1、Buffetts Letters To Berkshire Shareholders 1994巴菲特致股東的信1994年Our gain in net worth during 1994 was is, since present management took over per-share book value has grown from $19 $10,083, or at a rate of 23% compounded annually.1994年本公司的凈值成長(zhǎng)了14.5億美元或是14.3%，總計(jì)過(guò)去30年以來(lái)，也就是自從現(xiàn)有經(jīng)營(yíng)階層接手之后，每股凈值由當(dāng)初的19元成長(zhǎng)到現(xiàn)在的10

2、,083美元，年復(fù)合成長(zhǎng)率約為23%。查理孟格-伯克希爾的主要合伙人跟我本身很少做預(yù)測(cè)，不過(guò)有一點(diǎn)我們倒是很確定，那就是伯克希爾未來(lái)的表現(xiàn)將很難再像過(guò)去那樣的輝煌。Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice Chairman and partner, and I make few predictions. One we confidently offer, however,performance of Berkshire won't come close matching the performance of the past.contrary, we b

3、elieve that our formula -honest and able people -reasonable success. We expect, therefore, keep on doing well.worth of $11.9 billion compared to about company. Though there are as many good that are inconsequential in relation Berkshire's capital. (As Charlie all, it's not worth doing well.&

4、quot; We now a security for purchase only if we believe we minimum, Berkshire's investment universe shrunk dramatically.that got us here and try not to relax standards. Ted Williams, in The Story of My explains why: "My argument is, to be a1問(wèn)題不在于過(guò)去的方法在以后會(huì)不管用，相反的，我們認(rèn)為我們的成功方程式-那就是以合理的價(jià)格買(mǎi)進(jìn)具有產(chǎn)業(yè)

5、競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)同時(shí)由誠(chéng)實(shí)有才干的人經(jīng)營(yíng)的做法，在往后同樣能夠獲致令人滿意的結(jié)果，我們預(yù)估應(yīng)該可以繼續(xù)保持這種好成績(jī)。然而皮夾子太厚，卻是投資成果的大敵，目前伯克希爾的凈值已高達(dá)119億美元，還記得當(dāng)初查理跟我開(kāi)始經(jīng)營(yíng)這家公司時(shí)，公司的凈值只有2,200萬(wàn)美元，雖然還是一樣有許多好的公司，但卻很難在找到規(guī)模夠大的對(duì)象，(就像是查理常常說(shuō)的，如果一件事情不值得去做，那么就算是你把它做的再好也沒(méi)有用 現(xiàn)在我們只考慮買(mǎi)進(jìn)至少一億美元以上的投資，在這樣的高門(mén)檻下，伯克希爾的投資世界，一下子縮小了許多。盡管如此，我們才是會(huì)堅(jiān)持讓我們成功的方法，絕對(duì)不會(huì)放寬原有的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，Ted Williams在我妻子的故事中寫(xiě)到

6、，我個(gè)人的看法是如果你想成為一hitter, you've got to get a good ball to hit. stuff that is out of my happy zone, I'm not a and I agree and will try to wait for that are well within our own "happy zone."個(gè)優(yōu)秀的打擊者的話，首先你得先相中一顆好球來(lái)打，這是教科書(shū)里的第一課，如果強(qiáng)迫自己在不中意的好球帶揮棒，我絕對(duì)無(wú)法成為打擊率3成44的強(qiáng)打者，而可能變成2成5的普通球員，查理跟我都很同意這樣的

7、看法，所以我們寧愿靜靜的等待球兒滑進(jìn)我們喜歡的好球帶。對(duì)于坊間一般投資人與商業(yè)人士相當(dāng)迷信的政治與經(jīng)濟(jì)的預(yù)測(cè)，我們?nèi)詫⒈３忠暥灰?jiàn)的態(tài)度，三十年來(lái)，沒(méi)有人能夠正確地預(yù)測(cè)到越戰(zhàn)會(huì)持續(xù)擴(kuò)大、工資與價(jià)格管制、兩次的石油危機(jī)、總統(tǒng)的辭職下臺(tái)以及蘇聯(lián)的解體、道瓊在一天之內(nèi)大跌508點(diǎn)或者是國(guó)庫(kù)券殖利率在2.8%與17.4%之間巨幅波動(dòng)。We will continue to ignore political and for many investors and businessmen. Thirty ago, no one could have foreseen the expansion of the

8、 Vietnam War, wage and a one-day drop in the Dow of 508 points, and 17.4%.But, surprise - none of these blockbuster made the slightest dent in Ben investment principles. Nor did they unsound the negotiated purchases of to us, then, if we had let a fear of unknowns the friend of the fundamentalist.不過(guò)

