企業盈利質量分析中英文對照外文翻譯文獻企業盈利質量分析中英文對照外文翻譯文獻(文檔含英文原文和中文翻譯)原文：Measuringthequalityofearnings1.IntroductionGenerallyacceptedaccountingprinciples(GAAP)offersomeflexibilityinpreparingthefinancialstatementsandgivethefinancialmanagerssomefreedomtoselectamongaccountingpoliciesandalternatives.Earningmanagementusestheflexibilityinfinancialreportingtoalterthefinancialresultsofthefirm(OrtegaandGrant,2003).Inotherwords,earningsmanagementismanipulatingtheearningtoachieveapredeterminedtargetsetbythemanagement.Itisapurposefulinterventionintheexternalreportingprocesswiththeintentofobtainingsomeprivategain(Schipper,1989).Levit(1998)definesearningmanagementasagrayareawheretheaccountingisbeingperverted;wheremanagersarecuttingcorners;and,whereearningsreportsreflectthedesiresofmanagementratherthantheunderlyingfinancialperformanceofthecompany.Thepopularpresslistsseveralinstancesofcompaniesengaginginearningsmanagement.SensormaticElectronics,whichstampedshippingdatesandtimesonsoldmerchandise,stoppeditsclocksonthelastdayofaquarteruntilcustomershipmentsreacheditssalesgoal.CertainbusinessunitsofCendantCorporationinflatedrevenuesnearly$500millionjustpriortoamerger;subsequently,CendantrestatedrevenuesandagreedwiththeSECtochangerevenuerecognitionpractices.AOLrestatedearningsfor$385millioninimproperlydeferredmarketingexpenses.In1994,theWallStreetJournaldetailedthemanywaysinwhichGeneralElectricsmoothedearnings,includingthecarefultimingofcapitalgainsandtheuseofrestructuringchargesandreserves,inresponsetothearticle,GeneralElectricreportedlyreceivedcallsfromothercorporationsquestioningwhysuchcommonpracticeswere“front”news.Earningmanagementoccurswhenmanagersusejudgmentinfinancialreportingandinstructuringtransactionstoalterfinancialreportstoeithermisleadsomestakeholdersabouttheunderlyingeconomicperformanceofthecompanyortoinfluencecontractualoutcomesthatdependonreportedaccountingnumbers(HealyandWhalen,1999).MagrathandWeld(2002)indicatethatabusiveearningsmanagementandfraudulentpracticesbeginsbyengaginginearningsmanagementschemesdesignedprimarilyto“smooth”earningstomeetinternallyorexternallyimposedearningsforecastsandanalysts’expectations.Evenifearningsmanagementdoesnotexplicitlyviolateaccountingrules,itisanethicallyquestionablepractice.Anorganizationthatmanagesitsearningssendsamessagetoitsemployeesthatbendingthetruthisanacceptablepractice.Executiveswhopartakeofthispracticeriskcreatinganethicalclimateinwhichotherquestionableactivitiesmayoccur.Amanagerwhoasksthesalesstafftohelpsalesonedayforfeitsthemoralauthoritytocriticizequestionablesalestacticsanotherday.Earningsmanagementcanalsobecomeaveryslipperyslope,whichrelativelyminoraccountinggimmicksbecomingmoreandmoreaggressiveuntiltheycreatematerialmisstatementsinthefinancialstatements(Clikeman,2003