1、外文文獻(xiàn)翻譯譯文一、 外文原文原文：financial accounting information and corporate governance systemsabstractwe posit that limited transparency of firms operations to outside investors increases demands on governance systems to alleviate moral hazard problems. the accounting information system is one part of the comp

2、any governs, which has a close relation with the corporate governance. the accounting information system has a reaction to the corporate governance. and the quality of the accounting information would be influenced by the corporate governance .in current society, the phenomenon that accounting infor

3、mation distortion keeps appeared all the time. however,this reasonable arrangements wouldnt be carried out effectually because the sanction for the unit principal is not enough and its range is dwindled. and therefore,this paper suggests that accounting law and criminal law should be revised,examina

4、tions on the quality of accounting information should be strengthened and the socially informing system should be set up. it is necessary to perfect corporate governance in order to make the quality of the accounting information better in this article; i explain what the corporate governance and the

5、 quality of accounting information are present now. and then i will try to analysis the relationship between the deficiency of corporate governance and the accounting information quality, the influence that the accounting information quality 。introductionin the u.s. and in other economies with stron

6、g legal protection of outside shareholders rights, transparency of a firms operations and activities to outside investors disciplines managers to act in shareholders interests.1 wepos it that limited corporate transparency increases demands on corporate governance systems to alleviate moral hazard p

7、roblems resulting from a more severe information gap between managers and shareholders, ceteris paribus. we consider two factors that limit corporate transparency to varying degrees across large public u.s. companies: (1) relatively uninformative financial accounting systems characterized by the ina

8、bility of firms gaap earnings to explain changes in shareholder value in a timely fashion (low earnings timeliness) and, (2) firm complexity due to extensivegeographic and/or line of business diversification.accountinginformationcanhaveasignificantimpactoneconomiclife.realreliableaccountinginformati

9、onistheimportantbasisforcompaniestooperateday-to-daybusinessandmakecorrectdecisions,theimportantreferenceforthegovernmentstomakemacro-economicregulationandcontrol,thefavorableprotectionforthenormaloperationofmarketeconomy.aschinasmarketeconomicsystemhasimprovedsteadily,theroleofaccountingisincreasin

10、glyimportantineconomy,itisthegreatestconcernandmustbeansweredbyaccountingprofessionthatwhetheraccountinginformationisusedtomakedecisionsforgovernment,investorsandotherusers.butchinascurrentdisclosureofaccountinginformationshouldnotbeoptimistic,kindsofdisclosureproblemsoftenoccursuchasexcessivedisclo

11、sureofaccountinginformation,inadequatedisclosure,untruedisclosure,untimelydisclosure,abnormaldisclosure,etc.theseproblemsseriouslyaffectscorrectdecision-makingoftheinformationusers,disruptsthedistributionofsocialresources.with respect to monitoring technology, we conjecture that inherent limitations

12、 ofirms information systems in generating information relevant for monitoringmanagerial behavior influence governance structure formation by affecting the costbenefit trade-off underlying governance mechanism configurations. financialaccounting systems are a logical starting point for investigating

13、properties ofinformation systems important for addressing moral hazard problems. auditedfinancial statements prepared under generally accepted accounting principles (gaap) produce extensive, credible, low cost information that forms the foundation of the firm-specific information set available for a

14、ddressing agency problems. inmonitoring top managers, boards and outside investors cannot simply rely on stockprice changes to provide necessary information about the source of changes to firmvalue. for example, agency models generally imply that managers should be held. accountable for controllable

15、 events and not uncontrollable events, while stock returns aggregate the implications of all events. the accounting system facilitates boards efforts to separate controllable from uncontrollable events. as an illustration, managers often submit budgets to the board and then make periodic reports exp

16、laining variances from budget, presumably aiding boards in separating controllable from uncontrollable events (e.g., zimmerman, 2002, chapter 6)measuring governance value of accounting numbers we conjecture that the extent to which current accounting numbers capture theinfor mation set underlying cu

17、rrent changes in value (i.e., earnings timeliness, asdefined in our study) is a fundamental determinant of their governance value todirectors and in vestors. directors monitor managerial and firm performance, ratify managerial decisions, provide managerial incentives, and aid in strategic planningac

18、tivities (e.g., strategy development, succession planning). to carry out these duties, directors demand information to help them understand both how and why equity values are changing. for example, the detailed accounting system facilitates boards efforts to separate controllable from uncontrollable

19、 events to aid in the managerial evaluation process. outside investors and financial analysts who monitor firm and managerial performance also demand such information. stock prices provideinformation about overall changes in equity value. accounting systems, by collecting and summarizing the financi