9、令人驚訝的是，這些曾經(jīng)轟動(dòng)一時(shí)的重大事件卻從未讓班哲明葛拉罕的投資哲學(xué)造成絲毫的損傷，也從沒(méi)有讓以合理的價(jià)格買(mǎi)進(jìn)優(yōu)良的企業(yè)看起來(lái)有任何的不妥，想象一下，若是我們因?yàn)檫@些莫名的恐懼而延遲或改變我們運(yùn)用資金的態(tài)度，將會(huì)使我們付出多少的代價(jià)，事實(shí)上，我們通常都是利用某些歷史事件發(fā)生，悲觀氣氛到達(dá)頂點(diǎn)時(shí)，找到最好的進(jìn)場(chǎng)機(jī)會(huì)，恐懼雖然是盲從者的敵人，但卻是基本面信徒的好朋友。在往后的三十年間，一定還會(huì)有一連串令人震驚的事件發(fā)生，我們不會(huì)妄想要去預(yù)測(cè)它或是從中獲利，如果我們還能夠像過(guò)去那樣找到優(yōu)良的企業(yè)，那么長(zhǎng)期而言，外在的意外對(duì)我們的影響實(shí)屬有限。而就像我曾經(jīng)承諾過(guò)的，除了獲利沒(méi)辦法像以前那么好之外，你

10、們?cè)诓讼柟蓹?quán)所得到的待遇將會(huì)與查理和我一完全致，如果你遭受損失，我們A different set of major shocks is sure to predict these nor to profit from them. If we identify businesses similar to those we have little effect on our long-term results. What we promise you - along with more modest - is that during your ownership of Berkshire,

11、will fare just as Charlie and I do. If you2we will not break this bond by 也不好過(guò)，如果我們吃香的，那么你compensation arrangements that give us a 們也就跟著喝辣的，而且我們絕對(duì)不participation in the upside than the downside.會(huì)靠任何獎(jiǎng)金報(bào)酬制度讓我們多占點(diǎn)便宜而破壞這樣美好的關(guān)系。We further promise you that our personal will remain overwhelmingly concentrat

12、ed with us and then put our own money elsewhere. addition, Berkshire dominates both investment portfolios of most members of families and of a great many friends who 1960's. We could not be more motivated to do best.Luckily, we have a good base from which to companies held securities having a va

13、lue of almost entirely offset by the combination corporate overhead and interest expense. Now we hold securities worth $18 billion, or $15,000 per Berkshire share. If you again earnings in 1994 were about $384 million. 22,000 (including eleven people at Headquarters.此外我們也向大家保證我個(gè)人絕大部份的身家都將繼續(xù)擺在伯克希爾的股份

14、之上，我們不會(huì)在央求各位參與我們投資的同時(shí)，還把自己的錢(qián)擺在別的地方，甚至于巴菲特家族以及查理跟我在1960年代經(jīng)營(yíng)合伙企業(yè)時(shí)期的老朋友，所擁有的投資絕大部份也都是以伯克希爾股份為主。值得慶幸的是，我們可以在一個(gè)很好的基礎(chǔ)上努力打拼，十年前，也就是在1984年，伯克希爾的保險(xiǎn)子公司持有價(jià)值17億美元的股票投資組合，每股約當(dāng)有1,500美元的投資，扣除這部份的收益與資本利得不算，伯克希爾當(dāng)年的稅前盈余只有區(qū)區(qū)的600萬(wàn)美元，沒(méi)錯(cuò)，雖然我們?cè)谥圃?、零售以及服?wù)事業(yè)方面依然有不錯(cuò)的利潤(rùn)，但是大部分的盈余都被保險(xiǎn)事業(yè)的承保損失、營(yíng)業(yè)費(fèi)用以及利息支出所抵消掉。時(shí)至今日，我們持有的股票投資組合價(jià)值超過(guò)18

15、0億美元，每股約當(dāng)有15,000美元，若是再一次我們將這些股票投資所產(chǎn)生的收益扣除的話，我們?cè)?994年的稅前盈余是3.84億美元，十年來(lái)，雇用的員工人數(shù)從原先的5,000人增加到22,000人，(包含企業(yè)總部的11人在內(nèi)。之所以能有這樣的成果，要?dú)w功于旗下這群特別的經(jīng)理人，是他們讓那些看起來(lái)很普通平凡的事業(yè)能有不凡的結(jié)果，Casey曾經(jīng)把他帶領(lǐng)一支棒球隊(duì)的工作，形容為靠著別人擊出全壘打賺錢(qián)過(guò)活，這也是我在伯克希爾維superb corps of operating managers who extraordinary results from ordinary-appearing busin

