Chapter01-GoalsandGovernanceoftheFirmPAGE8CHAPTER1GoalsandGovernanceoftheFirmAnswerstoProblemSets1. a. real b. executiveairplanes c. brandnames d. financial e. bonds f. investment g. capitalbudgeting h. financing2. c,d,e,andgarerealassets.Othersarefinancial.3. a. Financialassets,suchasstocksorbankloans,areclaimsheldbyinvestors.Corporationssellfinancialassetstoraisethecashtoinvestinrealassetssuchasplantandequipment.Somerealassetsareintangible.Capitalbudgetingmeansinvestmentinrealassets.Financingmeansraisingthecashforthisinvestment.Thesharesofpubliccorporationsaretradedonstockexchangesandcanbepurchasedbyawiderangeofinvestors.Thesharesofcloselyheldcorporationsarenottradedandarenotgenerallyavailabletoinvestors. d. Unlimitedliability:investorsareresponsibleforallthefirm’sdebts.Asoleproprietorhasunlimitedliability.Investorsincorporationshavelimitedliability.Theycanlosetheirinvestment,butnomore.e. Acorporationisaseparatelegal“person”withunlimitedlife.Itsownersholdsharesinthebusiness.Apartnershipisalimited-lifeagreementtoestablishandrunabusiness.

4. c,d.5. b,c.6. Separationofownershipandmanagementtypicallyleadstoagencyproblems,wheremanagersprefertoconsumeprivateperksormakeotherdecisionsfortheirprivatebenefit--ratherthanmaximizeshareholderwealth.7. a. Assumingthattheencabulatormarketisrisky,an8%expectedreturnon theF&Hencabulatorinvestmentsmaybeinferiortoa4%returnonU.S. governmentsecurities.b. UnlesstheirfinancialassetsareassafeasU.S.governmentsecurities,theircostofcapitalwouldbehigher.TheCFOcouldconsiderwhattheexpectedreturnisonassetswithsimilarrisk.8. Shareholderswillonlyvotefor(a)maximizeshareholderwealth.Shareholderscanmodifytheirpatternofconsumptionthroughborrowingandlending,matchriskpreferences,andhopefullybalancetheirowncheckbooks(orhireaqualifiedprofessionaltohelpthemwiththesetasks).9. Iftheinvestmentincreasesthefirm’swealth,itwillincreasethevalueofthefirm’sshares.Ms.Espinozacouldthensellsomeorallofthesemorevaluablesharesinordertoprovideforherretirementincome.10. AsthePutnamexampleillustrates,thefirm’svaluetypicallyfallsbysignificantlymorethantheamountofanyfinesandsettlements.Thefirm’sreputationsuffersinafinancialscandal,andthiscanhaveamuchlargereffectthanthefineslevied.Investorsmayalsowonderwhetherallofthemisdeedshavebeencontained.11. Managerswouldactinshareholders’interestsbecausetheyhavealegaldutytoactintheirinterests.Managersmayalsoreceivecompensation,eitherbonusesorstockandoptionpayoutswhosevalueistied(roughly)tofirmperformance.Managersmayfearpersonalreputationaldamagethatwouldresultfromnotactinginshareholders’interests.Andmanagerscanbefiredbytheboardofdirectors,whichinturniselectedbyshareholders.Ifmanagersstillfailtoactinshareholders’interests,shareholdersmayselltheirshares,loweringthestock