20、al effects of firms investment, operating, and financing activities, convey information about the underlying sources of changes in equity value. earnings timeliness measures the extent to which current earnings capture the information set underlying contemporaneous changes in stock price. however, w

21、e acknowledge that the nature of this measure raises conceptual issues about our hypothesis that earnings timeliness is a determinant of governance choices. in particular, if stock prices efficiently reflect all information available to marketparticipants, is not theinfor mation also availableto res

22、idual claimants and theboard? and if so, why would firms need costly monitoring mechanisms or specificknowledge gathering to substitute for low earnings timeliness? why not just use stock price directly, or simply extract the information included in stock price? we draw on economic theory to address

23、 these questions in support of our hypotheses.the detailed information set reflected in stock price is not freely available to the board and residual claimants. grossman and stiglitz (1980) demonstrate that fullyrevealing stock prices are incompatible with costly information collection activities of

24、 investors. in an equilibrium where private information collection and processing activities are costly, prices cannot be fully revealing. this implies that boards and others cannot extract the underlying information from price.however, one could argue that even if prices are not invertible back to

25、the markets underlying information set, managers and directors have direct access to all this information. is this the case? research documents a significant relation betweenchanges in stock price and subsequent investment decisions (e.g., morck et al., 1990; baker et al., 2001). one potential expla

26、nation for this is that stock pricecommunicates new information to a firms managers that is then incorporated into investment decision (see morck et al., 1990 for a discussion of competing hypotheses).4 but, even if a firms managers know the entire information set, thisdoes not imply that the board

27、of directors knows it, and so board structure mayrespond to low earnings timeliness as the board seeks to close the information gap between them and top management.5 in addition, even if the board knows the entire information set, it is not necessarily the case that residual claimholders know it, an

28、d so costly monitoring activities may respond to low earnings timeliness as residual claimholders attempt to compensate for the information gap between them and both the firms executives and board of directors. finally, stock price formation is a complex process and the aggregated nature of informat

29、ion impounded in price potentially limits its governance usefulness (e.g., paul, 1992). as a result, utilizing stock price as a substitute information source forpoor accounting numbers is likely to involve substantial error and to require extensive sophistication, knowledge, and effort on the part o

30、f board members. thus, consistent with our hypotheses, costly governance mechanisms characterized by strong equity-based incentives for outside shareholders, directors, and executives, as well as a relatively knowledgeable, capable, and highly motivated board are likely demanded when earnings timeli

31、ness is low. more useful, earnings information is actually superfluous? the answer is no. while stock price changes provide overall information about changes in firm value, information from the accounting system aids directors and investors in understandingthe source of changes in firm value. for ex

32、ample, stock price changescommingle events under the control of managers with events that are not, while agency theory counsels that managers should be held accountable for controllable events and not uncontrollable events. the accounting system facilitates boards efforts to separate controllable fr

33、om uncontrollable events through analysis of budget variances and other techniques. thus, even if disaggregated accountinginformation explained 100% of the variance in returns, accounting would not be superfluous to governance as stock price is not a sufficient statistic for the deta. issues of reve

34、rse causalitywhile accounting information systems per se may directly influence governancechoices, we must acknowledge the possibility that governance structures also influence the properties of accounting numbers through accounting policy choices and earnings management activities.27 one econometri

35、c solution to this question would involve using an instrumental variable technique. this, however, does not appear to be a fruitful approach in this case, as it is not obvious what to use as areasonable instrument. only a small amount of thecrosssectionalvariation in earnings timeliness is explained

36、 by a wide range of firm characteristics. while we could use any or all of these variables as an instrument (e.g., two-stage least square), it would result in throwing out over 95% of the crosssectional variation in timeliness (recall that the explanatory power of the earnings timeliness models usin

37、g various firm characteristics .while we cannot definitively rule out reverse causality, we note that our timelinessmetrics are based on core earnings, defined as earnings before special items, extraordinary items and discontinued operations. while it is of course possible to manipulate core earning

38、s, the focus on core earnings excludes discretionary accruals within special items, extraordinary items and discontinued operations, which are arguably outlets for earnings management activity.further, it is not clear how much discretion managers have over earningstimeliness. range of important firm

39、 characteristics. even if executives were significantly manipulating earnings, it is not clear if this would impact earnings timeliness. if marginal sophisticated investors see through earnings management, then earnings management unlikely impacts timeliness. in this instance, our timeliness composi

40、te; could also be impacted if earnings management introducesnoise in earnings. if they are being fooled, then earnings management could increasee arnings timeliness as investors are fooled into thinking that current earnings are more informative than they really are. in the end, it is not clear how

