecameKingAgaininPrivateEquity..........................52
1
GlobalPrivateEquityReport2024
TheDarkbeforetheDawn
DearColleague:
Theyear2023wasoneofportent.Dealvaluefellby37%.Exitvalueslidevenmore,by44%.Fund-raisingdroppedacrossprivatecapital,as38%fewerbuyoutfundsclosed.Interestingly,dollarcommitmentsinbuyoutssurgedasanumberofhigh-performingfundscametomarket.Butitwastrulyayearofhavesandhave-nots.Just20fundsaccountedformorethanhalfofallbuyoutcapitalraised.
Thewordforthismarketisstalled.Cuttingthroughallofthemacronoisewasthe525-basis-pointincreaseinUScentralbankratesfromMarch2022toJuly2023.Thespeedandmagnitudeofthisrisecausedgeneralpartnerstohitthepausebutton.
Thegoodnews?Interestratesappeartobestableandhavebeenforafewmonths.Recorddrypowderisstackedandreadyfordeployment.Asizablechunkofthisdrypowderisagingandneedstobeputtowork.Lookingintoportfolios,nearlyhalfofallglobalbuyoutcompanieshavebeenheldforatleastfouryears.
Inshort,theconditionsappeartobeshiftinginfavorofhittingthegobutton.Wewillseewhat2024brings.
Bestwishes,
HughMacArthur
Chairman,GlobalPrivateEquity
2
PrivateEquityOutlook2024:
TheLiquidityImperative
Spikinginterestratesderaileddealmakingin2023andleftthecapitalflywheelsputtering..Gettingunstuckisjoboneintheyearahead..
ByHughMacArthur,RebeccaBurack,GrahamRose,ChristopheDeVusser,KikiYang,andSebastienLamy
AtaGlance
Privateequitycontinuedtoreelin2023asrapidlyrisinginterestratesledtosharpdeclinesindealmaking,exits,andfund-raising..
Theexitconundrumhasemergedasthemostpressingproblem,asLPsstarvedfordistributionspullbacknewallocationsfromallbutthelargest,mostreliablefunds..
Thelong-termoutlookremainssound,butbreakingthelogjamwillrequiremorerobustapproachestovaluecreationandrapidinnovationinliquiditysolutions..
It’ssafetosaytheprivateequityindustryhasneverseenanythingquitelikewhat’shappenedoverthelast24months.
Whilethesharpdrop-offindealactivityinlate2022andinto2023echoestheperiodfollowingthe2008–09globalfinancialcrisis(GFC),thesituationtheindustryfacestodayislargelyunprecedented.
ThenumbersareallveryGFC-like:Dealvalueanddealcounthavefallen60%and35%,respectively,fromtheirpeaksin2021.Exitvalueisdown66%,andthenumberoffundsclosingisoffbynearly55%
3
GlobalPrivateEquityReport2024
(seeFigure1).Yetwhat’sdrivingthesedeclinescouldn’tbemoredissimilartowhatwashappeningin2008–09,andmakingsenseofitrequiresadifferentlensaltogether.
Asdifficultasitwas,theaftermathoftheGFCfollowedapredictablepattern:Tocopewiththecrisis,centralbankersslashedinterestratestospuractivity,theeconomyslowlystabilized,andprivateequitywasabletoclawitswaybackfromwhatmanypredictedwouldbeitsunraveling.Theresultingperiodofgrowthintheyearsthatfollowedcreatedaprivateequityindustrythatisvastlylargerandmorecomplexthananyonein2008couldhavereasonablyexpected.
Yettodaythatsizeandcomplexitymagnifythechallengestheindustryfaces.Businessconditionsaremoreperplexingthanpredictable.Interestrateshaverisenfasterthanatanytimesincethe1980s,anditremainsunclearwhentheUSFederalReservewillreversecourseorwhererateswilleventuallysettle(seeFigure2).Concernsaboutwhatwedubbedlastyear“themostanticipatedrecessioninhistorythathasn’thappenedyet”continuetolinger.Yettothesurpriseofmostanalysts,theeconomyischuggingalongnicely.Record-lowunemployment,reasonablegrowth,andsurgingpublicmarketsintheUSsuggestthepossibilitythatwemightjustescapethesemonthsofturmoilwithnothingworsethanasoftlanding.
