LawsonBusinessOrganizations:AComparativeStudyDr.Prof.DingDINGSchoolofLawUniversityofInternationalBusinessandEconomics(UIBE)ding0118@1LawsonBusinessOrganizations比較商事組織法

法律碩士課程(法學)2比較商事組織法

法律碩士課程(法學)2BibliographyAnyTextbooksyoustudiedbeforeAresearchpaperonanyCorporateLawissuesRobertaRomano,FoundationsofCorporateLaw[公司法基礎(影印本)],法律出版社,北京,2005年3月第一版.BrianR.Cheffins,CompanyLaw:Theory,StructureandOperation[林華偉等譯],法律出版社,北京,2001年4月第一版.3Bibliography3Content·TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarket·LegalCharacteristicsoftheCorporation:LimitedLiability·TheProductionandStructureofCorporationLaws·FinancingtheCorporation·InternalGovernanceStructures·ExternalGovernanceStructures:TheMarketforCorporateControl·SecuritiesRegulation4Content·TheoryoftheFirmandWhatIExpectfromyou…

ClasspresentationanddiscussionOff-classPreviewandReviewOpen-minded…5WhatIExpectfromyou…

5<國家中長期教育改革和發展規劃綱要>(2010-2020)[公開征求意見稿]豐田汽車召回香港華懋集團前董事局主席龔如心遺產案AVATAR6<國家中長期教育改革和發展規劃綱要>(2010-2020)[TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(1)為什么有企業/廠商?[交易\市場和企業/廠商]它們在資本市場的地位和作用代理成本和交易成本(為什么代理成本在現代企業不可避免?)1929年,Berle和Means的調查表明,當時美國200個最大的公司中,88個是由管理人員控制的.Berle和Means認為,股東對于代理成本的監督是無能為力的,你是否同意這一看法?授權機制的優勢和弊端7TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalTheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(2)為什么股東被稱為“剩余財產的所有者”(ResidualOwners)?股東表決權----→集體行為----→監督成本----→信息取得的代價(在股權分散的情況下,為什么股東都愿意做消極股東,搭便車-FreeRiders會很普遍?)如何約束代理人的機會主義行為?(代理成本是所有和控制分離的代價,第7頁)8TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalTheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(2)股價能否反映公司管理人員的懈怠或其他機會主義行為?監督機制包括哪些方面?9TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalTheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(3)經理和股東存在利益沖突,代理成本不可能為零;所有者是代理成本的最終承擔者,增加代理成本則可以使經理單方面受益,這里就出現了需要法律敢于的現象----成本轉嫁(Externality),也界定了法律干預的目標----減少代理成本.因此,檢驗公司法的合理性,重要的是看它是否減少了代理成本.方流芳:序言,第3頁.[Jensen&Meckling]

！結合我國<公司法>,你如何理解我國法律是否減少了代理成本,請舉例說明.10TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalTheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(4)企業正是針對機會主義\交易成本和合同不完備的回應(p.10).當合同一方是“交易專用財產”(trade-specificassets)的所有者時,交易雙方組建企業比簽定合同更有效率(pp.11-15)OliverWilliamson11TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalTheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(5)HenryHansmann----權衡締約成本和所有權成本企業所有權類型和所有權成本存在相關性.→投資者所有→雇員所有→所有者缺位當所有權成本過高的時候,沒有所有者比“產權清晰”更重要.12TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalTheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(6)以保險公司與投保人的關系為例,說明公司股東與管理者的關系.SoleOwnership-----PartialOwnershipPecuniaryBenefits-----Non-pecuniaryBenefits13TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalTheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(7)在了解代理成本的存在之后,你的投資選擇是什么?在放棄全部所有權歸自己所有的企業形式后,投資者會面臨哪些合同關系?[NexusofContracts]作為投資者,你希望公司法或者公司章程加入企業社會責任的內容嗎?14TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalTheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(8)Question8atpp.24-25.RonaldCoase,TheNatureoftheFirm,4Economics386,1937.[中文譯本???]15TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalInstitutionalArrangements在交易成本為零的條件下,制度的選擇不會影響經濟活動的最終效益.在交易成本不為零的現實世界里,制度的安排會在不同程度上影響交易的效益.郁光華:<公司法的本質>,法律出版社2006年版,第38頁.RonaldCoase,TheProblemofSocialCost,3JournalofLawandEconomics1,1960.16InstitutionalArrangements在交易成FurtherReadingMaterialsRobertaRomano,pp.26-60.17FurtherReadingMaterialsRoberLegalCharacteristicsoftheCorporation:LimitedLiabilityWhatfeaturesacorporation?Pleaseprovideyourunderstandingandobservations.18LegalCharacteristicsoftheCReadingMaterialsLimitedLiabilityandtheCorporationLimitedLiabilityintheTheoryoftheFirmTowardUnlimitedShareholderLiabilityforCorporateTorts19ReadingMaterialsLimitedLiabiFourCharacteristicLimitedLiabilityforInvestorsFreeTransferabilityofSharesPerpetualLifeCentralizedManagement[SeetheTextbook]20FourCharacteristicLimitedLiCloseCorporationvs.

