ResilienceCOVID-19CrisisThroughaMigrationLens

Resilience

COVID-19CrisisThroughaMigrationLens

MigrationandDevelopmentBrief34

May2021

i

MigrationandDevelopmentBriefreportsanupdateonmigrationandremit-tanceflowsaswellassalientpolicydevelopmentsintheareaofinternationalmigrationanddevelopment.

TheGlobalKnowledgePartnershiponMigrationandDevelopment(KNOMAD)isaglobalhubofknowledgeandpolicyexpertiseonmigrationanddevelopment.Itaimstocreateandsynthesizemultidisciplinaryknowl-edgeandevidence;generateamenuofpolicyoptionsformigrationpolicymakers;andprovidetechnicalassistanceandcapacitybuildingforpilotprojects,evaluationofpolicies,anddatacollection.

KNOMADissupportedbyamulti-donortrustfundestablishedbytheWorldBank.TheEuropeanCommission,andDeutscheGesellschaftfürInternationaleZusammenarbeit(GIZ)GmbHcommissionedbyandonbehalfoftheGermanFederalMinistryforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment(BMZ),andtheSwissAgencyforDevelopmentandCooperation(SDC)arethecontributorstothetrustfund.

TheviewsexpressedinthispaperdonotrepresenttheviewsoftheWorldBankorthesponsoringorganizations.AllqueriesshouldbeaddressedtoKNOMAD@.KNOMADworkingpapers,policybriefs,andahostofotherresourcesonmigrationareavailableatwww.KNOMAD.org.

RESILIENCE

COVID-19CRISISTHROUGHAMIGRATIONLENS

MigrationandDevelopmentBrief34

May2021

MigrationandRemittancesTeam

SocialProtectionandJobs

WorldBank

MigrationandDevelopmentBrief34

MigrationandRemittancesTeam

?2021InternationalBankforReconstructionandDevelopment/TheWorldBank.

Somerightsreserved

ThisworkwasproducedundertheGlobalKnowledgePartnershiponMigrationandDevelopment(KNOMAD).

Aglobalhubofknowledgeandpolicyexper-tiseonmigrationanddevelopment,KNOMADaimstocreateandsynthesizemultidisci-plinaryknowledgeandevidence;generateamenuofpolicyoptionsformigrationpolicymakers;andprovidetechnicalassistanceandcapacitybuildingforpilotprojects,evaluationofpolicies,anddatacollection.

Thefindings,interpretations,andconclusionsexpressedinthisworkdonotnecessarilyreflecttheviewsofTheWorldBank,itsBoardofExecutiveDirectors,orofitsmembercountries.

TheWorldBank,doesnotguaranteetheaccuracyofthedataincludedinthiswork.Theboundaries,colors,denominations,andotherinformationshownonanymapinthisworkdonotimplyanyjudgmentonthepartofTheWorldBankconcerningthelegalstatusofanyterritoryortheendorsementoracceptanceofsuchboundaries.

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Attribution—Pleasecitetheworkasfol-lows:DilipRatha,EungJuKim,SoniaPlaza,

andGaneshSeshan.2021.“Migrationand

DevelopmentBrief34:

Resilience:COVID-19CrisisthroughaMigrationLens.”KNOMAD-WorldBank,Washington,DC.License:CreativeCommonsAttributionCCBY3.0IGO

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ResilienceCOVID-19CrisisThroughaMigrationLens

Contents

Summary x

Acknowledgements xiii

1.RemittanceFlowsProvedtoBeResilientin2020 2

2.Outlookfor2021-22 14

3.PolicyIssues 16

4.RegionaltrendsinMigrationandRemittanceFlows 20

4.1RemittancestoEastAsiaandthePacificdeclinedin2020 20

4.2RemittancestoEuropeandCentralAsiaFellSharplyin2020amidthe

ConsequencesoftheCoronavirusandLowerOilPrices 22

4.3RemittancestoLatinAmericaandtheCaribbeanWereResilientin2020and

AreExpectedtoContinueTheirPositiveGrowthin2021 25

4.4RemittancestotheMiddleEastandNorthAfricacontinuedtorisein2020 28

4.5RemittancestoSouthAsiaUnexpectedlyGrewin2020 30

4.6RemittancestoSub-SaharanAfricaDeclinedin2020 33

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MigrationandDevelopmentBrief34

ListofFigures

Figure1.1aRemittances,ForeignDirectInvestment,andOfficialDevelopment

AssistanceFlowstoLow-andMiddle-IncomeCountries,1990–2022.....................

