1、原文：Chain-Store Pricing for Strategic AccommodationThe chain store has been one of the principal factors in the movement towards the simplification of distributive functions. As such, it has caused pronounced concern among manufactures, jobbers, and retailers. It has been the subject of litigation, o

2、f recrimination, and of endless discussion. The manufacturer has hesitated to make full use of the chain store system as an outlet, because of his desire not to offend the members of his regular distributive systems. The jobber has made open war upon the chain because it has frankly attempted to sup

3、plant him, and to independent retailer has often failed to recognize the decisive line of division between price merchandising and service merchandising.Every concern which ultimately markets its products to the consumer is vitally affected by the status of chain retailing; more particularly with th

4、e position which it will occupy in the future. The following pages contain a brief resume of the present chain store situation in the fields of retailing where it has become well established.Trends of developmentThe most rapid growth of the chain store has taken place in the grocery, drug, dry goods

5、, tobacco, and confectionery lines. It is essential to understand the reasons for this:1. The public demand in these lines is well defined; is not subject to great fluctuation in times of business depression; and in each case there is a “repeat market.”2. The articles handled fall mainly in the clas

6、s of necessities, or semi-necessities. That is, they are regarded as essential by a proportion of the market large enough to insure a steady demand.3. Because of the standard character of the stocks, and the broad demand, a high rate of turnover may be maintained, which allows the chain to make a sm

7、all but steady margin of profit at frequent intervals.4. Buying or purchasing is standardized and centralized at headquarters.5. Since articles are of small unit value, and not bulky or heavy, the chain store is able to operate on a cash and carry basis-a factor of great importance in chain store gr

8、owth.6. Merchandising is largely a matter of display and price advertising.7. Standardization of methods has made it possible to centralize management at headquarters and control member stores under managers who, while they may have a pecuniary interest in sales made by their stores, have nothing to

9、 say about the conducting of them.Our analytic focus in this paper is the geographic scope of pricing. Specifically, is it better for a chain-store retailer to set prices according to local market conditions(reflecting differences in cost, demand and competition) or set common prices that apply acro

10、ss all its stores, i.e. adopt a uniform pricing policy? Are likely firm decisions on this in line with consumer preferences? In contrast to the entry deterrence issue considered by Selten (1978), Milgrom and Roberts (1982) and Kreps and Wilson(1982), we look to see whether pricing policy, other than

11、 deterring entry, might instead be employed strategically to accommodate entry when it is inevitable. The geographic scope for pricing is a very real issue for multiple retailers. It is evident that in practice some chain-store groups adopt uniform pricing while others do not. In some sectors, all m

12、ultiple retailers price identically across their stores, e.g. UK electrical goods retailers (MMC, 1997a,b). While in other sectors, local pricing is practised to the extent that product prices might vary considerably from one store to another, e.g. the FTC found that for office supply superstores av

13、erage prices varied by as much 16% depending on the extent of local competition in the US. Moreover, this pricing policy distinction applies not just to different sectors but can apply within the same sector, e.g. amongst UK supermarkets where, of the leading fifteen groups, eight priced uniformly w

14、hile seven priced according to local conditions (Competition Commission, 2000). Yet, in these days of computer-based pricing systems, it can hardly be said that ticketing costs are high, or that local demand and cost conditions cannot be effectively gauged. Hence, choosing a uniform price must be se

15、en as a conscious act. Of course, uniform pricing might not be practicable when retailing costs are substantially different from one area to another. Nevertheless, for many multiple retailers both local and uniform pricing might be feasible but a choice has to be made on which to adopt. This leads t

16、o two questions, first why it might ever be preferable for the incumbent to impose a constraint on its own behaviour, and second the circumstances under which the constraint is desirable. Our key insight on the first question is as follows: A firm will find itself more under competition in some mark

17、ets than others. By practicing uniform pricing, it softens competition between itself and rival players. This entails setting a higher price in those markets subject to (more) competition, at the expense of lower prices in markets where it is not subject (or is less subject) to competition, compared

18、 with a practice of market-specific pricing. The higher price in turn makes the action one which rivals find attractive, so it does not require agreement. Thus if the markets under competition are important enough to the firm, its net gain is positive. Hence our papers prime focus is on the paramete