PublicCorporationWhyisLimitedLiabilitycrucialtoamoderncorporation?LimitedliabilityCorporationShareholderCreditor21CloseCorporationvs.

Public有限責任的形成代表性論文如下：*PaulL.Davis,GowerandDavis’PrinciplesofModernCompanyLaw,40-46(6thEd,1997).*PhillipBlumburg,LimitedLiabilityandCorporateGroup,11JournalofCorporateLaw573(1986).22有限責任的形成代表性論文如下：22對于公司法人人格與股東有限責任合并意義的思考公司法人人格----積極的資產區分/公司財產成為公司債權人的擔保財產，為公司債權人設定優先于股東或者公司經營者的債權人受償的浮動擔保（floatingcharge），公司債權人在評估公司財產時具有比較優勢股東有限責任----消極的資產區分/股東的個人財產成為股東的債權人的擔保財產，降低了公司破產時的債權追討成本，簡化并實質性地穩定了股票的定價過程總體意義----便利交易另一方明確交易對象，區分公司與其股東，公司及其股東的總體融資成本得以降低23對于公司法人人格與股東有限責任合并意義的思考公司法人人格--對交易另一方的提示----來自公司法人人格與股東有限責任原則的適用共擔和轉嫁交易風險----債權人參與監督公司經營者隔離公司的不同經營活動與監督成本的增加——信息不對稱（InformationAsymmetry）參見：HenryHansmann&ReinierKraakman,TheEssentialRoleofOrganizationalLaw,110YaleLawJournal387(2000).24對交易另一方的提示----來自公司法人人格與股東有限責任原則LimitedLiabilityDoyouagreethatLimitedLiabilityeliminatestheriskofbusinessfailure?-作為有限責任的對價,應當要求公司服從政府管制\為顧客,雇員和相鄰社區的利益考慮而決策和行事.Whatdoes“externalizationofrisk”meaninthecontextofLimitedLiability?25LimitedLiabilityDoyouagreeWhyLimitedLiability:

SomeTheoriesLimitedLiabilityandTheoryofFirmsLimitedLiabilityandCorporateCapitalInformationandCostsInsurance:ASubstitute26WhyLimitedLiability:

SomeTLimitedLiabilityreducescosts“[W]eknowfromthesurvivaloflargecorporationsthatthecostsgeneratedbyagencyrelationsareoutweighedbythegainsfromseparationandspecializationoffunction.Limitedliabilityreducesthecostsofthisseparationandspecialization.”FrankH.Easterbrook&DanielR.Fischel,LimitedLiabilityandtheCorporation,52UniversityofChicagoLawReview,89,1985,SeetheTextbookp.63.27LimitedLiabilityreducescostLimitedLiabilityinacontextofdiversifiedshareholdingHowtoreducethecostsofmoralhazard?[FrankH.Easterbrook(美國第七巡回上訴法院法官)&DanielR.Fischel(芝加哥大學法學院教授)],TheEconomicStructureofCorporateLaw(公司法的經濟結構-張建偉&羅培新譯),LawPress,2005,pp.66-69.28LimitedLiabilityinacontextLiftingtheCorporateVeil法院為了平衡有限責任的成本和收益的嘗試29LiftingtheCorporateVeil法院為了LimitedLiabilityPiercingtheCorporateVeil:Analternativeforreducingthecostsofmoralhazard.-PiercingtheCorporateVeil-MinimumRegisteredCapital-MandatoryInsurance-DutiesofManagement-ExternalRegulation(fromthegovernment)