4

Figure1.1.bRemittances,ForeignDirectInvestment,andOfficialDevelopment

AssistanceFlowstoLow-andMiddle-IncomeCountries,ExcludingChina,

1990–2022................................................................................................................

4

Figure1.2RemittancesPlummetedinQ22020,butRecoveredinQ3andQ4

inManyCountries....................................................................................................

5

Figure1.3EmploymentLevelsofForeignBornandNativeBorninthe

UnitedStates............................................................................................................

8

Figure1.4OutwardRemittancesfromRussiaareHighlyCorrelatedwiththe

PriceofOil................................................................................................................

10

Figure1.5WeakOilPricesareAffectingOutwardRemittancesfromSaudiArabia

10

Figure1.6SaudiArabiahasReducedtheNumberofForeignWorkersintheCountry

11

Figure1.7One-offEffectsofCancellationofHaj,FloodsinBangladesh,andTax

IncentivesinBangladeshandPakistan....................................................................

13

Figure1.8RemittanceFlowstoMexicoIncreasedDuetoaWeakerPeso..............

13

Figure2.1PublicPerceptiontowardImmigrationHasTurnedMoreNegative......

15

Figure3.1HowMuchDoesItCosttoSend$200?AComparisonofGlobal

Regionsin2019and2020........................................................................................

18

Figure4.1TopRemittanceRecipientsintheEastAsiaandPacificRegion,2020...

20

Figure4.2RemittanceFeestothePhilippinesAreamongtheLowestintheEast

AsiaandPacificRegion............................................................................................

21

Figure4.3OutboundRemittancesfromRussiatoCentralAsianCountries

DroppedSharplyin2020.........................................................................................

23

Figure4.4TopRemittanceRecipientsinEuropeandCentralAsia,2020...............

24

Figure4.5RussiaRemainedtheLeastExpensiveCountryfromWhichto

SendMoney..............................................................................................................

24

Figure4.6RemittanceFlowstoLatinAmericaandCaribbeanWereResilient

in2020,Showinga“V”Recovery..............................................................................

25

Figure4.7TopRemittanceRecipientsinLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean,

2020..........................................................................................................................

26

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ResilienceCOVID-19CrisisThroughaMigrationLens

Figure4.8CostofSendingMoneytoLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean

RemainedStable......................................................................................................

27

Figure4.9USBorderPatrolSouthwestBorderApprehensions/Inadmissible,

FY2019–FY2021.......................................................................................................

28

Figure4.10OutwardRemittanceFlowsVariedAcrossGCCCountries..................

29

Figure4.11TopRemittanceRecipientsintheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica,

2020..........................................................................................................................

29

Figure4.12SendingMoneywithintheMiddleEastandNorthAfricaIsLess

ExpensivethanSendingMoneyfromOutside.........................................................

30

Figure4.13QuarterlyRemittanceFlowstoSouthAsia...........................................

31

Figure4.14TopRemittanceRecipientsinSouthAsia,2020....................................

31

Figure4.15TheCostsofSendingRemittancestoSouthAsiaVariedWidely

acrossCorridors.......................................................................................................

32

Figure4.16TopRemittanceRecipientsinSub-SaharanAfrica,2020....................

34

Figure4.17TheCostsofSendingRemittancestoSub-SaharanAfricaVaried

WidelyacrossCorridors...........................................................................................

35

ListofTables

Table1.1EstimatesandProjectionsofRemittanceFlowstoLow-and

Middle-IncomeRegions...........................................................................

3

Table1.2AShiftfromInformaltoFormalRemittance-SendingChannels?

IndicationsfromHouseholdSurveys...........................................................

5

Table1.3:RevisionstoIMFgrowthforecasts................................................

8

Table1.4Differencesbetweenthe2009GlobalFinancialCrisisand2020

COVID-19Crisis.....................................................................................

9

Table3.1PolicyresponsesduringtheCOVID-19Crisis...................................

16

Table4.1PercentageofRemittance-ReceivingHouseholdsThat

ExperiencedaDecreaseinRemittancesduring2020inSelectedAfrican

Countries..............................................................................................