41、or if earnings management impacts earnings/returns relations estimated over long time periods.summary and implicationsthis paper investigates how ownership concentration, equity incentives of directors, executive compensation and board structure vary with inherent limitationsof firms information sys

42、tems and with firms organizational complexity. we adopt the perspective that observed governance structures represent optimal contracting arrangements endogenously determined by firms contracting environments. we proxy for the intrinsic governance usefulness of accounting information with earnings t

43、imeliness, defined as the extent to which current accounting earnings incorporate current economic income or value-relevant information. we empirically document that only a small portion of the cross-sectional variation in earnings timeliness can be explained by firms growth opportunities, return vo

44、latility, size, industry and geographic diversification, and past performance. our inability to explain the cross-sectional variation in earnings timeliness is consistent with the idea that timeliness is distinct from other fundamental firm characteristics. most existing research into the stewardshi

45、prelevance and research into the value relevance of accounting have proceeded independently. we explore whether the relative importance of accounting numbers in equity valuation appears to matter in the determination of corporategovernance systems of large public companies in the u.s. although causa

46、l inferences are problematic, associations between measures of the usefulness of accounting numbers in valuation and governance structures are a necessary (although not sufficient) condition for concluding that governance structures are influenced by the limitations of accounting numbers for valuati

47、on purposesfinally, our evidence supports the notion that the firm-specific timeliness metrics capture meaningful differences across large public u.s. companies in the information properties of accounting numbers. this provides a basis for using such firm-specific metrics to investigate other econom

48、ic consequences of the information properties of accounting, such as voluntary disclosures, corporate signaling, analyst activity, corporate investment decisions, financing choices, and the cost of debt and equity capital.source : robert bushman,qi chen.financial accounting information, organization

49、al complexity and corporate governance systemsj.journal of accounting & economics,2004,37(2) 譯文：財務(wù)會計信息與公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)的關(guān)系摘要我們要增加公司治理制度所要求的透明度，以減輕道德風(fēng)險問題。因此我們就有必要研究會計信息系統(tǒng)與公司治理之間的關(guān)系，會計信息質(zhì)量優(yōu)劣會影響公司治理好壞且會計信息系統(tǒng)對公司治理具有反作用。在目前的社會中，會計信息失真現(xiàn)象屢見不鮮。要完善公司治理，以提高會計信息質(zhì)量迫在眉睫。在本文中本人解釋什么是公司治理與會計信息質(zhì)量。然后，我會盡量分析公司治理缺陷對會計信息質(zhì)量的影響

50、。介紹在美國和其他國家的法律保護(hù)下, 股東具有較全面的了解公司的經(jīng)營操作和活動空間，以及在一定程度上限制了投資者經(jīng)理的行為。公司透明度的增加對公司治理系統(tǒng)是有要求的。而減輕道德風(fēng)險遺留下來的問題更加嚴(yán)重阻礙了管理者和股東之間溝通。在其它條件不變的情況下，我們認(rèn)為這兩個因素在不同程度的限制在公共場合下美國公司的透明度。(1)在公認(rèn)的會計原則下，公司將收入的變化跟隨股東價值的變化而變化(2)公司治理的復(fù)雜性是由于廣泛地理因素和業(yè)務(wù)多樣化而形成的。針對監(jiān)視機(jī)制,我們推測,公司的內(nèi)部控制能夠?qū)镜男畔⑾到y(tǒng)在生成相關(guān)治理結(jié)構(gòu)中所需的信息進(jìn)行監(jiān)測管理。但同時成本效益在治理機(jī)制配置上具有潛在的影響。會計信

51、息系統(tǒng)重要的解決問題是道德風(fēng)險問題。在公認(rèn)會計準(zhǔn)則下，審計財務(wù)報表編制具有廣泛性,可靠性。而其形成的特定基礎(chǔ)的可供解決代理問題。高層管理者,董事會和外部投資者不能僅僅依靠股票價格變化所提供的信息來改變的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)和方向。例如,代理模型通常意味著管理者應(yīng)該為控制事件和無法控制的事件負(fù)責(zé), 而股票收益率的高低無法看出是受到哪方面的影響，但是會計信息可以在一定程度上將不可控制和可控制因素區(qū)分開。舉一個例子,管理者經(jīng)常向董事會提交預(yù)算,然后使周期報告從預(yù)算出發(fā)，來解釋差異的來源。 (如,zimmerman,2002年,第6章)測量的治理價值會計數(shù)字和組織的復(fù)雜性我們推測,目前會計信息數(shù)據(jù)的變化(如盈利的及時性)其根本決定因素是由董事會和投資者決定的。董事監(jiān)控管理層、批準(zhǔn)公司業(yè)績的管理決策,提供管理創(chuàng)新、并有助于戰(zhàn)略