請用法經濟學的方法分析上述各種方法的效率.30LimitedLiabilityPiercingthePiercingtheCorporateVeilCloseCorporationsv.PublicCorporationsCorporateShareholdersv.PersonalShareholdersContractsv.TortsVoluntaryCreditorsv.InvoluntaryCreditors(Seetheabovetopic)InadequateCapitalInvestment31PiercingtheCorporateVeilCloContractsv.TortsPiercingtheCorporateVeil[SeetheNoteNo.7,Textbook,pp.80-81]32Contractsv.TortsPiercingtheTheProductionofCorporationLawsRobertaRomano,StateCompetitionforCorporateChartersJonathanR.Mace&GeoffreyP.Miller,TowardanInterestGroupTheoryofDelawareCorporateLawFrankH.Easterbrook&DanielR.Fischel,TheCorporateContractJeffreyN.Gordon,TheMandatoryStructureofCorporateLawJohnC.Coffee,Jr.,TheMandatory/EnablingBalanceinCorporateLaw:AnEssayontheJudicialRole33TheProductionofCorporationWhatConcerned:USAFederalism?Mandatory?+Enabling?+DefaultRules?34WhatConcerned:USAFederalism?StateCompetitionAllparticipantsinthedebatebelievethattheincomeproducedbythecharteringbusinessspursstatestoenactlawsthatfirmsdesire.Howdoprinciples----theshareholders----ensurethattheiragents----themanagers----behavefaithfully?35StateCompetitionAllparticipaWhynotfederaldomain?Cary’sArguments…Winter’sresponse…Romano’sfurtherobservation…36Whynotfederaldomain?Cary’sATransactionalCostExplanationFranchisetaxrevenueConstitutionalsupermajorityrequirementInvestmentsinlegalcapital37ATransactionalCostExplanatiTowardanInterestGroupTheoryof

DelawareCorporateLawTaxpayersDelawarebar38TowardanInterestGroupTheorEnablingLaws…TheCorporateCodeinalmosteverystateisan“enabling”statute….Thehandiworkofmanagersisfinalinallbutexceptionalortrivialinstances…EasterbrookandFischel,pp.96-97.

Doyouthinkitistheinvestorswhochoosewhethertoorganizeasacorporation,trust,partnership,mutualorcooperative?39EnablingLaws…TheCorporateCoAnInvisibleHandHowdoestheinvisiblehandtakeaneffectontheself-interestedmanagers?40AnInvisibleHandHowdoestheWhyisitamandatorystructureofcorporatelaw?InvestorProtectionHypothesisUncertaintyHypothesisPublicGoodHypothesisInnovationHypothesisOpportunisticAmendmentHypothesis41WhyisitamandatorystructurMandatory/EnablingBalanceinCorporateLawJudicialRole42Mandatory/EnablingBalanceinWhatConcerned:China??????43WhatConcerned:China?43WhattoCompromise?EUShouldweexpecttheemergenceofaEuropean“Delaware”withtheEuropeanCommunity’seconomicintegration?Romano,p.96.44WhattoCompromise?EUShouldwWhatLearned:Japan公司形式的調整派生訴訟45WhatLearned:Japan公司形式的調整45WhatLearned:ChinaPiercingtheCorporateVeilDerivateSuits46WhatLearned:ChinaPiercingthFutureTrends:ConvergenceandCompromise???47FutureTrends:ConvergenceandFinancingtheCorporationCliffordW.Smith,Jr.&JeroldB.Warner,OnFinancialContracting:AnAnalysisofBondCovenants,pp.121-128KennethLehn&AnnettePoulsen,ContractualResolutionofBondholder-StockholderConflictsinLeveragedBuyouts,pp.128-130MichaelC.Jensen,ActiveInvestors,LBOsandthePrivatizationofBankruptcy,pp.130-13248FinancingtheCorporationCliffCont’dWilliamA.Sahlman,TheStructureandGovernanceofVentureCapitalOrganization,pp.132-138FrankH.Easterbrook,TwoAgency-CostExplanationsofDividends,pp.138-13949Cont’dWilliamA.Sahlman,TheTwoMechanismtoRaiseCapitalIssuingEquityIssuingDebt50TwoMechanismtoRaiseCapitalAgencyCostsAgencycostofoutsideequityAgencycostofdebt51AgencyCostsAgencycostofoutAStudyonCorporateBondMaturity:PerspectivefromTransactionCostsandAgencyCosts