Thesecrossedsignalshaveleftprivateequityhamstrung.Thesheervelocityoftheinterestrateshockwassomethingfewintheindustryhadeverexperienced,andtheimpactonvaluehasdrivenawedgebetweenbuyersandsellers.
Figure1a:Investments,exits,andthenumberofbuyoutfundsclosedallcontinuedtoslidein2023astheindustryreeledfromrisinginterestrates
Investments
Exits
Fund-raising
Globalbuyoutdealvalue
Globalbuyout-backedexitvalue
Globalbuyoutcapitalraised
Dealcount
Exitcount
Countoffundsclosed
$1,250B
(–60%)
4,000
$1,250B
(–66%)
3,000
$600B
(–1%)
1,000
1,000
3,000
1,000
2,000
400
800
750
750
600
2,000
500
500
1,000
200
400
1,000
250
250
0
0
0
0
0
0
2013
2018
2023
2013
2018
2023
2013
2018
2023
Notes:Investments—excludesadd-ons;excludesloan-to-owntransactionsandacquisitionsofbankruptassets;basedonannouncementdate;includes
announceddealsthatarecompletedorpending,withdatasubjecttochange;Exits—includesfullandpartialexits;bankruptciesexcluded;IPOvalue
representso?eramountandnotmarketvalueofcompany;Fund-raising—datagroupedbytheyearinwhichfundsheldtheir-inalclose;countisofall
funds,includingthoseforwhich-inalclosedataisunavailable;buyoutcategoryincludesbuyout,balanced,coinvestment,andcoinvestment
multimanagerfunds;excludesSoftBankVisionFund
Sources:Dealogic;Preqin
4
GlobalPrivateEquityReport2024
Figure1b:Activityduringthesecondhalfoftheyearwasanimprovementonthefirst,butnotbymuch
Investments
Exits
Fund-raising
Globalbuyoutdealvalue,quarterly
Globalbuyout-backedexitvalue,
Globalbuyoutcapitalraised,
quarterly
quarterly
Dealcount
Exitcount
Countoffundsclosed
$350B
1,000
$350B
600
$200B
400
300
800
300
150
300
250
250
400
600
200
200
100
200
150
400
150
200
100
200
100
50
100
50
50
0
0
0
0
0
0
2020
2021
2022
2023
2020
2021
2022
2023
2020
2021
2022
2023
Notes:Investments—excludesadd-ons;excludesloan-to-owntransactionsandacquisitionsofbankruptassets;basedonannouncementdate;includes
announceddealsthatarecompletedorpending,withdatasubjecttochange;Exits—includesfullandpartialexits;bankruptciesexcluded;IPOvalue
representso?eramountandnotmarketvalueofcompany;Fund-raising—datagroupedbytheyearinwhichfundsheldtheir-inalclose;countisofall
funds,includingthoseforwhich-inalclosedataisunavailable;buyoutcategoryincludesbuyout,balanced,coinvestment,andcoinvestment
multimanagerfunds;excludesSoftBankVisionFund
Sources:Dealogic;Preqin
Figure2:The525-basis-pointriseininterestratesfromMarch2022toJuly2023wasthesharpestmonetarytighteningindecades
Centralbankinterestratesbyregion(monthlyaverage)
+113basis+289bps+98bps+25bps
6%
points
inUS
4
2
0
Jan
Jul
Jan
Jul
Jan
Jul
Jan
Jul
2020
2020
2021
2021
2022
2022
2023
2023
US
UK
Europe
Notes:USshowsfederalfundsrate;Europeshowseuroshort-termreporate;UKshowsclearingbanksbaserate(middlerate);basispointchangesover
asix-monthperiodaredisplayedfortheUSonlyandcalculatedbasedontheincreaseinaverageinterestratesbetweentheendofJuneandDecember
ofeachyear
Source:LSEG
5
GlobalPrivateEquityReport2024
Pricemultiples,whichtendtomoveinverselytointerestrates,havetippeddownwardoverthelastyear,butonlyslightlysofar.That’sbecausesellersarebringingtomarketonlythehighest-qualityassets,thosetheyareconfidentwillmoveatareasonablereturn.Otherwise,theexitchannelshavelargelydriedup,leavinggeneralpartners(GPs)withatowering$3.2trillioninunsoldassetsandstanchingtheflowofcapitalbacktolimitedpartners(LPs).