19、rs associated with the nature and intensity of competition that might influence this choice. There is some commonality in this issue with related questions on third-degree price discrimination in oligopoly (e.g. Holmes, 1989). More specifically, the issues raised here tie in with why oligopolistic f

20、irms would wish to limit or even entirely avoid price discrimination, e.g. Winter (1997) and Corts (1998), or adopt practices which provide the same outcome, notably contemporaneous MFC clauses, e.g. DeGraba (1987) and Besanko and Lyon (1993). There are obvious links between our paper and Corts (199

21、8) which also considers the question of uniform versus discriminatory pricing under duopoly (within a rather different framework). However, in Corts model, it turns out that it is usually not in a firms unilateral interest to practise uniform pricing. Therefore, where uniform pricing is profitable,

22、strategic commitments not to price discriminate are normally involved and hence discussion focuses on the form these might take. By contrast, within our framework, and for a specified range of parameters, we find that it is in the firms own interest not to discriminate and that uniform pricing arise

23、s as an equilibrium strategy. This is important, and provides a new insight, because it means that uniform pricing need not be accompanied by evidence of strategic commitment to that policy in order for it to be worthwhile and practised. 1. IntroductionOur result that firms can commonly be better of

24、f under a uniform pricing regime casts an interesting light on some other previous models. The result is not new - it was first encountered in Holmes (1989) “weak market-strong market” model of price discrimination in oligopoly. However, in their investigation of a model similar to Holmes, Armstrong

25、 and Vickers (2001) find that if a market is sufficiently competitive, profits always increase with discrimination. This leads them to conclude that “Holmes result that profits may fall with discrimination requires markets to be reasonably uncompetitive.” (p. 597). Our model shows this is not comple

26、tely true. In our framework, which in effect has a weak and a strong market, profits may fall with discrimination whatever the degree of competition. That is, however uncompetitive the market, uniform pricing can be profitable. What is required for this is each individual monopoly market, in our con

27、text, to be sufficiently large.To consider how different competitive conditions affect the scope-of-pricing decision, the model developed here has an incumbent monopoly chain-store operating across a finite number of local markets, analogous to Seltens well-known chain-store paradox analysis. Howeve

28、r, in contrast to Seltens framework, these local markets are assumed to differ in respect of the scale of consumer demand and this in turn affects entry conditions. There are two market types. In each of the larger, “affluent” markets, entry barriers are insufficient to prevent entry by a new, indep

29、endent rival. Yet, in smaller, less affluent markets the chain-store is taken to have a protected monopoly position(arising from natural or institutional barriers). In this setting, we show that a chain-store would not necessarily prefer to use local pricing as a profit-enhancing price discriminatio

30、n tool. Competitive conditions exist in the form of a region trading off the degree of substitutability between entrant and incumbents products and the degree to which duopoly markets are larger than monopoly markets. Under these conditions, the chain-store would prefer to commit to a policy of unif

31、orm pricing since this allows for softer competition in contested local markets and hence raises its aggregate profits. While the prospect of strategic accommodation through dampening price competition influences the preference between local or national pricing, a chain-stores choice is not inevitab

32、ly at variance with that preferred by society. In particular, a stores willingness to commit to national pricing can in certain circumstances not only enhance its profits but also raise social welfare if not consumer surplus. Yet market conditions commonly exist under which welfare would be adversel

33、y affected by the chain-store following its preferred choice. Although our model is undoubtedly specific, the results are considerably more general. Our general results are (1) that under a range of conditions including very competitive markets, uniform pricing is privately optimal both for incumben

34、t and entrant without co-ordination and (2) that enforcing uniform pricing where firms would prefer local pricing by no means necessarily advances social welfare. The significance of the first is that existing papers have concentrated heavily on co-ordinated action on uniform pricing. By contrast, p

35、olicy has often focused on whether firms practice uniform pricing, viewing this with approval, something in conflict with our second point. The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the analytical framework whereby an incumbent chain-store retailer faces certain entry i

36、n a (fixed) number of its local monopoly markets. As with the original Selten story, entry into such “contested” markets is, in each case, by an independent, non-affiliated local retailer. Section 3 then examines and compares the outcomes where the chain-store uses local pricing against where it ado

37、pts a uniform (national) pricing approach. Section 4 addresses consumer welfare considerations. Section 5 concludes the paper.2. The FrameworkFollowing Selten and others, we consider the situation of a chain-store retailer holding a monopoly position in a finite number of independent, local markets.