發行長期債券可以降低交易成本，但債券期限越長，代理成本就越高。企業在發行新債券時必須對交易成本和代理成本進行權衡，尋求最優債券期限結構。模型證明，發行企業債券時運用提前贖回條款、賣回條款、償債基金條款和轉換權等債券契約條款可以同時達到降低發債總成本和延長企業債券融資期限的目的。Transactioncostsassociatedwithbondissuescanbereducedbyissuingbondswithlongertermstomaturity.However,thelongerthetermtomaturity,thehighertheagencycostsassociatedwiththeissue.Firmsthatpursuingoptimalbondmaturitystructuremustweightransactionandagencycostsofanewcorporatebondissue.Modelsinthepaperindicatethatfirmscanmakeuseofbondcovenantssuchasthecallprovision,theputprovision,thesinkingfundprovisionandconvertibilitytoincreasethetermtomaturityofabondissueandatthesametimereducetheaggregateoftheagencycostsandtransactioncostsassociatedwithit.Xiao-kunZHOU(周孝坤),“企業債券期限結構研究―基于交易成本和代理成本視角”,<生態經濟>,2007/01,pp.75-77.52AStudyonCorporateBondMatu公司的債權人交易債權人機構貸款人持有公司發出的付款證明的人53公司的債權人交易債權人53Examplesinpp.119-120Example1----ChoiceofShareholder----ProjectLExample2----ChoiceofBondholder----ProjectLExample3----withLeveragedEffect+LimitedLiabilityConcernedforShareholder----ProjectH

54Examplesinpp.119-120ExampleWhynot100percentdebt-financedfirms?P.120,Textbook.55Whynot100percentdebt-finanMajorSourcesofConflictbetweenBondholdersandStockholdersDividendPaymentClaimDilutionAssetSubstitutionUnderinvestment56MajorSourcesofConflictbetwBondCovenantsRestrictionsontheFirm’sProduction/InvestmentPolicyRestrictingthePaymentofDividendsRestrictingSubsequentFinancingPolicyCovenantsSpecifyBondingActivitiesbytheFirmTheRoleoftheTrustIndentureandtheTrustee57BondCovenantsRestrictionsonRestrictionsontheFirm’sProduction/InvestmentPolicyRestrictionsonInvestmentsSecuredDebtsRestrictionsonMergers58RestrictionsontheFirm’sProRestrictingthePaymentofDividendsPp.124-12559RestrictingthePaymentofDivRestrictingSubsequentFinancingPolicyLimitationsonDebtandPrioritySinkingFundsConvertibilityProvisions60RestrictingSubsequentFinanciSinkingFunds償債基金為確保債券能干到期日有足夠的資金以償還債權人的本金，發行公司于債券未到期前預先按期提存的基金。償債基金通常是存入選定的一家銀行作為信托管理人，由信托管理人利用這筆基金進行各種投資，投資收益則增加償債基金。由此可見，償債基金相當于一筆專用基金存款。由于償債基金不在債券發行公司掌握中，其性質是由受托人管理的公司債券持有人的資金，但在實際償還本金之前，并不抵消債券發行公司的債務。債券發行公司應按券契約的規定提存償債，每年提存償債基金的終值應等于債券的本金。每年年終應根據信托管理人關于償債基金的收支報告，確認應有投資收益或投資損失。如果償債基金不足以清償券本金，則就首先從一般存款戶補足，然后作清償全部公司債的會計處理。公司償債基金應作為一項長期投資反映在年末資產負債表上，償債基金投資收益或損失則應作為其他項目列入當年的損益表。

61SinkingFunds償債基金為確保債券能干到期日有足CovenantsSpecifyBondingActivitiesbytheFirmTheRequiredPurchaseofInsurance62CovenantsSpecifyBondingActiTheRoleoftheTrustIndentureandtheTrusteePp.127-128信托擔保協議Awrittenagreementbetweentheuserofabondandhis/herbondholders,usuallydecifyinginterestrate,maturitydate,convertibility,andotherterms.Alsocalledindenture.指一張明確記載債券持有人與發行公司雙方所擁有的權利和義務的法律文件。由發行人和債券所有人達成的，通常標明利率、期日、兌換性和其他項目的書面協議，也叫契約63TheRoleoftheTrustIndentur債權人的考量期限回報風險----違約風險控制利益沖突談判64債權人的考量期限64InternalGovernanceStructureBoardofDirectorsShareholdersVotingRightsFiduciaryDutiesExecutiveCompensationBlock-holders(OutsideShareholders)65InternalGovernanceStructureBReadings(A)OliverE.Williamson,CorporateGovernance,pp.148-155.CliffordW.Smith,Jr.&BossL.Watts,IncentiveandTaxEffectsofExecutiveCompensationPlans,pp.155-162.RobertaRomano,TheShareholderSuit:LitigationWithoutFoundation?JohnC.Coffee,Jr.,Does“Unlawful”Mean“Criminal”?:ReflectionsontheDisappearingTort/CrimeDistinctioninAmericanLaw,pp.172-179.66Readings(A)OliverE.WilliamsReading…MainPointsinEachArticles…67Reading…MainPointsinEachArOliverE.WilliamsonWhatisCorporateGovernancefor?WhoaretheBODresponsiblefor?ShareholdersandotherConstituencies?OutsideShareholders’Role?Managersthemselves?68OliverE.WilliamsonWhatisCoCliffordW.Smith,Jr.