Thesedeclinesinactivityhavehadachillingeffectonfund-raising.SlowerdistributionshaveleftLPscashflownegative,crimpingtheirabilitytoplowmorecapitalbackintoprivateequity.Theindustrystillraisedanimpressive$1.2trillioninfreshcapitalin2023,andthebuyoutcategoryattracted$448billion.ButLPswerehighlyselective.Whilecapitalflowedtothelargest“reliablehand”buyoutfunds,fund-raisingformostwasashardasit’severbeen.
SlowerdistributionshaveleftLPscashflownegative,crimpingtheirabilitytoplowmorecapitalbackintoprivateequity.
UntilGPscanbeginmovingassetsoutoftheirportfoliosinatimelyfashion,raisingthenextfundwon’tgetanyeasier.Andthethreattoreturnsisreal.Buyoutstypicallyinvolvetermloansthatexpireinfivetosevenyears.Already,interestcoverageratiosamongbuyout-backedportfoliocompaniesintheUShavedroppedto2.4timesearningsbeforeinterest,taxes,depreciation,andamortization(EBITDA),thelowestlevelsince2007.ThatispressuringGPstobothfindliquiditysolutionsanddevisenewwaystogenerateprofitsthroughoperatingleverage—notjustthemultipleexpansionandrevenuegrowththeindustryhasleanedonforyears.
Earlysignsofaturnaround?Themostdifficultaspectofthisgridlock,ofcourse,ispredictingwhatwillhappennext.Butinourview,thegreenshootsofarecoveryarestartingtopokethrough.Perhapsthemostimportantisthat,barringanynewmacroshocksorgeopoliticalcrises,ratesaremorelikelythannottomoderateinthecomingyear.
Evenslightcutsarelikelytospurondealmakingaslongasthemacrooutlookremainsrelativelystable.Buyoutfundsalonearesittingonarecord$1.2trillionindrypowder,and26%ofthatisfouryearsoldorolder,upfrom22%in2022(seeFigure3).ThatcreatesaheavierincentivethannormalforGPstogetoffthesidelinesandstartbuying,evenifconditionsaren’tideal.Activityisalreadytickingupward,andwithhelpfromtheFedandtheEuropeanCentralBank,thebiasin2024islikelytotheupsidewhenitcomestodealcountandvalue.
Exitsareanothermatter.Barringasharper-than-anticipateddropinrates,sellerswillcontinuetofacehighhurdlestounloadingcompaniestostrategicbuyers,othersponsors,orthepublicmarkets.
6
GlobalPrivateEquityReport2024
Figure3:Witharecord26%ofglobalbuyoutdrypowdernowfouryearsoldorolder,generalpartnersareundergrowingpressuretododeals
Globalbuyoutdrypowder,byyearssincecapitalraised($T)
$0.7T
0.7
1.0 0.9
0.8
1.2
1.0
3yearsorless
4–5years
Morethan5years
2017
18
19
20
21
22
23
Shareofcapital
19
19
18
19
23
22
26
thatisatleast
4yearsold(%)
Notes:Buyoutcategoryincludesbuyout,balanced,coinvestment,andcoinvestmentmultimanagerfunds;assumesaverageinvestmentperiodofiveyears;percentagesplitofcapitalraisedin2023isasofQ2;discrepanciesinbarheightsdisplayingthesamevalueareduetoroundingdi?erencesSources:Preqin;Bainanalysis
WithsponsorsstrugglingtosendcashbacktotheirLPs,2024willlikelybedefinedbyhowcreativetheindustrycanbeinfindingwaystogenerateliquidity.
Actionrequired.What’sclearisthatpassivelywaitingforconditionstorecoverisnotaviablestrategy.Muchofthisreportisdevotedtoexploringhowthesedynamicsareplayingoutandwhatthemostforward-thinkingGPsareworkingon.Gettingunstuckwilldemandactioninseveraldirectionsatonce:
Doublingdownonvaluecreation.Theexitsituationisshiningabrightlightonhowcriticalitistogenerateoperatingleverageinamarketwheretailwindsfrommultipleexpansionhaveturnedintoheadwinds.Youcan’tcontrolthedirectionofrates.Butyoucangetbetteratunderwritingvalueandcapturingitthroughcrispexecution.We’vetalkedaboutitforyears:Theindustryhasrelieddisproportionatelyonrisingmultiplesandrevenuegainstogeneratereturnswhilemarginimprovementhascontributedpracticallynothing.Thatnolongerworkswhenrisingratesserveasballastforassetmultiples.