price,andpotentiallycreatingthepossibilityofatakeover,whichcanagainleadtochangesintheboardofdirectorsandseniormanagement.12. Managersthatareinsulatedfromtakeoversmaybemorepronetoagencyproblemsandthereforemorelikelytoactintheirowninterestsratherthaninshareholders’.Ifafirminstitutedanewtakeoverdefense,wemightexpecttoseethevalueofitssharesdeclineasagencyproblemsincreaseandlessshareholdervaluemaximizationoccurs.Thecounterargumentisthatdefensivemeasuresallowmanagerstonegotiateforahigherpurchasepriceinthefaceofatakeoverbid–tothebenefitofshareholdervalue.AppendixQuestions:Bothwouldstillinvestintheirfriend’sbusiness.Ainvestsandreceives$121,000forhisinvestmentattheendoftheyear(whichisgreaterthanthe$120,000itwouldreceivefromlendingat20%).Galsoinvests,butborrowsagainstthe$121,000payment,andthusreceives$100,833today.a.Hecouldconsumeupto$200,000now(foregoingallfutureconsumption)orupto$216,000nextyear(200,000*1.08,foregoingallconsumptionthisyear).Tochoosethesameconsumption(C)inbothyears,C=(200,000–C)x1.08orC=$103,846.b.Heshouldinvestallofhiswealthtoearn$220,000nextyear.Ifheconsumesallthisyear,hecannowhaveatotalof$203,703.7(200,000x1.10/1.08)thisyearor$220,000nextyear.IfheconsumesCthisyear,theamountavailablefornextyear’sconsumptionis(203,703.7–C)x1.08.Togetequalconsumptioninbothyears,settheamountconsumedtodayequaltotheamountnextyear:C=(203,703.7–C)x1.08C=$105,769.2CHAPTER1第一章GoalsandGovernanceoftheFirm目標和公司的治理AnswerstoProblemSets習題的答案1. a. real1。答:真正的b. executiveairplanesb執行飛機c. brandnamesc.品牌d. financiald.金融e. bondse.債券f. investmentf.投資g. capitalbudgetingg.資本預算h. financingh.融資2. c,d,e,andgarerealassets.Othersarefinancial.2。c,d,e,g是真實的資產。其他人則金融。3. a. Financialassets,suchasstocksorbankloans,areclaimsheldby3所示。金融資產,如股票和銀行貸款,持有的索賠investors.Corporationssellfinancialassetstoraisethecashtoinvestinrealassetssuchasplantandequipment.Somerealassetsareintangible.投資者。公司出售金融資產以籌集現金投資于實物資產如廠房和設備。一些真正的資產是無形的。b.Capitalbudgetingmeansinvestmentinrealassets.Financingmeansb。資本預算是指在實際資產的投資。融資手段raisingthecashforthisinvestment.提高投資的現金。c.Thesharesofpubliccorporationsaretradedonstockexchangesandcanc。公共企業的股票在證券交易所交易,可以bepurchasedbyawiderangeofinvestors.Thesharesofcloselyheldcorporationsarenottradedandarenotgenerallyavailabletoinvestors.被廣泛的投資者購買。少數人持股公司的股票不是交易,不是一般提供給投資者。d. Unlimitedliability:investorsareresponsibleforallthefirm’sdebts.Asoled。無限責任:投資者負責所有公司的債務。獨家proprietorhasunlimitedliability.Investorsincorporationshavelimitedliability.Theycanlosetheirinvestment,butnomore.老板有無限責任。投資者在公司有限責任。他們可以失去投資,但僅此而已。e. Acorporationisaseparatelegal“person”withunlimitedlife.Itsownersholdsharesinthebusiness.Apartnershipisalimited-lifeagreementtoestablishandrunabusiness.e。公司是一個獨立的法律與無限的生活“人”。其持有公司股份的所有者。合作是一個有限的生命建立和運行一個業務的協議。4. c,d.4所示。c,d。5. b,c.5。b,c。6. Separationofownershipandmanagementtypicallyleadstoagencyproblems,6。分離公司的所有權和管理通常會導致代理問題,wheremanagersprefertoconsumeprivateperksormakeotherdecisionsfortheirprivatebenefit--ratherthanmaximizeshareholderwealth.經理更喜歡私人消費補貼或做出其他決定為他們的私人利益,而不是股東財富最大化。7. a. Assumingthattheencabulatormarketisrisky,an8%expectedreturnon7所示。