&

BossL.WattsManagementIncentivesandCorporateGovernance:proorcon?69CliffordW.Smith,Jr.

&

BosRobertaRomanoDerivativeSuits:SomeObservationswithEmpiricalStudiesPlaintiffs’counselsasshareholders’agents?70RobertaRomanoDerivativeSuitsJohnC.Coffee,Jr.TortsandCriminalLaws:Convergence?Benefits/Advantagesv.DisadvantagesWhy?71JohnC.Coffee,Jr.TortsandCFiduciaryDutiesWhyFiduciaryDutiesinCorporateLaw?HowaboutnormalContracts?ResidualOwnersandMarginalRisks訂立內容詳細的合同意味著極高的成本,信義義務成為不完備合同的補充規則.72FiduciaryDutiesWhyFiduciaryBJRDeferentialApproach(順從路徑)Incentive-compatibleContracts73BJRDeferentialApproach(順從路徑)DerivativeSuitsWhyanditsRole…74DerivativeSuitsWhyanditsRoReadings(B)FrankH.Easterbrook&DanielR.Fischel,VotinginCorporateLaw,pp.187-192.JeffreyN.Gordon,TiesthatBond:DualClassCommonStockandtheProblemofShareholderChoice,pp.192-197.JohnPound,ProxyContextsandtheEfficiencyofShareholderOversight,pp.197-206.MarkJ.Roe,APoliticalTheoryofAmericanCorporateFinance,pp.206-209.BernardS.Black,AgentsWatchingAgents:ThePromiseofInstitutionalInvestorVoice,pp.210-213.MichaelC.Jensen,ActiveInvestors,LBOs,andthePrivatizationofBankruptcy,pp.213-214.75Readings(B)FrankH.EasterbroFrankH.Easterbrook&DanielR.FischelFrankH.Easterbrook&DanielR.Fischel,VotinginCorporateLaw,pp.187-192.DoyouthinkVotingisakeyroleincorporategovernance?76FrankH.Easterbrook&DanielJeffreyN.GordonJeffreyN.Gordon,TiesthatBond:DualClassCommonStockandtheProblemofShareholderChoice,pp.192-197.WhydoAmericanCorporationsintroduceDualClassCommonStock?Howdoyoucommentonitsrelationshipwithcorporategovernance?77JeffreyN.GordonJeffreyN.GoJohnPoundJohnPound,ProxyContextsandtheEfficiencyofShareholderOversight,pp.197-206.WhatisProxyMechanism?Didtheauthorconcludethatproxycontextfacilitatedtheefficiencyofcorporategovernance?78JohnPoundJohnPound,ProxyCoMarkJ.RoeMarkJ.Roe,APoliticalTheoryofAmericanCorporateFinance,pp.206-209.HowwouldyouunderstandtheagencyprobleminAmericancorporategovernance?79MarkJ.RoeMarkJ.Roe,APoliBernardS.BlackBernardS.Black,AgentsWatchingAgents:ThePromiseofInstitutionalInvestorVoice,pp.210-213.WhowatchesWhom?80BernardS.BlackBernardS.BlaVI.ExternalGovernanceStructure:TheMarketforCorporateControl81VI.ExternalGovernanceStructCasesParamountCommunications,Inc.v.TimeInc.,571A.2d1140(Del.1990).Revlon,Inc.v.MacAndrews&ForbesHoldings,Inc.,506A.2d173(Del.1986).Moranv.HouseholdInternational.Inc.,500A.2d1346(Del.Ch.1988).UnocalCorp.v.MesaPetroleumCo.,493A.2d1049(Del.1988).CityCapitalAssociatesv.IntercoInc.,551A.2d787(Del.Ch.1988).82CasesParamountCommunications,AdditionalReadingMaterials…RonaldJ.GilsonandReinierKraakman,Delaware’sIntermediateStandardforDefensiveTactics:IsThereSubstancetoProportionalityReview,44BusinessLawyer247(1989).83AdditionalReadingMaterials…RVI.ExternalGovernanceStructure:TheMarketforCorporateControl(A)TheoriesandEvidence反接管條例:向底競爭還是力爭上游的競爭?