TheportfoliocompaniesthatwillstandoutinthisdifficultmarketarethosethathaveusedeverymeanspossibletoboostEBITDAefficientlyandcandemonstratetothenextownerthatthere’smoneyleftonthetable.Thatmeansfundshavetogetsharperatfindingandpullingthevalue-creation“levers”thatgenerateorganicgrowth—pricing,salesforceeffectiveness,and
7
GlobalPrivateEquityReport2024
productinnovation,tonameafew.Iftheseinsightsweren’tpartoftheoriginalvalue-creationplan,nowisthetimetofocusonthem.Themarkethasbeenabundantlyclearonthis.Thecompaniesthataresellingarenotthosethathavemerelygottenbiggerand/orleaner.Thepremiumisongeneratingstrong,profitable,organicgrowth.
Managingacrosstheportfolio.WhilestrategiesfocusedonEBITDAgrowthtaketime,aballooningexitbacklogalsopresentsmoreimmediateconcerns.Fundsneedtodevelopaclear-eyed,pragmaticappraisalofwhereeachportfoliocompanysitsintermsofitsreturnprofile,itscapitalstructure,anditsfutureprospects.Aslongasratesstayelevated,GPshavechoicestomake:Whichcompanieswillreapanacceptablereturnifwesellnow?WhichshouldwesellanywaysowecanreturncashtoLPs?Whichcompaniesfaceloanexpirations,andwherecanweeffectively“amendandextend”toreshapeabalancesheetwithouttoomuchpain?Whatareouroptionsforgeneratingliquiditythroughtheburgeoningsecondarymarket?
Iftheindustry’sgrowinginventoryofunsoldassetsisn’tgoingtobeaproblem,thereareafewthingsyouhavetobelieve.First,withalargevolumeofportfoliocompaniesfacingrefinancinghurdles,itwillbecriticalthatdebtholderstakethestancetheydidin2008–09.Lendersclearlydidn’twantthekeystoabunchoftroubledportfoliocompaniesthenandprobablydon’twantthemnow.Thatleavesopentheopportunitytopayapenalty,addsomeequity,andarriveataworkablecapitalstructure.
Thesecondthingyouneedtobelieveisthatthereareenoughinnovativesolutionslikecontinuationfunds,securitizations,andNAVfinancingtohelpGPsrecapprizedassetsandwaitforreturnstoripenwhilekeepingeconomicinterestalignedbetweenGPsandLPs.Thesecondariesspaceisstillsmallandsomewhatcontroversial.Butitisgrowingrapidlyandrepresentsthekindoffinancialinnovationthatisprivateequity’sspecialty.
Professionalizingfund-raising.Aneffectiveportfolioscanshouldleadtoaclear,practicalroadmapforsteeringthefundthroughanimmenselydifficultperiod.ThenextstepiscommunicatingtoLPshowportfoliomanagersareusingallthetoolsattheirdisposaltoactasatrustedstewardofinvestorcapital.GPsaren’tparticularlyadeptatthiskindofcommunicationbecausetheyhaven’thadtobeinthepast.Adhoc,anecdotalconversationsaboutasingleportfoliocompanyweresufficientwhenperformanceoverallwasn’treallyinquestion.
Nowperformanceiseverything,andthecompetitionforalimitedpoolofcapitalhasneverbeenmorefierce.Thisisspurringthemostproactivefundstoconsidermakingastepchangeinhowtheyapproachinvestorsbyprofessionalizingprocessesandhoningtheirgo-to-marketcapabilities.Thefirmsout-raisingothersarestrategicallymappingoutwhotheirLPsshouldbeanddevelopingthecapabilitiesandtoolsnecessarytounderstandwhatittakestowinwiththemandexpandshareofwallet.TheyarebuildingthekindofcommercialorganizationsthebestB2Bsellersrelyondaily.