34

vii

MigrationandDevelopmentBrief34

ListofBoxes

Box1.1TopRemittanceSourceandRecipientCountries 6

Box1.2COVID-19andMigrantsfromKerala 12

Box3.1ConcessionalFinancingFacilityforMigration 17

Box3.2AML/CFT,De-risking,andRemittances 19

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ResilienceCOVID-19CrisisThroughaMigrationLens

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MigrationandDevelopmentBrief34

Summary

ThisMigrationandDevelopmentBriefpro-videsupdatesonglobaltrendsinmigrationandremittances.Ithighlightsdevelopmentsrelatedtomigration-relatedSustainableDevelopmentGoal(SDG)indicatorsforwhichtheWorldBankisacustodian:increasingthevolumeofremittancesasapercentageofgrossdomesticproduct(SDGindicator

17.3.2),andreducingremittancecosts(SDGindicator10.c.1).

Defyingpredictions,remittanceflowshaveprovedtoberesilientduringtheCOVID-19crisis.In2020,officiallyrecordedremittanceflowstolow-andmiddle-incomecountriesreached$540billion,only1.6percentbelowthe$548billionseenin2019.Remittancesexceededforeigndirectinvestmentflowsbyawidermarginin2020.ExcludingChina,remit-tanceflowssurpassedthesumofforeigndirectinvestmentandofficialdevelopmentassis-tance.Remittanceshavethereforebecomeanimportantconsumptionsmoothingmechanismfortherecipienthouseholdsand,assuch,theyformanincreasinglyimportant(private)ele-mentofglobalsocialprotectionsystems.

Amongregions,remittancestoLatinAmericaandCaribbeangrewby6.5percentin2020andweresupportedbyarecoveringeconomyandmoderatelyimprovinglabormarketintheUnitedStates.InSouthAsia,therewasaslightmoderationinthegrowthofremittanceflowsin2020,to5.2percent,whileflowstotheMiddleEastandNorthAfricagrewbyamodest2.3percent.FlowstoEuropeandCentralAsiaareestimatedtohavefallenby9.7percent,toEastAsiaandthePacificby7.9percent,andtoSub-SaharanAfricaby12.5percent.

In2020,incurrentUSdollarterms,thetopfiveremittancerecipientcountrieswereIndia,China,Mexico,thePhilippines,andEgypt.

Indiahasbeenthelargestrecipientofremit-tancessince2008.Asashareofgrossdomesticproduct,thetopfiverecipientsin2020were,bycontrast,smallereconomies:Tonga,Lebanon,KyrgyzRepublic,Tajikistan,andElSalvador.TheUnitedStateswasthelargestsourcecoun-tryforremittancesin2020,followedbytheUnitedArabEmirates,SaudiArabia,andtheRussianFederation.

In2020,incurrentUSdollarterms,thetopfiveremittancerecipientcountrieswereIndia,China,Mexico,thePhilippines,andEgypt.Indiahasbeenthelargestrecipientofremittancessince2008.Asashareofgrossdomesticproduct,bycontrast,thetopfiverecipientsin2020weresmallereconomies:Tonga,Somalia,Lebanon,KyrgyzRepublic,andSouthSudan.TheUnitedStateswasthelargestsourcecountryforremittancesin2020,followedbytheUnitedArabEmirates,SaudiArabia,andRussia.

Foremostamongthedriversofremittanceflowsandreasonsbehindtheirresilienceduringthecrisiswasmigrants’desiretohelptheirfamilies,tosendmoneyhomebycuttingcon-sumptionordrawingonsavings.Otherdriversincludedfiscalstimulusinhostcountriesthatresultedinbetter-than-expectedeconomicperformance,ashiftinflowsfrominformaltoformalchannels,andcyclicalmovementsinoilpricesandcurrencyexchangerates.

Counter-cyclicalfiscalpolicy,especiallycashtransferandemploymentsupportpro-gramsimplementedinmanylargeeconomies,cushionedafallinpersonalincomesandconsumption,andsupportedbusinessesinthecontinuingemploymentofworkers.Suchprogramsalsobenefitedforeign-bornpersons.Theeconomicperformanceofmajormigrant-hostcountries,especiallythoseinNorth

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ResilienceCOVID-19CrisisThroughaMigrationLens

AmericaandEurope,provedtobebetterin2020thanthegrowthratesprojectedinMarchandApril.

