2022NO.6(56)From“Precaution”to“Containment”:ResearchReportonthePoliciesoftheSecuritizedUnitedStatesSemiconductorIndustryFudanDevelopmentInstituteInternationalResearchInstituteofGlobalCyberspaceGovernance,FudanUniversityComprehensiveLaboratoryofNationalDevelopmentandIntelligentGovernance,FudanUniversityFrom“Precaution”to“Containment”:ResearchReportonthePoliciesoftheSecuritizedUnitedStatesSemiconductorIndustrySHENYi,MOFeiFudanDevelopmentInstituteInternationalResearchInstituteofGlobalCyberspaceGovernance,FudanUniversityComprehensiveLaboratoryofNationalDevelopmentandIntelligentGovernance,FudanUniversityOctober,2022AuthorsSHENYiMOFei

ProfessorofFudanDevelopmentInstituteandComprehensiveLaboratory of National Development and IntelligentGovernance,FudanUniversityDirector of International Research Institute of GlobalCyberspaceGovernance,FudanUniversityPhDCandidateofSchoolofInternationalRelations&PublicAffairs,FudanUniversityResearchAssistantofInternationalResearchInstituteofGlobalCyberspaceGovernance,FudanUniversityResearchFundsThisreportisthephasedresultofResearchonNetworkGovernanceSystemintheViewoftheOverallNationalSecurityConcept,akeyprogramoftheNationalNaturalScienceFoundationChina(17ZDA106)ResearchMembersJIANGTianjiaoYAOXuHUFengbinCHENChengDUANHuiziYUANXiaofengWANGZiyueGAOJingwenGAOYu

AssociateResearcherofFudanDevelopmentInstituteAssistanttoDirectorofInternationalResearchInstituteofGlobalCyberspaceGovernance,FudanUniversityYoungAssociateResearcherofFudanDevelopmentInstituteAssociateResearcherofInternationalResearchInstituteofGlobalCyberspaceGovernance,FudanUniversityGuestResearcherofInternationalResearchInstituteofGlobalCyberspaceGovernance,FudanUniversityIn-servicePostDoctorateofFudanDevelopmentInstituteAssociateResearcherofShanghaiOpenUniversityOffice Head of International Research Institute of GlobalCyberspaceGovernance,FudanUniversityUndergraduateTeachingSecretaryofSchoolofInternationalRelations&PublicAffairs,FudanUniversityPhDCandidateofSchoolofJournalism,FudanUniversityTechnicalSupervisorofInternationalResearchInstituteofGlobalCyberspaceGovernance,FudanUniversityPhDCandidateofSchoolofInternationalRelations&PublicAffairs,FudanUniversityResearchAssistantofInternationalResearchInstituteofGlobalCyberspaceGovernance,FudanUniversityGONGYunmuWANGJiayinCHENHongyu

PhDCandidateofSchoolofInternationalRelations&PublicAffairs,FudanUniversityResearchAssistantofInternationalResearchInstituteofGlobalCyberspaceGovernance,FudanUniversityPhDCandidateofSchoolofInternationalRelations&PublicAffairs,FudanUniversityResearchAssistantofInternationalResearchInstituteofGlobalCyberspaceGovernance,FudanUniversityResearchAssistantofInternationalResearchInstituteofGlobalCyberspaceGovernance,FudanUniversityCatalogueAbstract 1ReportAbstract 1CoreViews 31.“Vigilance”,“Precaution”and“Containment”:theAdjustmentoftheUSPolicyofScientificandTechnologicalSuppressionagainstChina 6(1)VigilanceStage:priorityonsuppressingthedevelopmentofChina’smilitarytechnology.7(2)PrecautionStage:starttosuppressthepromotionofChina’stelecommunicationstechnology9(3) Containment Stage: comprehensively suppress the surpassing of China’s advancedtechnology 112.Securitization,SimplificationandSymbolization:SemiconductorIndustryHasBecometheLeverageofU.S.StrategicCompetitionwithChina 17(1) Strategic competition