16、esses. Casey paid for home runs other fellows hit." That's3formula at Berkshire, also.The businesses in which we have partial few statistics will illustrate billion 8-ounce servings and earned a little than a penny on each. But pennies add up. economic interest in 21 billion of its world

17、9;s razor and blade market (measured Wells Fargo, a $53 billion bank, our ownership translates into a $7 "Berkshire Bank" that earned aboutduring 1994.a growing collection.Stock prices will continue to fluctuate -sometimes sharply - and the economy will have own will continue to increase i

18、n value at satisfactory rate.Book Value and Intrinsic ValueWe regularly report our per-share book value, counts is intrinsic value, a number that impossible to pinpoint but essential estimate.生的方式。我們持有少數(shù)股權(quán)企業(yè)的貢獻(xiàn)，對(duì)伯克希爾來(lái)說(shuō)也功不可沒(méi)，從一些統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)字中，可以看出他們的重要性，1994年可口可樂(lè)總計(jì)賣(mài)出2,800億罐八盎斯飲料，每罐大概能賺一美分，不過(guò)積沙成塔，若按伯克希爾擁有7.8%可

19、口可樂(lè)的股權(quán)比例，我們大概可以分配到210億罐，總計(jì)光是飲料貢獻(xiàn)給我們的盈余就有二億美元；同樣的，透過(guò)對(duì)于吉列的持股，伯克希爾大概可以分得全世界刮胡刀7%的市場(chǎng)占有率(以營(yíng)收而非銷(xiāo)量計(jì)算，約為2.5億美元的銷(xiāo)售額；另外在擁有530億美元資產(chǎn)的富國(guó)銀行，我們持有13%的股權(quán)大概就等于是一家擁有70億美元資產(chǎn)同時(shí)每年獲利一億美元的銀行。我們寧愿擁有天然鉆石的一小部份，也不要有100%的人工鉆石，而剛剛提到的那些公司堪稱為天然的稀有寶石，更難得的是我們不是只擁有現(xiàn)在這一些，以后還會(huì)得到更多更多。股票價(jià)格仍會(huì)持續(xù)波動(dòng)，有時(shí)幅度會(huì)很大，同時(shí)經(jīng)濟(jì)景氣的循環(huán)也會(huì)上上下下，然而就長(zhǎng)期而言，我們相信所擁有的這類(lèi)

20、優(yōu)良企業(yè)的價(jià)值很有可能還會(huì)繼續(xù)以穩(wěn)定的速度成長(zhǎng)。帳面價(jià)值與實(shí)質(zhì)價(jià)值我們會(huì)固定公布每股的帳面價(jià)值，雖然它的用處不大，但這總算是一個(gè)比較容易計(jì)算的數(shù)字，就像是我們一再提醒各位真正重要的是實(shí)質(zhì)價(jià)值，雖然這個(gè)數(shù)字沒(méi)有辦法準(zhǔn)確計(jì)算但卻有必要將以估算。4For example, in 1964, we could state certitude that Berkshire's per-share book overstated the stock's intrinsic value since sub-profitable textile business. Our assets had

21、 neither going-concern nor then, anyone inquiring into the soundness Berkshire's balance sheet might well deserved the answer once offered up by worry, the liabilities are solid."Today, Berkshire's situation has reversed: than their carrying value. (Those we control, such as Coca-Cola o

22、r Gillette, to give you book value figures, however, they serve as a rough, albeit intrinsic value. Last year, in fact, the measures moved in concert: Book value 13.9%, and that was the approximate gain intrinsic value also.We define intrinsic value as the discounted intrinsic value necessarily come

23、s up with as estimates of future cash flows are revised however, intrinsic value is all-important and attractiveness of investments and businesses. To see how historical input (book value future output (intrinsic value can let's look at another form of investment, a college education. Think of t

24、he education's as its "book value." If it is to be accurate, cost should include the earnings that5例如我們可以很確定的告訴大家1964年每股的帳面價(jià)值是19.46美元，不過(guò)這個(gè)數(shù)字很明顯的高于其實(shí)質(zhì)的價(jià)值，因?yàn)楣镜馁Y產(chǎn)主要集中于獲利不怎么理想的紡織事業(yè)，我們紡織資產(chǎn)的繼續(xù)經(jīng)營(yíng)或清算價(jià)值都遠(yuǎn)比不上帳面價(jià)值，所以任何想要了解1964年伯克希爾資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表健全性的人士，得到的答案跟惡名昭彰的好萊塢大亨可能給你的答案一樣， “放心好了，所有的負(fù)債都如假包換！”。如今伯克希爾的