38、 In each market there is one potential entrant; should that firm enter, post-entry competition would be characterised by the Bertrand-Nash outcome in a duopoly pricing game. Complete information applies and it is assumed that the incumbent has no cost or demand advantage over the entrant, or vice ve

39、rsa. In this situation entry is inevitable in each local market when entry costs are low (at least when there is some minimal differentiation between the firms allowing for positive returns for the entrant) and when there are no institutional impediments such as planning restrictions that prevent ne

40、w stores being opened. However, if entry costs are substantial or there are no available sites then the local market is blockaded and entry does not occur. Our key departure from the previous literature is that we allow entry not be viable in all local markets. That is for the N markets originally h

41、eld by the chain-store we assume that M (<N) are blockaded or otherwise provide insufficient demand for two firms, but that the remainder C (= N M) can become “contested” by virtue of becoming local duopolies. The relevance of this assumption will become apparent from the analysis. We have a two-

42、stage game, depicted in Figure 1. In the first stage, each entrant simultaneously decides whether or not to enter; we illustrate with only two markets and potential entrants. Then in the second stage, the incumbent decides pricing policy whether to practice local (L) or uniform (U) pricing. There is

43、 no commitment stage. The equilibrium concept is subgame perfection. Hence, in determining its move, the entrant (e.g. E1) knows the payoffs facing the incumbent (I), as its aggregated profits (PI); knows that the incumbent will choose the path that is the more profitable. However, because an entran

44、t does not know how many other entrants will enter for certain (given simultaneous entry moves), it will not necessarily know whether the incumbent will practise local or uniform pricing.Source: Paul W. Dobson and Michael Waterson, April 2003“Chain-Store Pricing for Strategic Accommodation” The univ

45、ersity of warwick Department of Economica in its series The Wateick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) with number 677, PP.1-4.譯文：連鎖店的定價策略市場環境的變動對連鎖店的分布而言是主要因素之一。這樣，很明顯的它也引起制造商、零售商 、連鎖店的關注。因而已成為爭論的主體，或受到指責,成為沒完沒了的討論主體。制造商會對充分利用連鎖店系統作為出口的政策有些猶豫，因為他的這一欲望會違反成員間的定期的規律性分配。由于連鎖店想要取代零售店，因而他們之間的戰爭已經開始

46、，并且對獨立的零售商來講很難從價格商品銷售和服務的銷售活動中認識到自己的不足之處。每個關心最終市場的產品給消費者都會受到連鎖店狀態重大的影響；特別是未來將會占有的分布情況。本文以下的內容包括一個簡短的摘要以說明目前連鎖店在連鎖業領域的發展情況以及它將會有什么樣好的建設。發展趨勢連鎖店的快速增長發生在雜貨店、藥物、干貨、煙草和糖果行。經過了解至關重要的原因如下：1.在這些行業中有很好的公共需求；不受經濟不景氣的時候業務的抑制；每次有大波動的情況下，會有一個“重復”的市場。2.文章討論的主題主要是立足于必需品和半必需品這類產品。這就是說，它們被認為是基本的市場中所占比例足夠大以確保穩定的需求。3.