Itisbelievedthatanincreaseintherecordedflowswasinpartduetoabroadshiftinflowsfrominformaltoformalchannelsin2020.

Therewasagreateruseofdigitalremittancechannelsashandcarrywasaffectedbytravelbansandlockdowns.Thetruesizeofremit-tances,whichincludesformalandinformalflows,isbelievedtobelargerthanofficiallyreporteddata,thoughtheextentoftheimpactofCOVID-19oninformalflowsisunclear.

However,therewereimportantregionalvari-ances.Ingeneral,duetotheweakoilprice,remittancesfromoil-dependenteconomiesdeclinedmorethantheydidinnon-oilecon-omies.Forexample,weakoilpricesaffectedtheemploymentofmigrantworkersintheGulfCooperationCouncilcountries,leadingmorerecentlytodecliningoutwardremittancesfromtheregion.InthecaseofRussia,thetwineffectsofweakoilpriceanddepreciationofthesource-countrycurrencycausedanear-ly10percentfallinremittanceflowstotheEuropeandCentralAsiaregion.

RemittanceflowstoBangladeshandPakistanwerealsoaffectedbyidiosyncraticfactors

–suchasthecancellationofthepilgrimagetoMecca(hajj),floodsinBangladeshinJuly2020,andtaxincentivesofferedtoattractremittances.InthecaseofMexico,asharpdepreciationofthepesoagainsttheUSdollarsinceMarch2020attractedremittancesasgoods,services,andassetsinMexicobecamecheapertopurchasewiththeUSdollar.

Lookingahead,remittanceflowstolow-andmiddle-incomecountriesareexpectedtoincreaseby2.6percentperyear,to$553

billionin2021andby2.2percentto$565billionin2022(table1.1).RemittancesareexpectedtogrowtwiceasfastinLatinAmericaandtheCaribbeanandinSouthAsia,buttheyareexpectedtodeclinefurtherinEuropeandCentralAsia,andremainsluggishinSub-SaharanAfrica.

Theseprojectionsaresubjecttosignificantrisks,however.TherecurrenceofCOVID-19outbreakscannotberuledoutinthemedi-um-termcase,manycountriesmaynotbeabletoprovidethesameleveloffiscalstimulustheydidin2020.Finally,theshiftsfromcashtodigitalandinformaltoformalchannelsmayalsoslowdown,unlesssolutionsarefoundforimprovingaccesstobankingformigrantsandfornewmoneytransferoperators.

Therehasbeenprogressinsomeareasofpol-icyresponsesduringthecrisis.Forexample,somehostcountrieshaveincludedmigrantsincashtransferprogramsandvaccinationpro-grams.Hostcountriesshouldprovidevaccinestomigrantworkerstoenhancethesafetyoftheirownpopulations–apointthatseemstobeincreasinglyacknowledged.However,manyhostcountriesarefinanciallystretched.Inpar-ticular,themanydevelopingcountrieshostingmigrantswouldneedconcessionalfinanc-ingsupportfromexternalsourcestosustainincreasedspendingassociatedwithmigrants.Supportingmigrantswhomaybelowerskilled,inirregularstatus,andintheinformalsectorwillcontinuetobeachallenge.

Supportingremittanceinfrastructuretokeepremittancesflowingshouldincludeeffortstolowerremittancefees,whichhavecontinuedtoaverageabove6.5percentinQ42020,morethandoubletheSDGtargetof3per-centby2030.TheaverageremittancecostwaslowestinSouthAsia,at4.9percent,while

xixi

MigrationandDevelopmentBrief34

Sub-SaharanAfricacontinuedtohavethehighestaveragecost,at8.2percent.

Anti-moneylaunderingandcounteringoffinancingforterror(AML/CFT)regulationsandde-riskingpracticesbybanks(denyingbankaccountstomoneytransferoperators)continuebeonerousfornewmarketentrantsusingnewtechnologies.ManymigrantsdonothavetheIDdocumentsrequiredtoopenbankaccounts,whichpreventsthemfromusingonlineremittanceservices.Somecountriesissuedregulationsforallowinge-onboardingtocomplywithknow-your-customerlaws.Regulatorsareawareoftheusefulnessofapplyingarisk-basedapproachratherthanarule-basedapproachtosmall-valueremittanc-es,butthishasnotyetbeenadopted.