接管是最大化了個人(目標公司股東)的權益,它是否同時可以最大化社會效益?84VI.ExternalGovernanceStruct代理成本和要約收購并購是降低代理成本的有效方式?當公司的代理成本過高時,要約收購行為給股東開除管理層的機會.兼并與敵意要約收購:哪個成本更大?公司管理層應當聽任股東和相互競爭的要約收購者對投標行為自由博弈?85代理成本和要約收購并購是降低代理成本的有效方式?當公司的代理WilliamsAct任何人持有公眾公司5%以上的股份時,必須提交報告,披露其持股比例和意圖;而且,要約收購者必須就其財務狀況和計劃，提交更為詳細的報告,同時,必須向公眾開放其收購要約一個月.要約收購者在要約期內不得向市場另行購買股票,另外,必須以最高的交割按比例買超額售出的股份.86WilliamsAct任何人持有公眾公司5%以上的股份時,A.TheoriesandEvidenceHenryG.Manne,MergersandtheMarketforCorporateControl,pp.223-224.WhydoesaCorporate-controlmarketneeded?87A.TheoriesandEvidenceHenryA.TheoriesandEvidenceMichaelC.Jensen,Takeovers:TheirCausesandConsequences,pp.225-228.FreeCashFlowTheoryTheRoleofDebtinMotivatingOrganizationalEfficiencyLeveragedBuyoutsandFreeCashFlowTheory88A.TheoriesandEvidenceMichaeA.TheoriesandEvidenceAndreiShleiferandLawrenceH.Summers,BreachofTrustinHostileTakeovers,pp.228-232.Whatdidtheauthorsdemonstrateinthearticleviathreeexamples?Anexusoflong-termcontractsbetweenshareholdersandstakeholders89A.TheoriesandEvidenceAndreiA.TheoriesandEvidenceYakovAmihudandBaruchLev,RiskReductionasaManagerialMotiveforConglomerateMergers,pp.232-233.Whatdrivesasubstantialnumberoffirmstoengageinconglomeratemergers?90A.TheoriesandEvidenceYakovA.TheoriesandEvidenceRichardRoll,TheHubrisHypothesisofCorporateTakeovers,pp.233-235.91A.TheoriesandEvidenceRicharA.TheoriesandEvidenceMichaelC.JensenandRichardS.Ruback,TheMarketforCorporateControl:TheScientificEvidence,pp.235-242.92A.TheoriesandEvidenceMichaeA.TheoriesandEvidenceGreggA.Jarrell,JamesA.BrickleyandJeffryM.Netter,TheMarketforCorporateControl:TheEmpiricalEvidenceSince1980,pp.242-245.93A.TheoriesandEvidenceGreggA.TheoriesandEvidenceSanjaiBhagat,AndreiShleiferandRobertW.Vishny,HostileTakeoversinthe1980s:TheReturntoCorporateSpecialization,pp.245-248.94A.TheoriesandEvidenceSanjai州法:反接管條例第一代反接管條例:對本州公司,州官員有出價否決權第二代反接管條例:只適用于本州公司,“控股條例”或者“公平價格條例”第三代接管條例:“企業聯合條例”大約有40個州制定有不同的接管條例95州法:反接管條例第一代反接管條例:對本州公司,州官員有出VI.ExternalGovernanceStructure:TheMarketforCorporateControl(B)TheProperRoleofaTarget’sManagementinRespondingtoaTenderOffer,pp.258-261.96VI.ExternalGovernanceStruct97979898GoodLuck!!!ding0118@99GoodLuck!!!ding0118@9LawsonBusinessOrganizations:AComparativeStudyDr.Prof.DingDINGSchoolofLawUniversityofInternationalBusinessandEconomics(UIBE)ding0118@100LawsonBusinessOrganizations比較商事組織法