between China and the United States has accelerated the“securitization”ofthesemiconductorindustryintheUnitedStates 17StrategiccompetitionbetweenChinaandtheUnitedStateshasbeen“simplified”,andtheUnitedStateshasshapedthesemiconductorindustryasthe“leverage”tostrategiccompetitionwithChina 22(3)Advancedsemiconductorshavebeen“symbolized”asanoutletfortheUnitedStatestoreleaseitssecurityanxietytowardsChina 283.TheInherentAnxietyofBidenGovernment’s“ChipsStrategy” 30TheBidengovernment'ssemiconductorstrategyviolatesthedevelopmentlawoftheglobalsemiconductorindustry,andtheUnitedStateslackssufficientsupportforthesemiconductormanufacturingwithinitsborders 32TheinfluenceoftheUnitedStatesinthesemiconductorallianceisnotenoughtourgethealliesandpartnerstofollowtheBidengovernment’ssemiconductorstrategyina“outofpocket”wayunderthepremiseof“AmericaFirst” 34(3)TheBidengovernment’stendencyto“overblock”China’ssemiconductormanufacturingcapacityisnotinlinewiththeinterestsofitsalliesandequipmentsuppliers. 36ConclusionsandExpectations 38AbstractReportAbstractThestrategiccompetitionbetweenChinaandtheUnitedStatesoriginatedintheG.W.BushAdministration,wasincubatedintheObamaAdministration,andfinallyprevailedintheTrumpAdministration.Asearlyasthebeginningofthe21stcentury,theUnitedStateshasbeguntosuppressChinesetechnologyenterprises.However,thereweresignificantdifferencesinthefocusanddegreeofsuchsuppressionindifferentperiods.DuringtheG.W.BushAdministration,theUnitedStatesfocusedonvigilanceagainstthesupportfromChinesetechnologyenterprisesforChina’smilitarymodernization.IntheObamaAdministration,inadditiontomilitarymodernization,theUnitedStatesbegantotakegradualprecautionsagainsttheso-called“cyber-spy”and“cyber-attack”byChinesetechnologyenterprises,spreadingfromtraditionalsecuritytobroaderstrategiccompetitionbetweenChinaandtheUnitedStates.TheTrumpAdministration,undertheframeworkofthestrategiccompetitionbetweenChinaandtheUnitedStates,furtherclarifiedthat“thescientificandtechnologicaladvantagesoftheUnitedStatesoverChina”wereincludedinthecategoryof“nationalsecurity”.SuchstrategicandpolicyadjustmentresultingfromabovecognitivechangehasmadetheUnitedStates’cognitionandpracticeofscienceandtechnologyissuesandSino-USscienceandtechnologyrelationsinitsgameagainstChinafallintothetrendofcompletesecuritization.AnyChineseentityinvolvedin“advancedtechnology”,“datatransmission”andothertechnologicalcompetitionswiththeUnitedStateshasbeenactivelytargetedandextremelycontainedbytheTrumpgovernment.Now,intheBidenAdministration,withthefullswingofthestrategiccompetitionbetweenChinaandtheUnitedStates,theWashingtondecision-makershavedevelopedaspecialdemand:toidentifya“leverage”withcognitivelysufficientsecurityimportance,andcondenseitintoasymbolofsecuritycompetitionwithChina,soastoplayitsroleofleveragingpoliticalmobilizationinandoutsidetheUnitedStates,andmaintainthestrategicanxietyagainstChinaatahighlevel.Meanwhile,such“leverage”mustmeetcertainconditions:itmustbeof“absolutepriorityindiscussion”innature,soastomoreeasilyobtainakindofpowerandopportunitybeyondtheconventionalpoliticalconditions,andthenleadthestrategicplanning,policymakingandpublicopinionguiding,andasaspecialpower,drivethegovernmenttobettercompletetheintegrationandimprovementofthespecificstrategicresourcesoftheUnitedStates.Asaresult,the“semiconductorindustry”hasbecomethefirstchoiceinWashingtondecision-makersandhasbeenshapedasthe“leverage"strategiccompetitionwithChina.1Atpresent,thesemiconductorstrategyoftheBidengovernmentshowsthe“dual”characteristicsof“weakeningothers”and“improvingitself”.InsidetheUnitedStates,theBidengovernmenttriedtoconsolidatethetechnologicaladvantagesoftheUnitedStatesinthesemiconductorfieldandimprovethelocalchipmanufacturingindustrybycombining“meticulousdefensiveblockade”with“concentratedoffensiveinvestment”forfearofsupplychaindisruption,productsecurityloopholes,andrelativedeclineintechnologicalcompetitivenessinsemiconductor.Atthesametime,outsidetheUnitedStates,inthefaceofChina,its“mostsignificantstrategiccompetitor”,theBidengovernmenttriedtocooperatewith“alatticeworkofalliancesandpartnerships”and“themultilayeredcoalition”,integratetheprofessionaladvantagesofdifferentregionsinthesemiconductorsupplychain,forma“herdv.s.one”situationofcompetitionandblockade,and“confine”China'sspaceofrisinginthesemiconductorfield.Viewedfromalongerhistoricalperspective,theUnitedStates’victoriesinthescientificandtechnologicalcompetitionswiththeSovietUnionandJapancomefromthefollowingdeep-levelreason:thenationalinnovationsystemoftheUnitedStateshasbuiltagoodscientificandtechnologicalfoundationforthedevelopmentofhigh-techandrelatedindustries,and,withvariousscientificandtechnologicalrestrictionsagainststrategiccompetitors,formedajointforcetocontainthecompetitors’scientificandtechnologicalriseinandoutsidetheUnitedStates.However,duetotheinstitutionalfactorsoftheUnitedStatesitself,therelevantsuppressionmechanismhasnotbeenabletoconstantlyimproveitselfwithoutnewgoalsaftercompletingitshistoricalmission,eventosomeextent,notbeenabletoexist.Now,inthefaceofChina’sscientificandtechnologicalrise,themeasurestheBidengovernmentcanresorttoarereconstructingsuchmechanism,tryingandplanningtocreatethiskindofinstitutional“jointforce”inandoutsidetheUnitedStates,andhopingforthefinalvictoryinthelong-termcompetitionwithChina.However,duetothe rapidevolutionoftheobjectiveenvironmentandthecharacteristicsoftechnologyitself,inspiteofquiteobvioussimilaritiesofsuchpracticesinthehistoricalcategory,itsspecificpracticesandconsequenceshavesofarfailedtoreproducetheeffectiveachievementsinthepast.Overallspeaking,historyisalwaysamazinglysimilar,butitwillnotsimplyrepeatitself.UnitedStates,asoftoday,doesnothavetheoverwhelmingnationalstrengthandstrategiccapabilitiesthatitoncehad30yearsago,whiletoday'sChinahasalsobeenhighlyintegratedintotheworld’sindustrialdivisionandscientificinnovationcyclesystem.Atpresent,eveninthesemiconductorfieldwheretheUnitedStateshasextremelystrongtechnicalcontrolwhileChinahassignificanttechnicaldisadvantages,itisnotsufficientlycapableofseparatingChinafromthesupplychainofadvanced2semiconductorataneasilyaffordablecost.Theinherent“vulnerability”oftheBidengovernment'schipsstrategyhasreservedspaceforChina’ssemiconductorindustrytobreakthrough,asfollows:First,theBidengovernment'ssemiconductorstrategyviolatesthedevelopmentlawoftheglobalsemiconductorindustry,andtheUnitedStateslackssufficientsupportwithinthebordersforthesemiconductormanufacturing.ThesubjectivecognitionoftheUSstrategicelitecannotsubstantiallyhedgetheobjectiveconsequencesofsuchlawattheentitylevel.Second,theinfluenceoftheUnitedStatesinthesemiconductorallianceandthehugereal-lifeinterestsinvolvedinthesemiconductorindustryarenotenoughtourgeitsalliancesandpartnerstosubstantiallyfollowtheBidengovernment’ssemiconductorstrategyina“outofpocket”wayunderthepremiseof“AmericaFirst”.Third,theBidengovernment’stendencyto“overblock”China’ssemiconductormanufacturingcapacityisnotinlinewiththeinterestsofitsalliancesandequipmentsuppliers.Theadvantagesinpublicopinionguidancewillultimatelybedifficulttotrulybecomeapracticablepolicy,andtheeffectsinshapingcognitionsandexpectationswillultimatelybedifficulttosubstantiallyachievethegrandstrategicgoalssetbytheUnitedStates.CoreViewsTheformationandsolidificationofeconomicglobalization,globalindustrialchainsandvaluechains,andthedeepnestingofChinaandtheglobaleconomicsystemhavemadeitnearlyimpossiblefortheUnitedStatestocompletelycopyitsColdWarstrategywiththeSovietUnioninitsstrategiccompetitionwithChina.Although,withregardstoguidingthepublicopinion,theUnitedStateswillcontinuetomaintainitshighprofileintheColdWar,onthelevelofpracticalpractices,theUnitedStateshasmademorepragmaticchoicesthanexpectedtoensurethegrowthrateofitseconomy,maintainitsleadingedgesinthecrucialhigh-techfields,andguaranteeitsdominantpositionintheindustrialchain,sothataslongaspossible,theUnitedStatescangainmorefromtheglobalizationsystemthanChina.ThishasbecometheprioritytargetoftheUnitedStates.Thenationalsecurityanxietytriggeredbythelossofhegemony,whichresultsfromthestrategiccompetitionbetweenChinaandtheUnitedStates,hasintensifiedtheUnitedStates’cognitiveconcernaboutitsvulnerabilityintheglobal“semiconductor3supplychain”,aswellasreal-lifeurgencytodevelop“semiconductorproductioncapacity”inthecurrenteraofdigitaleconomy,thusdrivingtheUnitedStatestounderstandandanalyzethe“semiconductorindustry”fromtheperspectiveofnationalsecurity.Oncethe“semiconductorindustry”isdefinedasanationalsecurityissue,itwillmeanthat“semiconductor”ismoreimportantthanotherissuesintheUnitedStates,andhasanabsolutepriorityfordiscussion.Indecision-making,itismoreinclinedtotakethe“nationalsecurityinterests”ofhedgingindustrialandeconomicinterests,thatis,defendingthehegemonicadvantageoftheUnitedStates,asthemostimportantjudgmentbasisandstandard.ThestrategiccompetitionbetweenChinaandtheUnitedStateshasbeen“simplified”.ThecurrentUnitedStatesAdministrationhasshapedthesemiconductorindustryasoneofthe“simplest”andmostintuitive“leverages”ofthestrategiccompetitionwithChina.TheessentialeconomicdevelopmentpotentialofSino-USstrategiccompetitionisthecompetitionforsocialgovernancecapability;itistheirrespectiveeconomicmomentumandgovernancecapabilitythatreallydeterminethefutureofSino-USstrategiccompetition.However,theUnitedStateshas“simplified”thenatureofSino-USstrategiccompetitiontofocusonthe“scientificandtechnologicalcompetition”,andthencometomore“simplified”assumptionthattheadoptionofaseriesofpoliciescan“successfully”blockChina’sstrategicchallengesinarelativelyshorttimeatalowercost.DuringtheTrumpAdministration,theUnitedStatestooktheinitiativetolaunchtradefrictionswithChina,andthiscollisionrapidlyescalatedintoascientificandtechnologicaldecoupling.Preparedforlong-termscientificandtechnologicalcompetitionwith,theBidenAdministrationtriedtoslowdowntheriseofChina’sscienceandtechnologythroughtheblockadeofkeysemiconductortechnologies,soastogaintimefortheUnitedStatestocontinueitsleadingpositioninscienceandtechnologyinanewroundoftechnologicalinnovationandindustrialreform.Advancedsemiconductorindustryhasbeen“symbolized”andbecomeanoutletfortheUnitedStatestoreleaseitssecurityanxietytowardsChina.Advancedsemiconductortechnologyandrelatedindustrieshavegraduallybecome“iconicsymbols”intheUnitedStatestosafeguardnationalsecurityinterests,highlightitsadvantagesoverChina,andwinthestrategiccompetitionbetweenChinaandtheUnitedStatesinstages.Atthesametime,intheabsenceofasingleandeffective“tool”tocontaintheriseofChina'sscienceandtechnology,allactionsthatcanbroadenthegapbetweentheUnitedStatesandChinainadvancedsemiconductortechnology,asoneofthefew“leverages”intheUnitedStatesthatcaneffectivelyrestrictChinaintheeconomicfield,willplayapsychologicalroleof“easingandreleasinganxiety”and4“self-satisfaction”inthedecision-makersoftheUnitedStates.EachblockadeofChina’sadvancedsemiconductortechnologywillreleaseUnitedStates’anxietyofsecurityagainstChinaperiodically;Whennewanxietyofsecurityaccumulatestoacertainstage,itwillonceagaindrivetheUnitedStatestofurtherblockadeChina’sadvancedsemiconductortechnology.Underthecouplinginfluenceofsecuritization,simplificationandsymbolization,theUnitedStateshasformedaperceptionthataslongasitoccupiestheleadingpositionintheadvancedsemiconductorsupplychain,itwilleventuallywinthestrategiccompetitionwithChina.ThemoretheUnitedStatesisfacedwiththeproblemofdisconnectionbetweenitsstrategicobjectivesanditsstrategiccapabilitiestowardsChina,themoreitneedstoregainstrategicconfidenceinadvancedsemiconductorindustry.However,advancedsemiconductorsareonlyasmallpartofthestrategiccompetitionbetweenChinaandtheUnitedStates.The“confidence”oftheUnitedStatesgainedfromthesemiconductorindustryisdifficulttoradiatetheoverallstrategiccompetition,anditisveryeasytobepuncturedbyitssecurityconcernsandemergenciesinotherareas.Therefore,inthestageofthestrategicstalematebetweenChinaandtheUnitedStates,theUnitedStates,likeanaddict,canonlyfrequentlyaddblockadesinsemiconductortechnologytoshowthatitstillhasconsiderablestrategicadvantagesandcoercivepoweragainstChina.5“Vigilance”,“Precaution”and“Containment”:theAdjustmentoftheUSPolicyofScientificandTechnologicalSuppressionagainstChinaCountriesinteractmainlybycompetingandcooperating,whichhavealwaysbeeninthestrategicinteractionbetweenChinaandtheUnitedStates.Strategiccompetitionisan“advancedform”ofcompetitionbetweencountries,whichisrelatednotonlytotheadjustmentofpowersofbothsides,butalsotothetensionoftheorderbetweenbothsidesintheinternationalsystem.Itisbotha“battleofpower”anda“battleofstatus”.ThestrategiccompetitionbetweenChinaandtheUnitedStatesoriginatedintheG.W.BushAdministration,wasincubatedintheObamaAdministration,andfinallyprevailedintheTrumpAdministration.AstheUnitedStateschangeditsstrategicpositioningofChinafroma“partner”toa“competitor”,thetoneofitsscienceandtechnologypolicytowardsChinahasbecomeincreasinglynegative,transformingfrom“precaution”to“decoupling”.IndirectcompetitionisasignificantfeatureoftheUnitedStates’strategiccompetitionwithChina.TherapidgrowthofnuclearweaponsandChina’sconventionalmilitaryforceshas,toaconsiderableextent,eliminatedtheUnitedStates’optionof“showhandintheshortterm”;rather,ithaspaidmoreattentiontotheindirectcompetition,similartothe“coldwar”,withChina,withtheultimategoalofvictoryinthe“long-termcompetition”.Theformationandsolidificationofeconomicglobalization,globalindustrialchainsandvaluechains,andthedeepnestingofChinaandtheglobaleconomicsystemhavemadeitnearlyimpossiblefortheUnitedStatestocompletelycopyitsColdWarstrategywiththeSovietUnioninitsstrategiccompetitionwithChina.Inordertoensurethegrowthrateofitseconomy,maintainitsleadingedgesinthecrucialhigh-techfields,andguaranteeitsdominantpositionintheindustrialchain,sothataslongaspossible,theUnitedStatescangainmorefromtheglobalizationsystemthanChina,thishasbecometheprioritytargetoftheUnitedStates.Thechangeofdomesticcontradictions,thepolarizationofpoliticalpartiesandthetearingofsocialstratahavemadeitimpossiblefortheUnitedStatestoreplicatethehighlyconsistentdomesticpoliticalenvironmentasinthestrategicgameagainsttheSovietUnion.Basedontheabove,“scienceandtechnology”hasgraduallybecomethefocusoftheUnitedStates’strategiccompetitionandcontainmentagainstChina.The6scienceandtechnologyhereisnotjustinthepuresense,butinvolvesthreedimensionsofmilitary,economyandindustry:first,avoidingChinachangingthebalanceofpowerwiththeUnitedStatesinthemilitarythroughlow-costscientificandtechnologicaltransition;second,retardingthespeedofChina’seconomicdevelopmentandprolongingthetimerequiredforChinatosurpasstheUnitedStatesineconomicvolume;third,comprehensivelycontrollingorevencontainingChinainkeyareasthatmayhavepositivespilloverstofutureeconomicdevelopment.Basedontheaboveunderstandings,therisinganxietyofsecurityaboutChinahasdrivenandstimulatedthecontinuousescalationoftheUnitedStates’scientificandtechnologicalrepressionagainstChina.Sincethe21stcentury,theworriesaboutChina’sgrowthofnationalstrengthandthedoubtsaboutChina’sstrategicintentionshavemadetheUnitedStates’anxietyofsecurityaboutChinagraduallyrise,thuspromptingtheUnitedStatestobemorealerttotheimpactandconsequencesofChina’sriseinscienceandtechnology.ThisprocessbeganasearlyasG.W.Bush'sAdministration.The“scienceandtechnologyfields”ofsuchrepressionhavegraduallyspreadfrom“traditionalsecurityfields”to“non-traditionalsecurityfields”,whichcanbegenerallydividedintothreestagesofrepressionwithdifferentprioritiesoftargets:VigilanceStage:priorityonsuppressingthedevelopmentofChina’smilitarytechnologyDuringtheG.W.BushAdministration,theUnitedStates’concernabouttheriseofChina’sscienceandtechnologymainlyfocusedontheriseofChina’sforceprojectionandlaunchingcapabilities.InMarch2005,CondoleezzaRice,SecretaryofStateoftheG.W.BushAdministration,saidthatChina’srapidlygrowingmilitaryspendingwasconcerning.TheUnitedStateswouldrespondtoChina’sgrowingmilitarypowerbyreinforcingitsownmilitarystrengthandstrengtheningitsallianceswithSouthKoreaandJapan.1InFebruary2006,JohnNegroponte,DirectorofNationalIntelligenceoftheG.W.BushAdministration,proposedintheAnnualThreatAssessmentin2006reportsubmittedtotheSenateSelectCommitteeOnIntelligence,thatafullsuiteofmodernweaponsandhardwarewereequippedforalargeproportionofitsoverallforcestructureoftheChinesemilitary,andtheUnitedStatesneededtobevigilantagainstChina,arapidlyrisingpowerthatwasrapidlyadvancingitsmilitarymodernization.2AlsoinFebruary2006,theUnitedStatesDepartmentofDefensestatedinthe1“RicewarnsChinaoverbuildupofitsmilitary,”theSeattleTimes,March16,2005.https://www.seattlet/nation-world/rice-warns-china-over-buildup-of-its-military/2JohnNegroponte,AnnualThreatAssessmentoftheDirectorofNationalIntelligencefortheSenateSelectCommitteeonIntelligence,February2,2006./files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/20060202_testimony.pdf7QuadrennialDefenseReviewReportthat,“Ofthemajorandemergingpowers,ChinahasthegreatestpotentialtocompetemilitarilywiththeUnitedStatesandfielddisruptivemilitarytechnologiesthatcouldovertimeoffsettraditionalU.S.militaryadvantagesabsentU.S.counterstrategies[...]U.S.policyseekstoencourageChinatochooseapathofpeacefuleconomicgrowthandpoliticalliberalization,ratherthanmilitarythreatandintimidation.”3ForthepurposeofweakeningChina’smilitaryandtechnologicalstrength,onJune19th,2007,theBureauofIndustryandSecurity(BIS)oftheU.S.DepartmentofCommerceissuedthe“RevisionsandClarificationofExportandReexportControlsforthePeople'sRepublicofChina(PRC);NewAuthorizationValidatedEnd-User;RevisionofImportCertificateandPRCEnd-UserStatementRequirements”,imposinglicensingrequirementsonexportsofitemsthat“mayenhanceChina’smilitarycapabilities”,whichspecificallyinvolved31productsofabout20categories,suchasaircraftengines,underwatersystems,airbornecommunicationsystems,inertialnavigationsystems,andhighlyspecializedtelecommunicationsequipmentconducivetoelectronicwarfare,spacecommunicationsorairdefense.4Atthesametime,around2005,theUnitedStates’concernaboutChina’smilitarymodernizationmadeitmoresuspiciousofChinesescienceandtechnologyenterprisesthat“maybeassociatedwithChina’smilitary”.Asearlyasthisstage,Huaweibegantobequestionedas“threateningthenationalsecurityoftheUnitedStates”.In2005,Rand,aU.S.thinktank,pointedoutinareportthat“boththegovernmentandthemilitarytoutHuaweiasanationalchampion[...]Huaweiwasfoundedin1988byRenZhengfei,aformerdirectorofthePLAGeneralStaffDepartment’sInformationEngineeringAcademy,whichisresponsiblefortelecomresearchfortheChinesemilitary.HuaweimaintainsdeeptieswiththeChinesemilitary,whichservesamulti-facetedroleasanimportantcustomer,aswellasHuawei’spoliticalpatronandresearchanddevelopmentpartner.”5In2007,NationalSecurityAgencyoftheUnitedStateslaunchedanactioncodenamed“Shotgiant”,whichbreachedtheserversofHuawei’sheadquartersinShenzhen,obtainedandmonitoredtheinformationofHuaweiroutersandswitches,aswellasthecommunicationsofHuaweiexecutives,inordertofindoutanycontactbetweenHuaweiandtheChinesemilitary.6InFebruary2008,MichaelMcConnell,thesecondDirectorofNationalIntelligenceoftheG.W.BushAdministration,3QuadrennialDefenseReviewReport,February6,2006./Portals/70/Documents/quadrennial/QDR2006.pdf?ver=2014-06-25-111017-1504“RevisionsandClarificationofExportandReexportControlsforthePeople'sRepublicofChina(PRC);NewAuthorizationValidatedEnd-User;RevisionofImportCertificateandPRCEnd-UserStatementRequirements,”FederalRegister,June192007./documents/2007/06/19/E7-11588/revisions-and-clarification-of-export-and-reexport-controls-for-the-peoples-republic-of-china-prc5EvanMedeirosetal.,ANewDirectionforChina’sDefenseIndustry(Arlington,VA:RANDCorporation,2005),pp.217-218.6“N.S.A.BreachedChineseServersSeenasSecurityThreat,”March22,2014./2014/03/23/world/asia/nsa-breached-chinese-servers-seen-as-spy-peril.html8submittedtheAnnualThreatAssessmentin2008totheSenateArmedServicesCommittee,proposinginparticulartheriskthatChinacouldobtainintelligencebydestroyingtheinformationinfrastructureoftheUnitedStates(includingtheInternet,telecommunicationsnetworks,computer