)TheSecuritiesandExchangeCommission(SEC)issuedthreestaffaccountingbulletins(SAB)toprovideguidanceonsomeaccountingissuesinordertopreventtheinappropriateearningsmanagementactivitiesbypubliccompanies:SABNo.99“Materiality”,SABNo.100“RestructuringandImpairmentCharges”andSABNo.101“RevenueRecognition”.Earningsmanagementbehaviormayaffectthequalityofaccountingearnings,whichisdefinedbySchipperandVincent(2003)astheextenttowhichthereportedearningsfaithfullyrepresentHichsianeconomicincome,whichistheamountthatcanbeconsumed(i.e.paidoutasdividends)duringaperiod,whileleavingthefirmequallywelloffatthebeginningandtheendoftheperiod.Assessmentofearningqualityrequiressometimestheseparationsofearningsintocashfromoperationandaccruals,themoretheearningsisclosedtocashfromoperation,thehigherearningsquality.AsPenman(2001)statesthatthepurposeofaccountingqualityanalysisistodistinguishbetweenthe“hard”numbersresultingfromcashflowsandthe“soft”numbersresultingfromaccrualaccounting.Thequalityofearningscanbeassessedbyfocusingontheearningpersistence;highqualityearningsaremorepersistentandusefulintheprocessofdecisionmaking.BeneishandVargus(2002)investigatewhetherinsidertradingisinformativeaboutearningsqualityusingearningpersistenceasameasureforthequalityofearnings,theyfindthatincome-increasingaccrualsaresignificantlymorepersistentforfirmswithabnormalinsiderbuyingandsignificantlylesspersistentforfirmswithabnormalinsiderselling,relativetofirmswhichthereisnoabnormalinsidertrading.Balsametal.(2003)usesthelevelofdiscretionaryaccrualsasadirectmeasureforearningquality.Thediscretionaryaccrualsmodelisbasedonaregressionrelationshipbetweenthechangeintotalaccrualsasdependentvariableandchangeinsalesandchangeinthelevelofproperty,plantandequipment,changeincashflowfromoperationsandchangeinfirmsize(totalassets)asindependentvariables.Iftheregressioncoefficientsinthismodelaresignificantthatmeansthatthereisearningmanagementinthatfirmandtheearningsqualityislow.Thisresearchpresentsanempiricalstudyonusingthreedifferentapproachesofmeasuringthequalityofearningsondifferentindustry.Thenotionis;ifthereisacompleteconsistencyamongthethreemeasures,ageneralassessmentforthequalityofearnings(highorlow)canbereachedand,ifnot,thequalityofearningsisquestionableandneedsdifferentotherapproachesformeasurementandmoreinvestigationsandanalysis.Therestofthepaperisdividedintofollowingsections:Earningsmanagementincentives,Earningsmanagementtechniques,Modeldevelopment,Sampleandstatisticalresults,andConclusion.2.Earningsmanagementincentives2.1Meetinganalysts’expectationsIngeneral,analysts’expectationsandcompanypredictionstendtoaddresstwohigh-profilecomponentsoffinancialperformance:revenueandearningsfromoperations.Thepressuretomeetrevenueexpectationsisparticularlyintenseandmaybetheprimarycatalystinleadingmanagerstoengageinearningmanagementpracticesthatresultinquestionableorfraudulentrevenuerecognitionpractices.MagrathandWeld(2002)indicatethatimproperrevenuerecognitionpracticeswerethecauseofone-thirdofallvoluntaryorforcedrestatementsofincomefiledwiththeSECfrom1977to2000.Ironically,itisoftenthecompaniesthemselvesthatcreatethispressuretomeetthemarket’searningsexpectations.Itiscommonpracticeforcompaniestoprovideearningsestimatestoanalystsandinvestors.Managementisoftenfacedwiththetaskofensuringtheirtargetedestimatesaremet.Severalcompanies,includingCoca-ColaCo.,IntelCorp.,andGilletteCo.,havetakenacontrarystanceandnolongerprovidequarterlyandannualearningsestimatestoanalysts.Indoingso,thesecompaniesclaimtheyhaveshiftedtheirfocusfrommeetingshort-termearningsestimatestoachievingtheirlong-termstrategies(MckayandBrown,2002).2.2Toavoiddebt-covenantviolationsandminimizepoliticalcostsSomefirmshavetheincentivetoavoidviolatingearnings-baseddebtcovenants.Ifviolated,thelendermaybeabletoraisetheinterestrateonthedebtordemandimmediaterepayment.Consequently,somefirmsmayuseearnings-managementtechniquestoincreaseearningstoavoidsuchcovenantviolations.Ontheotherhand,someotherfirmshavetheincentivetolowerearningsinordertominimizepoliticalcostsassociatedwithbeingseenastooprofitable.Forexample,ifgasolinepriceshavebeenincreasingsignificantlyandoilcompaniesareachievingrecordprofitlevel,thentheremaybeincentiveforthegovernmenttointerveneandenactanexcess-profittaxorattempttointroducepricecontrols.2.3Tosmoothearningstowardalong-termsustainabletrendFormanyyearsithasbeenbelievedthatafirmshouldattempttoreducethevolatilityinitsearningsstreaminordertomaximizeshareprice.Becauseahighlyviolateearningpatternindicatesrisk,thereforethestockwilllosevaluecomparedtootherswithmorestableearningspatterns.Consequently,firmshaveincentivestomanageearningstohelpachieveasmoothandgrowingearningsstream(OrtegaandGrant,2003).2.4MeetingthebonusplanrequirementsHealy(1985)providestheevidencethatearningsaremanagedinthedirectionthatisconsistentwithmaximizingexecutives’earnings-basedbonus.Whenearningswillbebelowtheminimumlevelrequiredtoearnabonus,thenearningaremanagedupwardsothattheminimumisachievedandabonusisearned.Conversely,whenearningwillbeabovethemaximumlevelatwhichnoadditionalbonusispaid,thenearningsaremanageddownward.Theextraearningsthatwillnotgenerateextrabonusthiscurrentperiodaresavedtobeusedtoearnabonusinafutureperiod.Whenearningsarebetweentheminimumandthemaximumlevels,thenearningsaremanagedupwardinordertoincreasethebonusearnedinthecurrentperiod.2.5ChangingmanagementEarningsmanagementusuallyoccursaroundthetimeofchangingmanagement,theCEOofacompanywithpoorperformanceindicatorswilltrytoincreasethereportedearningsinordertopreventorpostponebeingfired.Ontheotherhand,thenewCEOwilltryshiftpartoftheincometofutureyearsaroundthetimewhenhis/herperformancewillbeevaluatedandmeasured,andblamethelowearningatthebeginningofhiscontractontheactsofthepreviousCEO.3.EarningsmanagementtechniquesOneofthemostcommonearningsmanagementtoolsisreportingrevenuebeforethesellerhasperformedunderthetermsofasalescontract(SEC,SABNo.101,1999).AnotherareaofconcerniswhereacompanyfailstocomplywithGAAPandinappropriatelyrecordsrestructuringchargesandgeneralreservesforfuturelosses,reversingorrelievingreservesininappropriateperiods,andrecognizingornotrecognizinganassetimpairmentchargeintheappropriateperiod(SEC,SABNo.100,1999).Managerscaninfluencereportedexpensesthroughassumptionsandestimatessuchastheassumedrateofreturnonpensionplanassetandtheestimatedusefullivesoffixedassets,alsotheycaninfluencereportedearningsbycontrollingthetimingofpurchasing,deliveries,discretionaryexpenditures,andsaleofassets.3.1Bigbath“BigBath”chargesareone-timerestructuringcharge.Currentearningswillbedecreasedbyoverstatingtheseone-timecharges.Byreversingtheexcessivereserve,futureearningswillincrease.Bigbathchargesarenotalwaysrelatedtorestructuring.InApril2001,CiscoSystemsInc.announcedchargesagainstearningsofalmost$4billion.Thebulkofthecharge,$2.5billion,consistedofaninventorywritedown.Writingoffmorethanabilliondollarsfrominventorynowmeansmorethanabilliondollarsoflesscostinthefutureperiod.Thisanexampleofwhatultra-conservativeaccountinginoneperiodmakespossibleinfutureperiods.3.2AbuseofmaterialityAnotherareathatmightbeusedbyaccountantstomanipulatetheearningistheapplicationofmaterialityprincipleinpreparingthefinancialstatements,thisprincipleisverywide,flexibleandhasnospecificrangetodeterminewheretheitemismaterialornot.SECusestheinterpretationruledbythesupremecourtinidentifyingwhatismaterial;thesupremecourthasheldthatafactismaterialifthereisasubstantiallikelihoodthatthefactwouldhavebeenviewedbyreasonableinvestorashavingsignificantlyalteredthe“totalmix”ofinformationmadeavailable(SEC,SABNo.99,1999).TheSEChasalsointroducedsomeconsiderationsforaquantitativelysmallmisstatementofafinancialstatementitemtobematerial:.whetherthemisstatementarisesfromanitemcapableofprecisemeasurementorwhetheritarisesfromanestimateand,ifso,thedegreeofimprecisioninherentintheestimate;.whetherthemisstatementmasksachangeinearningsorothertrends;.whetherthemisstatementhidesafailuretomeetanalysts’consensusexpectationsfortheenterprise;.whetherthemisstatementchangesalossintoincomeorviceversa;.whetherthemisstatementconcernsasegmentorotherportionoftheregistrant’sbusinessthathasbeenidentifiedasplayingasignificantroleintheregistrant’soperationsorprofitability;and.whetherthemisstatementinvolvesconcealmentofanunlawfultransaction.3.3Cookiejar“Cookiejar”reserve–sometimeslabeledrainydayreserveorcontingencyreserves,inperiodsofstrongfinancialperformance,cookiejarreserveenabletoreduceearningsbyoverstatingreserves,overstatingexpenses,andusingone-timewrite-offs.Inperiodsofweakfinancialperformance,cookiejarreservescanbeusedtoincreaseearningsbyreversingaccrualsandreservestoreducecurrentperiodexpenses(Kokoszka,2003).ThemostfamousexampleofuseofcookiejarreservesisWorldComInc.InAugust2002,aninternalreviewrevealedthatthecompanyhad$2.5billionreservesrelatedtolitigation,uncollectibleandtaxes.Thecompanyusedmostoftheminaseriesofso-calledreservereversalsinordertohavehigherearnings.Source:KhaledElMoatasemAbdelghany,2005.“Measuringthequalityofearnings”,ManagerialAuditingJournal,vol.20,no.9,pp.1001–1015.

譯文：衡量盈利質量1、引言一般公認會計原則（GAAP）提供準備一定的靈活性的財務報表，給財務經理一定的自由空間進行選擇會計政策和方案。收入管理使用中的靈活性的財務報告改變公司（奧爾特加和格蘭特，2003年）的財務結果。換句話說，收入管理是操縱收益達到預定目標的管理設置。這是有目的的干預外部報告過程并獲得一些私利的意圖（席佩爾，1989）。萊維特（1998）盈余管理的定義是一個灰色地帶，其中會計核算是不恰當的；其中，管理人員偷工減料；并在財報反映了管理層的意愿，而不是潛在的財務業績公司。大眾媒體列出了幾個公司從事盈利實例的管理。先訊美資電子對其所售商品加蓋裝運日期和時間，在一季度的最后一天停止了其時鐘，直到客戶出貨量達到其銷售目標。勝騰公司的某些業務部門為了合并虛增收入近5億美元；隨后，圣達特重申和與SEC同意改變收入確認方法。AOL重申收益為3.85億美元包括遞延不正當的營銷費用。1994年，華爾街日報詳細介紹通用電氣平滑收益的許多方法，包括資本收益和使用重組費用和儲備的時機。以回應文章中，通用電氣據說受到其他公司的質疑-為什么這樣約定俗成的做法會變成“頭版”的消息。收入管理發生在管理者判斷財務報告和結構性交易時，為了改變財務報表，誤導有關該公司的基本經濟表現的一些利益相關方或影響會改變合同結果的會計數據（希利和惠倫，1999年）。馬格拉斯和威爾德（2002）指出，一開始從事設計濫用盈余管理和欺詐行為的收益管理方案主要是為了“平穩”，以滿足內部或外部強加的盈利財報預測和分析師的預期。即使盈余管理并沒有明確違反會計準則，但它是一個道德上有問題的做法。其盈利的管理組織發送給它的員工的消息是彎曲的真相，但卻是一個可以接受的做法。高管這種做法創造一個道德氛圍，誰參加就不會出現在其他可能可疑的活動中。一位經理問銷售人員，如果你以喪失1天道德來幫助加快銷售，那么另一天你就會被批評質疑。盈余管理也處在一個十分危險的境地,而相對次要的會計花招越來越咄咄逼人,直到他們創建的財務報表出現重大錯報（克利克曼，2003年）。美國證券交易委員會（SEC）發出了三名員工的會計公報（SAB）以此來對一些會計問題提供指導，以防止有不恰當的盈余管理活動在上市公司中出現：SAB99號“實質性”，SAB第100號“重組費用和資產減值”和SAB第101號“收入確認”。盈余管理行為可能會影響會計盈余質量，該報告是由席佩爾和溫深特（2003）所作，為一定程度反映盈利忠實的代表Hichsian的經濟收入，這是量能食用期間（即支付股息），而離開公司在開始和期間的結束同樣富裕。評估收益質量的要求有時就會變成操作現金的分離和收益,收益越不對現金操作,收益質量就越高。由彭曼（2001）指出，會計質量分析的目的是區分“硬”的數字現金流和權責發生制所帶來的“軟”的數字。盈利質量可以通過關注盈利持續性進行評估；高品質的市盈率可以讓企業做出更持久和更有用的決策。班尼胥和瓦古斯（2002）調查內幕交易信息是關于是否使用收益持久性的收益質量作為衡量收益的質量，他們發現，相對于沒有異常內幕交易的公司，收益更持久的公司內存在異常內幕購買和異常內部銷售。貝奧森（2003）使用可操縱應計利潤水平來衡量盈利質量。審計師變更模型是基于回歸總收益作為因變量，改變銷售和物業，廠房及設備，并且改變現金流運作和公司規模(總資產)作為獨立的變量。如果在此模型中的回歸系數是顯著的，這意味著有收入管理，表示該公司的收益質量低下。這項研究提供了一個實證，使用三種不同的方法衡量收入在不同行業的質量。這一概念是；如果這三項措施有一個完整的一致性，質量評價收益（高或低）可以達到總體水平，如果沒有，表面盈利質量有問題的，需要不同的其他方法進行測量，調查和分析。本文的其余部分被分為以下幾個部分：盈余管理激勵，盈余管理技術，發展模式，采樣和統計結果，與結論。2、盈余管理的激勵2.1滿足了分析師的預期一般而言,分析師預期和公司財務業績的預測傾向于解決兩個高調的組件:營運收入和利潤。滿足收入預期的壓力尤為激烈，管理人員從事的盈余管理行為可能是主要的催化劑，導致不良或欺騙性的收入確認的做法。馬格拉斯和威爾德（2002）表明，從1977年到2000年提交給美國證券交易委員會(SEC)的收入報表中，其中收入確認方法不恰當的，有三分之一都是自愿或被迫的。有諷刺意味的是,這往往是企業自己創造這種壓力來滿足市場的盈利預期。這是公司為分析師和投資者提供收益預期的常見的做法。管理層經常面臨的任務就是確保他們的目標得到滿足。有幾家公司，其中包括可口可樂公司，英特爾公司和吉列公司，以相反的立場，不再提供季度和年度的盈利預測。這樣一來，這些公司聲稱他們已經把他們的注意力從短期的盈利預測轉移了，以實現其長期戰略（曼克凱和布朗，2002）。2.2為了避