47、由于存貨的標準特征，為儲備和廣泛的需求保持了很高的流動比率，從而允許連鎖店是一個小規模但具有穩定的盈利的單位。4. 購買或購買標準化,集中在總部。5.盡管本文是從小單位價值而不是大的方面來描述，但連鎖店能夠起到操縱市場現金，對連鎖店的成長起到了重要的基礎作用。6. 購貨很大程度上是一種展示和價格廣告。7.標準化的方法有可能集中在總部的管理和控制下的商店經理人手中，然而毫無疑問的他們或許會在商店銷售中會受到罰款。1.介紹本章分析的重點是地域定價范圍。具體地說,是零售商連鎖店如何更好地根據當地市場條件制定價格(反映不同的成本、需求和競爭)或在所有申請的店面里建立同樣的價格,即采用一個統一的定價政策

48、。公司做這個決定是否會符合消費者的喜好?和澤爾滕 (1978)、爾格羅姆和羅伯茨 （1982 年） 和科瑞普和威爾遜(1982) 提出的各種威懾問題相比，我們想看看在否定價格政策上的其他威懾條目, 可能會在相反的時候使用,以適應戰略上不可避免的要求。對多數零售商而言地域范圍的價格是很實際的問題。實際上這是很明顯的,是某連鎖企業組隊采用統一的定價,但另外一些卻不會這么做。在某些領域,所有的多個零售商的價格一致,例如在英國零售商的商店，然而在其他的行業,當地的基本定價從一家商店到另一家在產品價格上可能相差很大,公平貿易委員會發現,對于辦公用品的超市平均價格的修改,有多達16%取決于在美國本地競爭的

49、程度各不相同。此外,這種價格政策不僅適用于區別不同部門申請而且也適用于在相同的部門, 例如在英國超級市場的位置，十五個主導牌子的商品的八個價格統一而其他的七個的定價則根據當地條件（競爭委員會 2000年)。然而, 基于計算機的定價系統的今天，可以幾乎說成是票務成本很高，或本地需求和成本條件不能有效地衡量。因此，選擇一個統一的價格必須看作是一種有意識的行為。當然,當零售成本從一個地方到另一個地方還是完全不同的時候，統一的定價這一行為是不可行的。不過,對于很多零售商來說自行定價和統一定價或許可以行得通,不過要在其采用上做出的一種選擇。這會導致出現兩個問題, 首先為什么它可能永遠受現任征收而抑制自己

50、的行為,其次在某些情況下約束是可取的。我們對第一個問題的關鍵性認知如下：一個公司將會發現自己在市場競爭中會比其他的公司有優勢。通過實踐統一定價, 會使其與競爭對手之間的競爭關系變得緩和。這就意味著在那些競爭激烈的市場中更要樹立比較高的價格,與那些特定市場的定價的做法相比，使較低的價格不受市場競爭的影響。反過來看更高的價格會使其競爭對手更具有吸引力,所以它不需要協議。因此判斷是否足夠重要的是該公司在市場競爭條件下,其公司凈收益是正的。所以本文的主要重點是競爭的性質與競爭的激烈性，以及可能會影響這種選擇的有關參數。在寡頭壟斷就這一問題上三度價格歧視會有一些共性(例如霍姆斯，1989年)。更具體地說

51、，為什么寡頭公司在這里提出配合問題，想限制甚至完全避免價格上的歧視，例如溫特 (1997)和 柯爾 （1998 年）， 為采取的做法提供了相同的結果，尤其是同期的 MFC 條款，如迪格林顧爾拜（1987 年） 和 班思科和里昂 (1993 年)。很明顯的，本文和 霍爾茨（1998 年） 也認為統一的問題與價格歧視在寡頭壟斷之間的存在聯系。然而，在霍爾茨的模型中，原來它通常不是一個公司的單方面利益實行統一定價。因此，實行統一的定價是盈利的,承諾不價格歧的戰略通常視為涉及這些可采取的形式。相比之下,在我們的框架中,指定了參數的整定范圍,我們就會發現它是在公司的自身的利益下不歧視和統一定價而產生一個平衡的策略。提供了新的研究思路是重要的,因為這個政策意味著統一定價不用伴隨戰略承諾的證據,以便它值得去實行。我們的結果顯示與先前的模型相比，一般企業在統一定價政策下可以做的更好。這個結果并不是最新的，第一次是在福爾摩斯的(1989)“軟弱市場、較強市場價格歧視”模式的寡頭壟斷的市場中被提及。然而,在他們的調查一個類似于福爾摩斯的模型中,阿姆斯特朗和維(2001)發現,如果市場是充分競爭的、價格歧視的利潤始終是增加的。這導致