TheunexpectedresilienceofremittanceflowsduringtheCOVID-19crisishasonceagainhighlightedtheimportanceofthetimelyavailabilityofdata.Afterovertakingforeigndirectinvestmentandofficialdevelopmentassistanceinlow-andmiddle-incomecountries(excludingChina),remittancescannolongerbeignoredassmallchange.Countriesneedtocollectbetterdataonremittances,intermsoffrequency(eithermonthlyorquarterly),timelyreporting,andgranularity(bycorridor,chan-nel,instrument).

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ResilienceCOVID-19CrisisThroughaMigrationLens

Acknowledgements

ThisBriefwaspreparedbyDilipRatha,EungJuKim,KebbaJammeh,andMajaVezmaroftheMigrationandRemittancesUnitoftheJobsGroupintheSocialProtectionandJobsGlobalPractice;SoniaPlazaoftheFinance,Competitiveness,andInnovationGlobalPractice;andGaneshSeshanofthePovertyGlobalPractice.ThankstoMichalRutkowskiandIanWalkerforhelpfulcommentsandsupport.Usefulcommentsandcontributionswere

receivedfromtheWorldBank’sregionalchiefeconomistofficesandmembersoftheMigrationSteeringGroup,includingSamikAdhikari,OyaPinarArdicAlper,ValerieMercerBlackman,ErgysIslamaj,GerardKambou,JeanLee,MichaelLokshin,HarishNatarajan,IffathSharif,SiddharthSharma,MaheshworShrestha,andHansTimmer.ThankstoRebeccaOngforcommunicationssupportandFayreMakeigforediting.

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MigrationandDevelopmentBrief34

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ResilienceCOVID-19CrisisThroughaMigrationLens

1.RemittanceFlowsProvedtoBeResilientin2020

Defyingpredictions,remittanceflowshaveprovedtoberesilientduringtheCOVID-19crisis.In2020,remittanceflowstolow-andmiddle-in-comecountries(LMICs)reached$540billion,only1.6percentbelowthe$548billionseenin2019(figure1.1andtable1.1).ThedeclinewassmallerthanthepredictionspublishedinAprilandOctober2020(seeWorldBank2020aand2020b).Itwasevensmallerthantherateofdeclineregisteredduringtheglobalfinancialcrisisin2009.Andthedeclineinremittancesisfarlowerthanthe11percentdeclineinforeigndirectinvestment(FDI)flowstoLMICsseenin2020.

Thus,thegapbetweenremittancesandFDIwidenedfurther(figure1.1a).ExcludingChina,FDIflowstoLMICsdeclinedbyover30percentin2020.Asaresult,remittanceflowstoLMICsotherthanChinasurpassedthesumofFDIandofficialdevelopmentassistance(ODA)in2020(figure1.1b).

Amongregions,remittancestoLatinAmericaandCaribbeangrewby6.5percentin2020andweresupportedbyarecoveringeconomyandmoderatelyimprovinglabormarketintheUnitedStates.InSouthAsia,therewasaslightmoderationinthegrowthofremittanceflowsin2020,to5.2percent,whileflowstotheMiddleEastandNorthAfricagrewbyamodest2.3percent.FlowstoEuropeandCentralAsiaareestimatedtohavefallenby9.7percent,toEastAsiaandthePacificby7.9percent,andtoSub-SaharanAfricaby12.5percent.

In2020,incurrentUSdollarterms,thetopfiveremittancerecipientcountrieswereIndia,China,Mexico,thePhilippines,andEgypt.Indiahasbeenthelargestrecipientofremit-tancessince2008(box1.1).Asashareofgrossdomesticproduct,bycontrast,thetopfiverecipientsin2020weresmallereconomies:Tonga,Lebanon,KyrgyzRepublic,Tajikistan,

andElSalvador.TheUnitedStateswasthelargestsourcecountryforremittancesin2020,followedbytheUnitedArabEmirates,SaudiArabia,andtheRussianFederation.

Therewasasharptemporarydropinremit-tanceflowsinthesecondquarter(Q2)of2020,aslockdownsandtravelbansimposedinresponsetotheCOVID-19crisisalsoshutdownremittanceservices(figure1.2).Itispos-siblethatmigrantspostponedsendingmoneyduringtheinitialchaosinlateMarchandApril2020.Buteveniftheyhadmoneytosend,theycouldnotsendcash,asmoneytransferopera-torshadtemporarilyclosedtheiroffices.Travelrestrictionsaffectedin-kindorcashremittanc-escarriedbyhandbytravelers.However,assomeofthestrictlockdownswerelifted,therewasarecoveryinQ3andQ4inLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean(andotherregions).