25、情況已完全倒轉(zhuǎn)，我們掌控的許多企業(yè)其實(shí)際的價(jià)值遠(yuǎn)高于帳面價(jià)值，(至于無(wú)法掌控的公司，如可口可樂(lè)或吉列刮胡刀則是以目前市價(jià)列示，不過(guò)我們還是照舊提供各位帳面價(jià)值的數(shù)字，因?yàn)殡m然這項(xiàng)數(shù)字被嚴(yán)重低估，但仍然可以被當(dāng)作為追蹤伯克希爾實(shí)質(zhì)價(jià)值的一項(xiàng)指針，事實(shí)上，以去年來(lái)說(shuō)，這兩項(xiàng)數(shù)字以頗為一致的速度變動(dòng)，帳面價(jià)值增加了13.9%，而實(shí)質(zhì)價(jià)值大概也是以這個(gè)速度成長(zhǎng)。我們將實(shí)質(zhì)價(jià)值定義為一家企業(yè)在其生涯中所能產(chǎn)生現(xiàn)金流量的折現(xiàn)值，任何人在計(jì)算實(shí)質(zhì)價(jià)值都必須特別注意未來(lái)現(xiàn)金流量的修正與利率的變動(dòng)都會(huì)影響到最后計(jì)算出來(lái)的結(jié)果，雖然模糊難辨，但實(shí)質(zhì)價(jià)值卻是最重要的，也是唯一能夠作為評(píng)估投資標(biāo)的與企業(yè)的合理方法。為

26、了了解歷史投入的帳面價(jià)值與未來(lái)產(chǎn)出的實(shí)質(zhì)價(jià)值會(huì)有怎樣不同的演變，讓我看看另外一種不同形式的投資-大學(xué)教育，假設(shè)把教育成本當(dāng)作是帳面價(jià)值，再算的仔細(xì)一點(diǎn)，還要包含學(xué)生因?yàn)樽x書(shū)而放棄工作收入的機(jī)foregone by the student because he chose 會(huì)成本。rather than a job.estimate the earnings that the graduate receive over his lifetime and subtract from excess earnings figure, which must then discounted, at an

27、appropriate interest back to graduation day. The dollar result the intrinsic economic value of the education.their education exceeds its intrinsic didn't get his money's worth. In other cases, its book value, a result that proves capital of intrinsic value.Fetzer, an example from Berkshire&#

28、39;s experience. This account will not illustrate how the relationship of book value intrinsic value can change but also will here to talk about an acquisition that has out to be a huge winner.Berkshire purchased Scott Fetzer at a collection of 22 businesses, and today we exactly the same line-up -e

29、arnings as well. 在這里，我們姑且先不論非經(jīng)濟(jì)的效益而只專(zhuān)注于經(jīng)濟(jì)效益，首先，我們必須先估計(jì)這位畢業(yè)生在畢業(yè)后終其一生的職場(chǎng)生涯所能得到的收入，然后再扣除要是他沒(méi)有接受這項(xiàng)教育，原本可以得到的收入，從而我們可以得到因?yàn)檫@項(xiàng)投資，他可以獲得的額外收入，當(dāng)然之后還要利用一個(gè)適當(dāng)?shù)睦始右哉郜F(xiàn)，得到截至畢業(yè)日止的折現(xiàn)值，所得到的數(shù)字也就等于這場(chǎng)教育所能夠帶來(lái)的實(shí)質(zhì)經(jīng)濟(jì)價(jià)值。有些畢業(yè)生可能會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)其帳面成本可能遠(yuǎn)高于計(jì)算出來(lái)的實(shí)質(zhì)價(jià)值，這就代表著不值得他去接受這樣的教育，相對(duì)地，要是接受教育所產(chǎn)生的實(shí)質(zhì)價(jià)值遠(yuǎn)高于投入的成本，那么就表示這樣的投資是明智的抉擇，不過(guò)不管怎樣，有一點(diǎn)很明確的，