a。假設encabulator市場是有風險的,8%的預期回報率theF&Hencabulatorinvestmentsmaybeinferiortoa4%returnonU.S.的F&Hencabulator投資可能不如在美國4%的回報governmentsecurities.政府證券。b. UnlesstheirfinancialassetsareassafeasU.S.governmentsecurities,theircostofcapitalwouldbehigher.TheCFOcouldconsiderwhattheexpectedreturnisonassetswithsimilarrisk.b。除非他們的金融資產一樣安全的美國政府證券,他們的資本成本會更高。首席財務官可以考慮預期回報的資產具有類似風險。8. Shareholderswillonlyvotefor(a)maximizeshareholderwealth.Shareholderscanmodifytheirpatternofconsumptionthroughborrowingandlending,matchriskpreferences,andhopefullybalancetheirowncheckbooks(orhireaqualifiedprofessionaltohelpthemwiththesetasks).8。股東只會投票支持(一)股東財富最大化。股東可以通過借貸和修改他們的消費方式貸款,風險偏好相匹配,希望平衡自己的支票簿(或雇傭一個合格的專業來幫助他們與這些任務)。9. Iftheinvestmentincreasesthefirm’swealth,itwillincreasethevalueofthefirm’sshares.Ms.Espinozacouldthensellsomeorallofthesemorevaluablesharesinordertoprovideforherretirementincome.9。如果投資增加了公司的財富,這將增加該公司的股票的價值。埃斯皮諾薩女士可以出售部分或全部這些更有價值的股票提供退休收入。10. AsthePutnamexampleillustrates,thefirm’svaluetypicallyfallsbysignificantlymorethantheamountofanyfinesandsettlements.Thefirm’sreputationsuffersinafinancialscandal,andthiscanhaveamuchlargereffectthanthefineslevied.Investorsmayalsowonderwhetherallofthemisdeedshavebeencontained.10。普特南的例子說明了,公司的價值通常下降遠遠超過任何罰款和定居點的數量。公司的聲譽遭受金融丑聞,這比罰款能有更大的效果。投資者可能也想知道是否所有的罪行已得到控制。11. Managerswouldactinshareholders’interestsbecausetheyhavealegaldutytoactintheirinterests.Managersmayalsoreceivecompensation,eitherbonusesorstockandoptionpayoutswhosevalueistied(roughly)tofirmperformance.Managersmayfearpersonalreputationaldamagethatwouldresultfromnotactinginshareholders’interests.Andmanagerscanbefiredbytheboardofdirectors,whichinturniselectedbyshareholders.Ifmanagersstillfailtoactinshareholders’interests,shareholdersmayselltheirshares,loweringthestock11。經理會在股東的利益,因為他們有法律義務在他們的利益。經理也可以獲得補償,獎金或股票和期權支付其價值(大約)公司業績掛鉤。經理可能會擔心個人名譽損害,不采取行動將導致股東的利益。和管理者可以被董事會解雇,進而是由股東選舉產生。如果經理們仍然未能在股東的利益,股東可能會出售他們的股票,降低庫存price,andpotentiallycreatingthepossibilityofatakeover,whichcanagainleadtochangesintheboardofdirectorsandseniormanagement.價格,并可能創造收購的可能性,可以再次導致董事會和高級管理層的變化。12. Managersthatareinsulatedfromtakeoversmaybemorepronetoagencyproblemsandthereforemorelikelytoactintheirowninterestsratherthaninshareholders’.Ifafirminstitutedanewtakeoverdefense,wemightexpecttoseethevalueofitssharesdeclineasagencyproblemsincreaseandlessshareholdervaluemaximizationoccurs.Thecounterargumentisthatdefensivemeasuresallowmanagerstonegotiateforahigherpurchasepriceinthefaceofatakeoverbid–tothebenefitofshareholdervalue.12。經理從收購絕緣可能更傾向于代理問題,因此更有可能在自身利益行事,而不是股東。如果一個公司制定了一套新的收購防御,我們可能期望看到其股票的價值減少代理問題增加,減少股東價值最大化。談判的抗辯是防御措施允許經理在面對更高的收購價格收購——股東價值的好處。AppendixQuestions:附件問題:1.Bothwouldstillinvestintheirfriend’sbusiness.Ainvestsandreceives$121,000forhisinvestmentattheendoftheyear(whichisgreaterthanthe$120,000itwouldreceivefromlendingat20%).Galsoinvests,butborrowsagainstthe$121,00