8
GlobalPrivateEquityReport2024
Noneofthisiseasy,ofcourse,butnoneofitisinsurmountable.PrivateequitysurvivedtheoverexuberanceoftheRJRNabiscoyears.Itlivedthrough9/11andthesubsequentrecession.Ittooktheworstblowsoftheglobalfinancialcrisisandcameoutevenstronger.Theindustry,inotherwords,hasconsistentlydemonstrateditsresilience.Thisisoneofthosemoments.Timetogettowork.
Here’samoredetailedlookatwhathappenedin2023.
Investments
Privateequitydealmakerstendtomakethemostofthecardsthey’redealt.Aslongastheyhavereasonableconfidenceinwhat’scoming,they’llfindawaytomakeagooddealwork.ButconfidencewasthefirstcasualtywhentheFedjackedratesatthefastestpacesincethe1980s,leavingtheindustrygaspingforair.Thefalloffthatstartedinthesecondhalfof2022bledoverinto2023.
Excludingadd-ons,buyoutinvestmentvaluedroppedto$438billion,a37%decreasefrom2022andtheworsttotalsince2016(seeFigure4).Overalldealcountdropped20%toaround2,500transactions.Thesteepslopeofthedeclinewassomethingtheindustryhadn’texperiencedsincetheglobalfinancialcrisis.Themalaiseinfectedregionsacrosstheworld,withEuropeandAsia-Pacificbothexperiencingsignificantdeclines(seeFigure5).
Figure4:Thetwo-yearfalloffinglobalbuyoutdealvaluemarksthesteepestdeclinesincetheglobalfinancialcrisis
Globalbuyoutdealvalue,byregion
$1,200B
1,086
Dealcount
Changeindealvalue
4,000
2023vs.
2023vs.
1,000
726
3,000
Restof
2022
5-yr.avg.
800
–22%
–47%
694
699
world
600
332
463
532
499
519
2,000
Asia-
–8%
–32%
400
240
397
369
438
Pacific
200
295
195
222
231
305
1,000
Europe
–46%
–38%
94
North
–38%
–31%
0
0
America
Total
–37%
–34%
20050607080910
1112
1314
1516
1718
19
2021
22
23
Avg.
256
476
118
260
304
349
521
542
1,029
788
deal
494
165
229
206
278
380
604
700
801
size($M)
Notes:Excludesadd-ons;excludesloan-to-owntransactionsandacquisitionsofbankruptassets;basedonannouncementdate;includesannounced
dealsthatarecompletedorpending,withdatasubjecttochange;geographybasedontarget’slocation;averagedealsizecalculatedusingdealswith
disclosedvalueonly
Source:Dealogic
9
GlobalPrivateEquityReport2024
Figure5:Dealvalueandactivitydeclinedglobally
NorthAmerica
Europe
Asia-Paciic
Buyoutdealvalue
Buyoutdealvalue
Buyoutandgrowthdealvalue
$600B
Buyoutcount
Buyoutcount
Buyoutandgrowthcount
2,000
$600B
2,000
$600B
6,000
1,500
1,500
400
400
400
4,000
1,000
1,000
200
500
200
500
200
2,000
0
0
0
0
0
0
2012
2023
2012
2023
2012
2023
Notes:NorthAmericaandEurope—excludesadd-ons;excludesloan-to-owntransactionsandacquisitionsofbankruptassets;basedonannouncementdate;includesannounceddealsthatarecompletedorpending,withdatasubjecttochange;geographybasedontarget’slocation;Asia-Paciic—includesbuyout,growth,early-stage,privateinvestmentinpublicequity,andturnarounddeals;excludesadd-ons;excludesrealestate;dealvalueexcludesdealswithannouncedvaluelessthan$10million;includesinvestmentsthathaveclosedandthoseatagreement-in-principleordeinitiveagreementstageSources:Dealogic;AVCJ;Bainanalysis
Dealsofallkindsfelttheimpact,butthosethatdependedonbankfinancingsufferedthemost.Asyieldsonlargesyndicatedloansapproached11%intheUSand9%inEurope(both10-yearhighs),banksretreatedandissuanceofnewloansplunged(seeFigure6).
Thelackofaffordableleveragecutthenumberofmegadeals—thoseover$5billion—byalmosthalf,andtheaveragedealsizedroppedto$788million,downfromthepeakof$1billionin2021.Buyoutsbroadlysawdoub
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