Theinitialdeclineinremittanceflowsaffect-edalmostallcountries,especiallythoseintheEuropeandCentralAsiaregion.Therewereafewexceptions,however;remittanceflowstoBangladesh,Mexico,andPakistancontinuedtoincrease,forreasonsdiscussedbelow.Amongregions,LatinAmericaandtheCaribbeanandSouthAsiaweremoreresil-ienttothecrisisandsawthestrongestgrowth(table1.1).RemittancestoLatinAmericaandCaribbeangrewby6.5percentin2020andweresupportedbyarecoveringeconomyandmoderatelyimprovinglabormarketintheUnitedStates.InSouthAsia,therewasaslightmoderationinthegrowthofremittanceflowsin2020,to5.2percent,whiletheMiddleEastandNorthAfricagrewbyamodest2.3percent.FlowstoEuropeandCentralAsiaareestimatedtohavefallenby9.7percent,toEastAsiaandthePacificby7.9percent,andtoSub-SaharanAfricaby12.5percent.

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MigrationMigrationandandDevelopmentDevelopmentBriefBrief3234

Table1.1EstimatesandProjectionsofRemittanceFlowstoLow-andMiddle-IncomeRegions

Region

2009

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020e

2021f

2022f

($billion)

Low-andMiddle-Income

302

446

441

478

524

548

540

553

565

countries

EastAsiaandPacific

80

128

128

134

143

148

136

139

142

EuropeandCentralAsia

33

42

43

52

59

62

56

54

50

LatinAmericaand

55

68

73

81

89

96

103

108

112

Caribbean

MiddleEastandNorth

31

50

49

52

53

55

56

57

59

Africa

SouthAsia

75

118

111

117

132

140

147

152

158

Sub-SaharanAfrica

28

41

37

41

49

48

42

43

44

World

433

602

597

640

694

719

702

713

726

(Growthrate,percent)

Low-andMiddle-Income

-4.8

0.5

-1.3

8.4

9.8

4.6

-1.6

2.6

2.2

countries

EastAsiaandPacific

-4.8

3.7

-0.5

5.1

6.8

3.0

-7.9

2.1

2.1

EuropeandCentralAsia

-11.3

-15.3

2.1

21.0

12.9

4.6

-9.7

-3.2

-6.9

LatinAmericaand

-12.3

6.5

7.4

11.1

9.9

8.3

6.5

4.9

4.0

Caribbean

MiddleEastandNorth

-6.0

-6.4

-1.2

5.3

2.3

3.4

2.3

2.6

3.1

Africa

SouthAsia

4.5

1.6

-5.9

6.0

12.3

6.1

5.2

3.5

4.0

Sub-SaharanAfrica

-2.1

6.6

-8.3

10.8

17.4

-0.4

-12.5

2.6

1.6

World

-5.0

-1.3

-0.8

7.1

8.5

3.7

-2.4

1.5

1.8

Source:WorldBank-KNOMADstaffestimates.SeeappendixinMigrationandDevelopmentBrief32forforecastingmethods(WorldBank2020c).

Note:e=estimate,f=forecast.

3

ResilienceCOVID-19COVIDCrisisThrough-19CrisisaThroughMigrationLensMigrationLens

Figure1.1aRemittances,ForeignDirectInvestment,andOfficialDevelopmentAssistanceFlowstoLow-andMiddle-IncomeCountries,1990–2022

($billion)

800

FDI

600

400

Remittances

200

ODA

0

1990199119921993

994

995

00

2001

2002200320042005200620072008

9

0

7

8

9

e

f

f

1

1

199619971998199920

200

201

201120122013201420152016

201

201

201

2020

20212022

Sources:WorldBank?–KNOMADstaffestimates;WorldDevelopmentIndicators;InternationalMonetaryFund(IMF)BalanceofPay-mentsStatistics.SeeappendixintheMigrationandDevelopmentBrief32forforecastingmethods(WorldBank2020c).Note:FDI=foreigndirectinvestment;ODA=officialdevelopmentassistance;e=estimate;f=forecast.

Figure1.1bRemittances,ForeignD