30、那就是實(shí)質(zhì)價(jià)值的多寡跟帳面投入成本一點(diǎn)關(guān)系都沒(méi)有。 若各位覺(jué)得這種說(shuō)法學(xué)究氣太重，就讓我們以伯克希爾本身實(shí)際投資史考特飛茲的經(jīng)驗(yàn)當(dāng)做具體的例證，在這里我們不但可以解釋帳面價(jià)值與實(shí)質(zhì)價(jià)值之間的關(guān)系會(huì)有多大的變化，同時(shí)可以藉此替大家上一課期待已久的會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)，當(dāng)然這次我選擇說(shuō)明的對(duì)象是一個(gè)相當(dāng)成功的購(gòu)并投資案。 伯克希爾是在1986年初買(mǎi)下史考特飛茲的，在當(dāng)時(shí)這家公司擁有22項(xiàng)不同的事業(yè)，時(shí)至今日我們沒(méi)有新增，也沒(méi)有處分其中任何一項(xiàng)，史考特飛茲主要的營(yíng)運(yùn)集中在世界百科全書(shū)、寇比吸塵器與Campbell 空壓機(jī)，當(dāng)然其余的事業(yè)對(duì)盈余的貢獻(xiàn)也相當(dāng)重要。6at the time had $172.6 mil

31、lion of book value. our belief that the company's intrinsic value close to double its book value. 當(dāng)時(shí)我們斥資3.152億美元買(mǎi)下帳面價(jià)值1.726億美元的史考特飛茲，超過(guò)的1.426億美元溢價(jià)，代表著我們認(rèn)為這家公司的實(shí)質(zhì)價(jià)值大概是其帳面價(jià)值的兩倍。下表顯示的是自我們買(mǎi)下史考特飛茲Scott Fetzer, as well as its earnings 后，歷年來(lái)的帳面價(jià)值以及它的獲利與股利收入。 dividends, since our purchase.Because it had

32、 excess cash when our deal was Scott Fetzer was able to pay Berkshire $40.3 million. I should mention that we have introduced leverage into Scott Fetzer's modest debt when we purchased it to virtually debt at all (except for debt used by its the like. Throughout our years of Scott Fetzer has ope

33、rated as conservatively-financed and liquid enterprise.因?yàn)樵谫?gòu)并交易完成當(dāng)年，公司帳上有多余的現(xiàn)金，所以雖然史考特飛茲1986年的獲利只有4,030萬(wàn)美元，但卻能夠支付伯克希爾 1.25億美元的股利，另外還有一點(diǎn)我必須強(qiáng)調(diào)的是，在史考特飛茲我們并沒(méi)有運(yùn)用任何的財(cái)務(wù)杠桿，事實(shí)上，該公司在我們購(gòu)并之初的負(fù)債便相當(dāng)有限，之后甚至還掉了所有的債務(wù)(除了財(cái)務(wù)子公司的借款，同時(shí)我們也沒(méi)有把工廠賣(mài)掉再租回來(lái)或是出售應(yīng)收帳款之類(lèi)的舉動(dòng)，在我們擁有的這幾年，史考特飛茲一直以相當(dāng)保守的財(cái)務(wù)杠桿經(jīng)營(yíng)并且維持相當(dāng)高的流動(dòng)性。大家可以看到，史考特飛茲的盈余在我們買(mǎi)

34、下之后持續(xù)穩(wěn)定的增加，不過(guò)在此同時(shí)凈值卻未呈等比例的增加，也因此在我們買(mǎi)下該公司時(shí)，就已經(jīng)相當(dāng)不錯(cuò)的股東權(quán)益報(bào)酬率，到現(xiàn)在又變得更加優(yōu)異，我們甚至可以拿它與財(cái)星五百大作比較，事實(shí)上以史考特飛茲的規(guī)模，若單獨(dú)計(jì)便得以列入五百大之林。 As you can see, Scott Fetzer's earnings value has not grown Consequently, return on equity, which exceptional at the time of our purchase, has become truly extraordinary. Just extr

35、aordinary is illustrated by comparing Fetzer's performance to that of the Fortune a group it would qualify for if it were stand-alone company.Had Scott Fetzer been on the 1993 500 list -latest available for inspection -return on equity would have ranked 4th. But is far from the whole story. The

36、top and Gaylord Container, each of which emerged 7以所能得到最新的1993年五百大名單來(lái)說(shuō)，該公司的股東權(quán)益報(bào)酬率可以名列第四，故事還沒(méi)結(jié)束，前三名分別是Insilco、LTV與Gaylord，全部都是因?yàn)楫?dāng)年度脫離破產(chǎn)邊緣，除了當(dāng)年因?yàn)閭鶆?wù)獲得免除致使盈余暴增之外，其它年度的獲利皆乏善可陳，因此若扣除這些沒(méi)什么營(yíng)運(yùn)的爛果子they realized when they were accorded aside such non-operating windfalls, two. Indeed, Scott Fetzer's return

37、 on equity double that of the company ranking tenth.You might expect that Scott Fetzer's earnings, a monopolistic position, or But no such circumstances apply. Rather, company's success comes from the you more later.First, however, the promised accounting recorded on Berkshire's balance