法律碩士課程(法學)101比較商事組織法

法律碩士課程(法學)2BibliographyAnyTextbooksyoustudiedbeforeAresearchpaperonanyCorporateLawissuesRobertaRomano,FoundationsofCorporateLaw[公司法基礎(影印本)],法律出版社,北京,2005年3月第一版.BrianR.Cheffins,CompanyLaw:Theory,StructureandOperation[林華偉等譯],法律出版社,北京,2001年4月第一版.102Bibliography3Content·TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarket·LegalCharacteristicsoftheCorporation:LimitedLiability·TheProductionandStructureofCorporationLaws·FinancingtheCorporation·InternalGovernanceStructures·ExternalGovernanceStructures:TheMarketforCorporateControl·SecuritiesRegulation103Content·TheoryoftheFirmandWhatIExpectfromyou…

ClasspresentationanddiscussionOff-classPreviewandReviewOpen-minded…104WhatIExpectfromyou…

5<國家中長期教育改革和發展規劃綱要>(2010-2020)[公開征求意見稿]豐田汽車召回香港華懋集團前董事局主席龔如心遺產案AVATAR105<國家中長期教育改革和發展規劃綱要>(2010-2020)[TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(1)為什么有企業/廠商?[交易\市場和企業/廠商]它們在資本市場的地位和作用代理成本和交易成本(為什么代理成本在現代企業不可避免?)1929年,Berle和Means的調查表明,當時美國200個最大的公司中,88個是由管理人員控制的.Berle和Means認為,股東對于代理成本的監督是無能為力的,你是否同意這一看法?授權機制的優勢和弊端106TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalTheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(2)為什么股東被稱為“剩余財產的所有者”(ResidualOwners)?股東表決權----→集體行為----→監督成本----→信息取得的代價(在股權分散的情況下,為什么股東都愿意做消極股東,搭便車-FreeRiders會很普遍?)如何約束代理人的機會主義行為?(代理成本是所有和控制分離的代價,第7頁)107TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalTheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(2)股價能否反映公司管理人員的懈怠或其他機會主義行為?監督機制包括哪些方面?108TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalTheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(3)經理和股東存在利益沖突,代理成本不可能為零;所有者是代理成本的最終承擔者,增加代理成本則可以使經理單方面受益,這里就出現了需要法律敢于的現象----成本轉嫁(Externality),也界定了法律干預的目標----減少代理成本.因此,檢驗公司法的合理性,重要的是看它是否減少了代理成本.方流芳:序言,第3頁.[Jensen&Meckling]

！結合我國<公司法>,你如何理解我國法律是否減少了代理成本,請舉例說明.109TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalTheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(4)企業正是針對機會主義\交易成本和合同不完備的回應(p.10).當合同一方是“交易專用財產”(trade-specificassets)的所有者時,交易雙方組建企業比簽定合同更有效率(pp.11-15)OliverWilliamson110TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalTheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(5)HenryHansmann----權衡締約成本和所有權成本企業所有權類型和所有權成本存在相關性.→投資者所有→雇員所有→所有者缺位當所有權成本過高的時候,沒有所有者比“產權清晰”更重要.111TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalTheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(6)以保險公司與投保人的關系為例,說明公司股東與管理者的關系.SoleOwnership-----PartialOwnershipPecuniaryBenefits-----Non-pecuniaryBenefits112TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalTheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(7)在了解代理成本的存在之后,你的投資選擇是什么?在放棄全部所有權歸自己所有的企業形式后,投資者會面臨哪些合同關系?[NexusofContracts]作為投資者,你希望公司法或者公司章程加入企業社會責任的內容嗎?113TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalTheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(8)Question8atpp.24-25.RonaldCoase,TheNatureoftheFirm,4Economics386,1937.[中文譯本???]114TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalInstitutionalArrangements在交易成本為零的條件下,制度的選擇不會影響經濟活動的最終效益.在交易成本不為零的現實世界里,制度的安排會在不同程度上影響交易的效益.郁光華:<公司法的本質>,法律出版社2006年版,第38頁.RonaldCoase,TheProblemofSocialCost,3JournalofLawandEconomics1,1960.115InstitutionalArrangements在交易成FurtherReadingMaterialsRobertaRomano,pp.26-60.116FurtherReadingMaterialsRoberLegalCharacteristicsoftheCorporation:LimitedLiabilityWhatfeaturesacorporation?Pleaseprovideyourunderstandingandobservations.117LegalCharacteristicsoftheCReadingMaterialsLimitedLiabilityandtheCorporationLimitedLiabilityintheTheoryoftheFirmTowardUnlimitedShareholderLiabilityforCorporateTorts118ReadingMaterialsLimitedLiabiFourCharacteristicLimitedLiabilityforInvestorsFreeTransferabilityofSharesPerpetualLifeCentralizedManagement[SeetheTextbook]119FourCharacteristicLimitedLiCloseCorporationvs.