38、sheet. Report and get to the bottom line: After premium is initially recorded, it must in all cases be written off over time through charges that are shown as costs in the company's earnings statement.The following table shows, first, the charges Berkshire has made to extinguish the Scott Fetzer

39、 acquisition and, second, the premium that remains on economic cost (though many accountants our books so that the figure will employs in its business. 的話，史考特飛茲的股東權(quán)益報(bào)酬率足以名列財(cái)星五百大首位，遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)比其它對(duì)手拋在腦后，甚至是第十名的兩倍之多。 或許你會(huì)認(rèn)為史考特飛茲的成功不過(guò)是盈余循環(huán)的高峰、獨(dú)占?jí)艛嗷蚴强控?cái)務(wù)杠桿，不過(guò)全都不對(duì)，這家公司真正成功的原因在于總裁Ralph Schey 優(yōu)異的管理技能，這點(diǎn)在后面我們還會(huì)詳加報(bào)告。 接

40、下來(lái)是之前說(shuō)過(guò)的會(huì)計(jì)課，我們支付超過(guò)史考特飛茲帳面價(jià)值1.426億美元的溢價(jià)，將會(huì)被記錄在伯克希爾的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表上，詳細(xì)的細(xì)節(jié)我就予以省略(這些在我們1986年年報(bào)的附錄都有，而溢價(jià)在登錄之后，不管怎樣都必須按年攤銷(xiāo)當(dāng)作成本，并顯現(xiàn)在每年的盈余報(bào)表之上。 下表顯示，第一欄是伯克希爾每年必須慢慢地?cái)備N(xiāo)購(gòu)買(mǎi)史考特飛茲所產(chǎn)生的溢價(jià)的余額，第二欄是每年必須攤銷(xiāo)的金額，這些費(fèi)用對(duì)現(xiàn)金部位或稅負(fù)支出都不會(huì)有影響，同時(shí)就我們的觀點(diǎn)而言，也沒(méi)有任何實(shí)質(zhì)的經(jīng)濟(jì)意義(雖然很多會(huì)計(jì)師可能不同意我們的看法，這不過(guò)是讓我們的帳列投資成本能夠慢慢減少，到最后終與史考特飛茲本身帳列凈值一致的方法而已。大家可能注意到截至199

41、4年底為止，帳列的溢價(jià)還剩下5,420萬(wàn)美元，這個(gè)數(shù)字若再加上史考特飛茲當(dāng)年底的 8is the current carrying value of Scott Fetzer Berkshire's books. That amount is less than of our carrying value for the company when it down its carrying value through charges that reduced Berkshire'snet worth.The difference between Scott Fetzer'

42、s value and its carrying value on Berkshire's is now huge. As I mentioned earlier -delighted to mention again -credit agreeable mismatch goes to Ralph Schey, focused, smart and high-grade manager.The reasons for Ralph's success are that in investing it is not necessary to extraordinary thing

43、s to get results. In later life, I have been surprised handle the basics well and not That's precisely Ralph's formula. He the right goals and never forgets what he set work with. He's forthright about problems and self-confident without being self-important.He is also experienced. Thoug

44、h I don't Ralph's age, I do know that, like many ofto performance, not to the calendar. Charlie Foreman's picture on our desks. You can make will grow stronger every year.Intrinsic Value and Capital Allocation 凈值9,400萬(wàn)美元的話，就等于伯克希爾帳上持有該公司的投資成本1.482億美元，這個(gè)數(shù)字甚至不到當(dāng)初我們買(mǎi)下它時(shí)的一半不到，然而史考特飛茲現(xiàn)在每年所賺的錢(qián)

45、，卻是當(dāng)時(shí)的二倍，很明顯的，其實(shí)質(zhì)價(jià)值一直都在成長(zhǎng)，然而透過(guò)溢價(jià)攤銷(xiāo)，伯克希爾帳上持有的投資成本卻一再向下調(diào)整。 史考特飛茲實(shí)質(zhì)價(jià)值與其在伯克希爾帳上的帳面價(jià)值差距越來(lái)越大，如同先前我曾經(jīng)提到而現(xiàn)在也很高興在重申一次，這種不對(duì)稱的現(xiàn)象完全都要?dú)w功于Ralph Schey-這位專(zhuān)注、聰明且高格調(diào)的經(jīng)理人。 Ralph 之所以能夠成功的原因并不復(fù)雜，我的老師葛拉漢四十五年前就告訴我，畫(huà)蛇不必添足，爾后在我個(gè)人的投資生涯，我相當(dāng)驚訝地發(fā)現(xiàn)，這道理也適用在企業(yè)管理之上，經(jīng)理人真正應(yīng)該做的是把基本工夫做好而不分心，這正是Ralph 的做事方法，在設(shè)立好正確的目標(biāo)后，并毫不猶豫放手去做，至于在私底下，Ra

46、lph也是很好共事的人，對(duì)于問(wèn)題他坦率直言，自信卻不自大。 我忘了經(jīng)驗(yàn)豐富的Ralph 今年真正的歲數(shù)? 但我確信他跟我們旗下其它許多經(jīng)理人一樣，老早就過(guò)了65歲，在伯克希爾，我們注重的是績(jī)效，而不是年資，查理今年71歲，而我64歲，兩人都把拳王George Foreman 的照片擺在桌上，你可以記下，我們對(duì)于強(qiáng)制退休年齡的反感將會(huì)與日俱增。 實(shí)質(zhì)價(jià)值與資金分配9for managers as it is for investors. managers are making capital allocation - including decisions to repurchase share

47、s -vital that they act in ways that decrease it. This principle may seem obvious we constantly see it violated. And, misallocations occur, shareholders are hurt.and acquisitions, many managers tend to focus whether the transaction is immediately financial institutions, to per-share dangers. Going ba

48、ck to our day laborer. The MBA student, a non-earner, find that a "share-for-share" merger of laborer would enhance his near-term earnings student than a deal of this kind?earnings when the prospective acquiree either different prospects, different amounts non-operating assets, or a differ

49、ent merger and purchase opportunities that that would have reduced per-share value. Our approach, rather, has beenWayne Gretzky's advice: "Go to where the puck our shareholders are now many billions of the standard catechism. 了解實(shí)質(zhì)價(jià)值，對(duì)經(jīng)理人來(lái)說(shuō)，其重要性與投資人一般，當(dāng)經(jīng)理人本身在做資金分配的決策時(shí)-也包含決定買(mǎi)回股份，必須確定這些舉動(dòng)能夠增加公

50、司的實(shí)質(zhì)價(jià)值，并盡量避免損害實(shí)質(zhì)價(jià)值的舉動(dòng)，這原則看來(lái)理所當(dāng)然，但是違反的情況卻屢見(jiàn)不鮮，而只要不當(dāng)?shù)臎Q策形成，股東的權(quán)益立即就會(huì)受到傷害。 舉例來(lái)說(shuō)，在思考企業(yè)合并與購(gòu)并活動(dòng)時(shí)，許多經(jīng)理人都會(huì)專(zhuān)注于每股盈余是會(huì)被稀釋或是反稀釋(或是在金融機(jī)構(gòu)，則是每股帳面價(jià)值，過(guò)分強(qiáng)調(diào)這點(diǎn)是相當(dāng)危險(xiǎn)的，回到我們先前所舉大學(xué)教育的例子，假設(shè)一位25歲MBA 一年級(jí)的學(xué)生，考慮將他個(gè)人未來(lái)的經(jīng)濟(jì)利益與另一位25歲的工人做結(jié)合，他會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)如果現(xiàn)在尚無(wú)謀生能力的他，要是現(xiàn)在與工人做一比一的合并的話，他往后幾年的賺錢(qián)能力將會(huì)立即大幅提升，但是你想這位MBA 會(huì)笨到接受這樣的提議嗎? 談到企業(yè)購(gòu)并，對(duì)于可能的買(mǎi)主來(lái)說(shuō)，只

51、專(zhuān)注于現(xiàn)在的獲利情況卻不管潛在的賣(mài)方擁有不同的前景、不一樣的非營(yíng)業(yè)資產(chǎn)或不同的資本結(jié)構(gòu)，是一件很愚蠢的事，在伯克希爾我們不知拒絕了多少那種雖然會(huì)讓短期盈余美觀但卻可能損及每股實(shí)質(zhì)價(jià)值的合并案或投資機(jī)會(huì)；總之我們的方式乃效法Wayne Gretzky的建議，要緊盯小精靈的去向而不是它現(xiàn)在的位置，結(jié)果長(zhǎng)期下來(lái)比起運(yùn)用一般的投資標(biāo)準(zhǔn)方法，我們的股東因此多賺了好幾十億美元。The sad fact is that most major 很遺憾的是，大部分的購(gòu)并交易案都 10display an egregious imbalance: They are they increase the income

52、 and status of for the investment bankers and professionals on both sides. But, alas, usually reduce the wealth of the shareholders, often to a substantial That happens because the acquirer chain letter in reverse."Over time, the skill with which a managers allocate capital has an enormous on t

53、he enterprise's value. Almost by (at least after its early years than it can internally. The company could, of dividends or share repurchases. But often the investment bankers whether an acquisition or might make sense. That's like asking rug.a biological bias: Many CEO's attain position

54、s in part because they possess abundance of animal spirits and ego. If executive is heavily endowed with sometimes have their advantages - they CEO is encouraged by his advisors to make life. It's not a push he needs. 充滿了不公平性，對(duì)于被購(gòu)并方來(lái)說(shuō)，算是得到解脫，購(gòu)并一方的管理階層則名利雙收，旁邊的投資銀行家與專(zhuān)業(yè)顧問(wèn)也都能跟著大撈一筆，只不過(guò)真正受害的卻是購(gòu)并方背后全

55、體的股東，他們損失慘重，原因在于購(gòu)并公司最后所得到的實(shí)質(zhì)價(jià)值通常遠(yuǎn)比得到的低，就像是Wachovia 公司已退休的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人John Medlin說(shuō)，這種事做太多，就好象是在倒寫(xiě)連鎖信一樣。就長(zhǎng)期而言，公司經(jīng)理然濫用公司資金將會(huì)對(duì)企業(yè)的價(jià)值有很大的影響，我們認(rèn)為一家好公司所能貢獻(xiàn)出的現(xiàn)金(至少是在早期，一定會(huì)超過(guò)其本身內(nèi)部所需，而公司當(dāng)然可以透過(guò)分配股利或買(mǎi)回股份的方式回饋給股東，但是通常企業(yè)的CEO 會(huì)要求公司策略企劃部門(mén)、顧問(wèn)或是投資銀行，做出購(gòu)并一、兩家公司的必要性報(bào)告，這樣的做法就好象是問(wèn)你的室內(nèi)設(shè)計(jì)師，你是否應(yīng)該增添一條五萬(wàn)美元的地毯。 這類(lèi)購(gòu)并問(wèn)題又因?yàn)殡[藏在背后的生物原始本能而變得更

56、復(fù)雜，許多CEO 之所以能夠做到這個(gè)位置，部份的原因在于他們先天擁有相當(dāng)豐富的動(dòng)物本能與自尊，當(dāng)然我們必須承認(rèn)一位主管擁有這樣的特質(zhì)，有時(shí)對(duì)他們有極大的優(yōu)勢(shì)，然而這種本能在他們爬上頂峰之后并不會(huì)消失，而當(dāng)CEO 被其顧問(wèn)們鼓勵(lì)去進(jìn)行購(gòu)并交易時(shí)，我想他的反應(yīng)跟一位青少年被父親鼓勵(lì)可以擁有正常的性生活一樣，這樣的做法未免有點(diǎn)揠苗助長(zhǎng)。Some years back, a CEO friend of mine -幾年前，我的一位CEO 朋友半開(kāi)玩笑地在無(wú)意間透露出許多大交易的病態(tài)pathology of many big deals. This friend, who 心理，我這位朋友經(jīng)營(yíng)的是一家產(chǎn)

57、物 11his directors why he wanted to acquire a life insurance company. After droning unpersuasively through the economics strategic rationale for the acquisition, look, he simply said: "Aw, fellas, all the kids have one."At Berkshire, our managers will continue to extraordinary returns from

58、what appear to ordinary businesses. As a first step, managers will look for ways to deploy earnings advantageously in their run by managers whom we like, admire and trust.CompensationAt Berkshire, we try to be as logical example, we compensate Ralph Schey based upon results of Scott Fetzer rather th

59、an those Berkshire. What could make more sense, since responsible for one operation but not the A cash bonus or a stock option tied to fortunes of Berkshire would provide capricious rewards to Ralph. He could, while Charlie and I rang up mistakes Berkshire, thereby negating his efforts times over. C

60、onversely, why should things are occurring in other parts of but Scott Fetzer is lagging? 意外險(xiǎn)公司，當(dāng)時(shí)他在董事會(huì)上向所有的成員解釋為何公司必須要取得一家人壽保險(xiǎn)公司，在就經(jīng)濟(jì)與策略面解釋了半天理由之后，突然間他停止了演說(shuō)，同時(shí)露出頑皮的眼神說(shuō)道： “好吧！我承認(rèn)，誰(shuí)叫其它人也都有一家?！?在伯克希爾，我們的經(jīng)理人不斷地透過(guò)看似平凡普通的事業(yè)，賺取驚人的報(bào)酬，這些經(jīng)理人的第一步是先尋找可以充分利用其盈余的最佳方法，之后再把剩余的資金交回給查理跟我，然后我們會(huì)試著為這些資金尋找更好的出路以創(chuàng)造出更多的實(shí)質(zhì)價(jià)值，我們的目標(biāo)