PublicCorporationWhyisLimitedLiabilitycrucialtoamoderncorporation?LimitedliabilityCorporationShareholderCreditor120CloseCorporationvs.

Public有限責任的形成代表性論文如下：*PaulL.Davis,GowerandDavis’PrinciplesofModernCompanyLaw,40-46(6thEd,1997).*PhillipBlumburg,LimitedLiabilityandCorporateGroup,11JournalofCorporateLaw573(1986).121有限責任的形成代表性論文如下：22對于公司法人人格與股東有限責任合并意義的思考公司法人人格----積極的資產區分/公司財產成為公司債權人的擔保財產，為公司債權人設定優先于股東或者公司經營者的債權人受償的浮動擔保（floatingcharge），公司債權人在評估公司財產時具有比較優勢股東有限責任----消極的資產區分/股東的個人財產成為股東的債權人的擔保財產，降低了公司破產時的債權追討成本，簡化并實質性地穩定了股票的定價過程總體意義----便利交易另一方明確交易對象，區分公司與其股東，公司及其股東的總體融資成本得以降低122對于公司法人人格與股東有限責任合并意義的思考公司法人人格--對交易另一方的提示----來自公司法人人格與股東有限責任原則的適用共擔和轉嫁交易風險----債權人參與監督公司經營者隔離公司的不同經營活動與監督成本的增加——信息不對稱（InformationAsymmetry）參見：HenryHansmann&ReinierKraakman,TheEssentialRoleofOrganizationalLaw,110YaleLawJournal387(2000).123對交易另一方的提示----來自公司法人人格與股東有限責任原則LimitedLiabilityDoyouagreethatLimitedLiabilityeliminatestheriskofbusinessfailure?-作為有限責任的對價,應當要求公司服從政府管制\為顧客,雇員和相鄰社區的利益考慮而決策和行事.Whatdoes“externalizationofrisk”meaninthecontextofLimitedLiability?124LimitedLiabilityDoyouagreeWhyLimitedLiability:

SomeTheoriesLimitedLiabilityandTheoryofFirmsLimitedLiabilityandCorporateCapitalInformationandCostsInsurance:ASubstitute125WhyLimitedLiability:

SomeTLimitedLiabilityreducescosts“[W]eknowfromthesurvivaloflargecorporationsthatthecostsgeneratedbyagencyrelationsareoutweighedbythegainsfromseparationandspecializationoffunction.Limitedliabilityreducesthecostsofthisseparationandspecialization.”FrankH.Easterbrook&DanielR.Fischel,LimitedLiabilityandtheCorporation,52UniversityofChicagoLawReview,89,1985,SeetheTextbookp.63.126LimitedLiabilityreducescostLimitedLiabilityinacontextofdiversifiedshareholdingHowtoreducethecostsofmoralhazard?[FrankH.Easterbrook(美國第七巡回上訴法院法官)&DanielR.Fischel(芝加哥大學法學院教授)],TheEconomicStructureofCorporateLaw(公司法的經濟結構-張建偉&羅培新譯),LawPress,2005,pp.66-69.127LimitedLiabilityinacontextLiftingtheCorporateVeil法院為了平衡有限責任的成本和收益的嘗試128LiftingtheCorporateVeil法院為了LimitedLiabilityPiercingtheCorporateVeil:Analternativeforreducingthecostsofmoralhazard.-PiercingtheCorporateVeil-MinimumRegisteredCapital-MandatoryInsurance-DutiesofManagement-ExternalRegulation(fromthegovernment)

請用法經濟學的方法分析上述各種方法的效率.129LimitedLiabilityPiercingthePiercingtheCorporateVeilCloseCorporationsv.PublicCorporationsCorporateShareholdersv.PersonalShareholdersContractsv.TortsVoluntaryCreditorsv.InvoluntaryCreditors(Seetheabovetopic)InadequateCapitalInvestment130PiercingtheCorporateVeilCloContractsv.TortsPiercingtheCorporateVeil[SeetheNoteNo.7,Textbook,pp.80-81]131Contractsv.TortsPiercingtheTheProductionofCorporationLawsRobertaRomano,StateCompetitionforCorporateChartersJonathanR.Mace&GeoffreyP.Miller,TowardanInterestGroupTheoryofDelawareCorporateLawFrankH.Easterbrook&DanielR.Fischel,TheCorporateContractJeffreyN.Gordon,TheMan